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Executive Summary 
 
The main aim of the present work is to contribute enriching the existing literature on 
the main factors influencing the accountability level of public and private sector 
organizations. Two main points which make original the present work are: i) the 
exploration the field of International Intergovernmental Organizations, which is 
relatively unexplored by the managerial literature and the organizational studies; ii) 
the treatment of contingency and legitimacy frameworks as complementary and 
sometimes alternative, rather than opposite approaches to explaining differences in 
the level of disclosure. 
In the present work we proceeded in the following way: in the first chapter we set the 
context of the international organizations, clarifying the difference between 
international NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations; we tried to categorize the 
I(G)Os consistently with different families which can be identified in relation to their 
operational nature, their membership and other relevant characteristics. We then 
explained our interest for the United Nations system in the light of the significant 
attention given by previous literature and of the peculiarities of this system, which 
make it a unique object of observation within the IOs population. The identification of 
the UN system as objective of observation allowed us to explain in depth the basic 
elements of the functioning and governance systems of these organizations, the 
understanding of whose is fundamental for the analysis which followed.  
In chapter two we provided an overview of the governance and managerial reforms 
of the UN system; while a great attention has been given to the first, despite their 
scarce success to date, managerial reforms have been until recent largely 
understudied. Since the late 90s’ though these reforms attracted growing attention by 
practictioners and literature. We consequently reviewed the most significant elements 
of the managerial reforms at the UN system level, with a particular attention to the 
role played by the issue of transparency and accountability. In this chapter we 
pointed out the main aspects of the managerial reforms related to accountability, and 
in particular: i) the current transition to the IPSAS; ii) the methodological consistency 
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among organizations of the budgeting and reporting for extra-budgetary projects and 
the progressive implementation to the result based management and reporting. All 
these three aspects are equally important, but, how we explained, the focus of the 
present study has been on the last mentioned aspect, judged as the most significant 
in the perspective of the transition from a traditional model of accountability -input 
and compliance based- to a performance based model of accountability.  
In the first two chapter we hence set the context and focused the object of our study: 
the performance-related accountability dynamics of the UN system organizations.  
In the third chapter we identified and analysed the theoretical perspective of the 
present work and we developed the relevant hypothesis which have been tested in 
the empirical part of the study.  
We first identified the theoretical frameworks most commonly used by the existing 
international literature related to accountability in public and private sector 
organziations -decision usefulness, positive accounting theory, political economy 
theory, stakeholder theory. contingency theory and legitimacy theory. We noted that 
these frameworks are often strictly interrelated and complementary and we selected 
two frameworks which seems to be the most frequently used by the organizational 
studies focused on accountability, the contingency and the legitimacy frameworks. 
These are very broad theoretical constructs, grounded on political economy 
framework and the systemic (or “open system”) view of the organization. We 
consequently reviewed the development of these theories, their main assumptions, 
the criticisms moved to them and the specific use of these theories in the accounting 
literature.  
This review showed us that the two selected theories can be usefully considered as 
complementary and sometimes alternative in explaining accountability features, 
rather than opposite, as considered by a large body of literature. In this sense, we 
combined the constructs of both theories to develop our hypotheses regarding the 
factors potentially affecting the accountability features of UN system organizations.  
We identified three main categories of factors potentially influencing organizational 
accountability: organizational factors (resource availability, complexity, 
decentralization, financial performance as capacity to attract resources or to 
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effectively use availabile resources), corporate governance factors (presence of 
warranty mechanisms for stakeholders, accessibility for them to the executive 
organs, concentration of contributions and bargaining power) and external factors 
(environmental uncertainty, market dependence, prevailing activity of the 
organization). Consistently with the previous contingency and legitimacy literature, for 
each of these factors we hypothesized a positive or negative influence on the 
financial and/or non financial accountability level to be tested.  
Chapter four explains the methodological approach we used to analyse UN system 
organziations’ reporting documents, accountability levels and relations with 
influencing factors. The main methods analyzed in this chapter are: i) 
operationalisation of the factors considered relevant in affecting accountability in the 
environment of international organizations; ii) identification of the target international 
organizations’ population to be analysed and the specific method of analysis; iii) 
selection of the reporting documents suitable for the analysis; iv) development of a 
checklist to analyse the contents of reporting documents, based on the literature on 
disclosure and accountability indices; v) use of cluster analysis as main tool for 
interpretation of data. 
Chapter 5 presents the main results of the empirical study: the first paragaph 
describes the distribution and the main statistical data of the independent variables of 
the study and their reciprocal linear correlation. It is for example worthed to notice 
that larger organizations are also the more complex and decentralized, and that the 
more exposed is the organization to environmental uncertainty, the more it is 
dependent on the market of voluntary contributions. These data contribuetes to a 
greater understanding of the considerations developed in the second paragraph, 
which took into consideration the single hypotheses developed in chapter three. By 
the results of the data analysis, we draw the general conclusion that between 
contingency and legitimacy theory it cannot be identified a clearly prevailing 
framework to explain the accountability differences among UN system organizations’. 
The two theories are concurring at explaining different aspects of the UN 
organizations’ accountability. In some cases,accountability seems driven by 
contingent elements –i.e. resource availability and level of decentralization seem to 
lead to a greater financial accountability- while in other cases it is at least in part due 
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to the seach of legitimacy by the organizations –i.e. organizations with larger 
barganing power disclose more information consistently with a long term strategy to 
legitimize and maintain consensus-.  
Nonetheless, contingency approach seems to be relatively stronger as explaining 
rationale then legitimacy; linking this result to the broader context of the study, 
managerial reforms and “rational” reactions to contingent internal and external factors 
seem relatively more suitable to explain variations in UN organizations’ accountability 
than factors linked to the search for legitimacy towards the main stakeholders. This 
evidence can be interpreted as a sign of the fact that UN organizations react and 
adapt to their environmental dynamics improving their accountability, rather than 
putting in action cosmetic strategies to respond to social and stakeholders’ claims. 
The category showing more verified hypothesis is represented by the external 
factors, followed by the internal factors, while the corporate factors quite 
unexpectedly seem less relevant in explaining differences among organizations in 
the accountability level. The most sensitive accountability dimension to the identified 
influencing factors seems by large to be the financial one, which also shows the more 
significant variantions among agencies.  
Implications of the study are both on the theoretical and the practical side; on the first 
side, further research can be conducted based on our results, for example refining 
the parameters used to operationalise the influencing factors, modifying the 
accountability checklist in relation to new developments in the performance reporting 
of the organizations or enlarging the panel of organizations/the historical series of the 
considered data. In the perspective of professionals, the present study can represent 
a point of reference for managers willing to confront their performance reports with 
other organization’s to improve their level of accountability or to re-design relevant 
contents. In a system wide perspective, this work can be a starting point to 
homogenize languages and tools for performance reporting, improving the overall 
transparency and consistency of the system as a whole. 
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Chapter 1  
Defining the Objective of Analysis: International Organizations and 
United Nations System 
 
The present chapter sets the context of the whole work and presents an overview 
and analysis of some definitions and concepts related to international organizations: 
the difference between international “inter-governmental” and “non-governmental” 
organizations (INGOs and IOs) and the identification of various “families” of IOs. The 
choice of the UN system as objective of observation of the present work is explained 
and the main elements and peculiarities of such system of are described. Concepts 
regarding the functioning and governance system analyzed in the last part of the 
present chapter are fundamental for the understanding of the main elements of the 
empirical study developed in the following chapters.  
 
1.1 International Organizations: basis for a common understanding 
1.1.1 International Organizations: Basis for a Terminological Understanding 
International Organizations (IOs) is a generic term which can represent two main kind 
of organizations: Intergovernmental Organizations (known as IGOs) and International 
Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs). Usually, the multinational companies are 
excluded from the IOs group. The main element of differentiation between IGOs and 
INGOs appears to be the governance system or the “ownership” of these 
organizations: if IGOs’ constituencies are national states (and more recently 
supranational institutions, such as the European Union), the INGOs’ constituencies 
are private subjects, individuals, companies, other non profit organizations, etc. For 
example, a typical IGO is the World Health Organization, which is a UN specialized 
agency constituted by two main governing bodies, the General Assembly and the 
executive board, where representatives of member states are sitting and politically 
running the organization. An example of INGO is Medicins Sans Frontiers, (MSF), 
which is participated by several national physicians’ unions, professionals as 
individuals and health protection organizations all around the globe. The distinction 
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between IGOs and INGOs based on this criteria is apparently simple but not always 
unequivocal. On one side, National Ministries often participate in INGOs in their 
public capacity, operating through them some of their sectoral foreign policies. For 
example, the UICC (International Union Against Cancer) is participated –and 
governed- by a mix of private companies and heath ministries of developed countries 
and operates in the area of cancer prevention, detection and early diagnosis in a very 
similar fashion with the Technical Cooperation Agencies such as WHO. On the other 
side, in this case participation by governments does not mean “ownership”, which 
would quality these organizations as IGOs, but rather funding and collaboration.  
On another page, IGOs could be defined in terms of the “public” nature of the 
organization’s mandate towards the international community. In other words, usually 
international organizations’ mandates have been agreed within the community of the 
national states, giving to their action a sort of legitimacy in the international law 
settings. For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received 
the mandate to protect displaced people and refugees internally and out of the origin 
country. This gives to the organization the so called “extra-territorial” powers. On the 
other hand, there are some INGOs which benefits as well from these kind of powers: 
the best suited example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
which has been entitled by the Geneva Convention on war and armed conflicts to 
supervise the respect of the accord between the conflicting parties and the right to 
intervene in protection of the civilian in the war zones. The ICRC is formally an 
INGOs even if it substantially plays the role of an Intergovernmental Organisation. 
The present work adopts the definition of IGOs based on the principle of national 
states’ ownership of the governance structure of an organization and in what follows 
for simplicity uses the generic term IOs to indicate the IGOs. 
 
1.1.2 Families of International Organizations  
In the common language, it is really common to associate the expression 
“International Organizations” with the United Nations family. However, taking into 
consideration the tassonomy of IOs in Tables 1.2-1.4, Appendix 1, there are several 
families of IOs and even if there is not a common understating of their classification 
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and some sort of overlapping is inevitable, it is possible to identify at least five main 
types of organizations: 
− The organizations of the United Nation systems; 
− The Bretton Woods institutions; 
− The international financial institutions; 
− The supra-national organizations; 
− The organizations administering regional and sectoral intergovernmental 
agreements. 
The organizations of the United Nations system can be classified in three main 
categories: United Nations Secretariat-related; Founds and Programmes, Specialized 
Agencies. These three categories differ mainly in terms of governance mechanisms 
and level of independence from the central UN representative bodies (General 
Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Security Council), which will be further 
explored in the next paragraph. The system has been growing constantly since its 
foundation and currently counts nearly thirty organizations.  
The Bretton Woods (BW) institutions, -the World Bank group (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)-, got their label from 
the system of international monetary management, which established the rules for 
commercial and financial relations amongst the world's major industrial states, being 
the first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern monetary 
relations among independent nation-states. The Bretton Woods’ financial system 
formally died in the 1970’s, with the abolishment of the golden standard system, but 
since several trade agreements and financial system rules related to that system still 
exist and are administered by these institutions, this category of organizations could 
still be considered as existing. 
The group of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is mainly formed by 
regionally based organizations -African Development Bank (AfDB); Asian 
Development Bank (ADB); Caribbean Development Bank (CDB); European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)-. 
and some global membership institutions, such as the International Fund for 
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Agricultural Development and IFAD. IMF and WB could be considered as part of the 
IFIs’ family as well- 
These institutions’ main purpose is to promote development through lending to 
national governments and other public entities in beneficiary countries, providing 
public value through a facilitated pay-back system and a technical cooperation 
service to secure fair and knowledge-based fund utilization. IFIs are usually funded 
by the most prominent development countries (from CEB data issued in 2005 the 
OECD countries cover from 70 to 80% of the overall fund of IFIs) and their funds are 
periodically replenished to sustain special conditions granted to the least developed 
countries and to protect the financial soundness of organizations from lenders’ 
defaults.  
The main characteristic of the supra-national institutions is to be considered a further 
level of government to which the national governments pass over some sovereign 
functions or powers. These institutions are the only ones with a legislative power 
directly impacting on the domestic law system. The most suitable example of 
supranational institution is the European Union; in particular, with the creation of the 
monetary union the member states gave up their ownership on monetary policies to 
the Central European Bank administering the Euro area policies as a whole. 
Sometimes the supranational institutions are opposed to and considered stronger 
than the other IOs because, while in their case states accept to put another level of 
governance above them, the other organizations do not have any overarching power 
on member states but are neutral organizations operating at their same level in the 
international arena. 
A residual category of IOs can be then identified covering a wide spectrum of 
sectoral and regional agreements: several organizations can be for example found in 
the trade area (NAFTA, MERCOSUR), and in the security area (NATO, OCSE, etc.). 
These organizations are usually in charge of the administration, monitoring and 
advancement of the constituting agreements, and their main function is to support the 
member states in coping with the existing commitments and negotiating new 
arrangements and to report periodically on the functioning and the respect of the 
agreements.  
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As mentioned, the proposed classification presents some physiological overlapping, 
inherent to the very nature of the IOs: for example, WB is a BW institution and an IFIs 
at the same time, WTO is a BW institution and an agreement administering 
institution; IFAD is part of the UN family but at the same time is one of the global IFIs.  
Moreover, this classification should be taken as a first attempt to identify some main 
families of IOs but cannot be fully exhaustive since it is always possible to find 
alternative criteria to classify the international organization.  
For example, according to their scope and membership, it is possible to subdivide 
IOs in different families: there are institutions, which serve as political forums for 
countries to meet and discuss common issues (i.e. UN, WTO, ITC, UNCHR); there 
are organizations which are in charge of researching and providing training, 
information and standards (UNEP, ITU, ICAO, UNITAR); there are those responsible 
of building capacity and promote development (UNIDO); there are the emergency 
agencies, reacting to crisis or natural disasters (UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP); there are 
institutions, which serve as lenders to other nations in difficulties (regional and global 
IFIs), there are institutions which act as financial intermediaries towards 
implementing agencies and INGOs (UNDP). This is again only a partial classification 
of IOs and some overlapping is possible: i.e. UNDP is at the same time a 
development cooperation agency and a financial intermediary for the UN system, 
WFP acts at the cross line between food emergency and agricultural development.  
A further possible way to classify IOs is according to their structural and institutional 
nature: in particular, according to the rationalist theory (Koremenos and others 2001) 
the IOs could be differentiated in relation to their level of “centralization” between 
Institutions and Organizations. Institutions are a set of rules and agreements without 
a centralised structure or with an essential staff which support the constituencies in 
their negotiations and administration of the agreements. Organisation are 
characterized by the presence of a formal (centralised) structure dedicated to 
international agreement management, to delivery of service or public goods. 
All these possible classifications are valid and at the same time cannot be considered 
completely exhaustive; the observer will identify the most suitable one from time to 
time, depending on the scope and specific aim of the observation. 
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1.2 The Choice of the United Nations System as Objective of Investigation  
Having clarified the several ways under which is possible to classify the IOs, the 
present work takes into consideration the first proposed classification as the most 
suitable for our purposes. In particular, among the five identified families of IOs the 
present work takes into account the United Nations System family. For the purpose 
of this work, the UN family appears to be the more interesting to take into 
consideration for a number of reasons which will be further discussed in Chapter 4: 
− A consolidated stream of managerial reforms, envisaged since late eighties 
and initiated in the middle of the nineties; 
− The number of existing studies, researches and official documents about the 
United Nation system and its governance and managerial reforms; 
− The recognized nature of “system” of this group of organizations: the concept 
of United Nations system has always been in place but in the last decade has 
become more and more important in parallel with the progressive growth of 
the number of organizations and the increasing competition for the voluntary 
resources donated by constituencies for determinate projects (the so called 
“extra-budgetary resources”); 
− The variety of core operations among organizations, balanced by the 
homogeneity of the basic functioning rules and procedures. 
 
1.2.1. The Significance of UN System in the Previous International Literature 
on IOs 
Focusing on the second point, it should be noticed that UN system organizations are 
by far the most investigated object in the previous international literature on IOs’ 
functioning and reforms. These have been interested by various streams of literature, 
with a strong prevalence of the political scientists. In particular, the international 
relations scholars studied these organizations in relation to their very nature, their 
autonomy and the dependence upon the member states; while “liberalists” (Russet 
and Oneal, 2001) and “rationalists” (i.e. Jacobson H. 1984, Koremenos and others, 
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2001) state the space for an autonomous identity and policy making by these 
organizations, encouraged by the most recent governance reforms, “realists” 
consider these institutions as branch of the foreign policies of the most powerful 
states, based on the power and conflicts paradigms (Mershmeier, 1994). In 
particular, some political scientists have been studied the IOs with reference to the 
extent to which the individual goals of the constituencies are able to influence the 
governance patterns and rules (Rhodes 2000, Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 
2004, Rosenau, 2000) while other scholars focused on the power dependence on the 
decision making of multilateral institutions such as the IOs (Ritchcie, 1995; Rahaman, 
1998, Gordenker and Weiss 1995). An interesting review of the different approaches 
offered by the political scientists is offered by Rojas, 2000.   
Political scientists have been also studied the IOs under the game theory 
perspective, with particular reference to the governance of the negotiations and the 
role of IOs in mediating information asymmetries between negotiating parties, in 
mitigating moral hazard and in turning “dilemma’s prisoners” situation into successful 
collaborative games (Dupont, 1994; Lax and Sebenius, 1991).  
Macroeconomists usually try to understand how the presence and activity of IOs can 
influence the international economy, the trade exchange among countries and the 
level and distribution of development (Lele and Gerrard, 2003; Thomas, 2004; 
Swamy, 2004).  
Finally institutional theorists approached some issues related to civil society-
business-government relations (Keim, 2003) and agency theorists explores the 
different tiers and the various delegation and responsibility enforcement mechanisms 
governing the IOs (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989, Buchanan & Stubblebine, 1962; Caves, 1990).  
Only recently, some authors have embraced organizational theories, and in particular 
managerial approaches, to study IOs. Among them, the stakeholder theory (initiated 
by Freeman, 1984) is particularly diffused even if it generally considers the IOs as 
one of the major stakeholders of multinational companies or NGOs in the policy 
making processes or in the companies’ strategies and they are rarely taken into 
consideration as the nexus of the stakeholder relationships. According to such 
studies, IOs are considered as stakeholders of multinational business companies 
 20
affecting their exchange transactions, their power dependencies, their legitimacy 
degree and other claims (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997, 
Forster & Snyder, 1989; Hill, 1992; Van de Walle, 2002). To them (accountees) 
companies (accountors) have an accountability obligation to fulfill. In other cases, IOs 
are considered within the spectrum of INGOs advocacy and technical cooperation 
activity, as means or institutional tool but also as “regulator” (Eibrahim, 2003) 
The present works will observe the IOs under the organizational theories’ 
perspective, contributing to strengthen a relatively unexplored approach for the study 
of this kind of organizations. 
 
 
1.2.2. The Relevance of the “UN System”  
Regarding the third item cited above and in light of the IOs’ classification exercise, it 
should be at first noticed that the UN system is the largest recognizable group or 
“family” of international organizations. In relation to the other possible aggregations of 
IOs, the organizations of the UN system share common governance patterns, similar 
funding and membership arrangements, have a decision making mechanism 
generally based on consensus, share a common charter and are formally committed 
to contribute to the same objectives and missions.  
Secondly, the UN system can be considered as a significant and autonomous 
dimension of analysis by itself. Significant efforts recently put on gaining consistency 
and unity of the system as a whole given the growing –and not always fair- 
competition for resources and visibility among UN agencies. As chronological note, at 
the 2005 World Summit in New York, the Secretary-General has established a High-
level Panel to explore how the UN System could work more coherently and 
effectively across the world in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance 
and the environment1. 
The study was intended to lay the groundwork for a fundamental restructuring of the 
United Nations operational work, complementing other major reform initiatives 
currently under way at the United Nations system level, including the creation of a 
                                                 
1 See High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence at http://www.un.org/events/panel/index.html 
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new Peacebuilding Commission, the negotiations over the establishment of a new 
Human Rights Council and a proposal for comprehensive management reform. 
As a result to its mandate, the High-level, produced in 2006 a report called “Delivery 
as One”. 
This report mainly consists of a set of recommendation, based on the following five 
strategic directions (United Nations, 2006): 
− Coherence and consolidation of UN activities, in line with the principle of 
country ownership at all levels (country, regional, headquarter); 
− Establishment of appropriate governance, managerial and funding mechanism 
to empower and support consolidation, and link the performance and results of 
UN organizations to funding; 
− Renovation of business practices of the UN system to ensure focus on 
outcomes, responsiveness to needs and delivery of results by the UN system; 
− Creation of significant further opportunities for consolidation and effective 
delivery of One UN through a profound review of the field presence and 
coordination mechanisms of the implementing agencies; 
− Urgency in the implementation, without mismanagement and bad planning 
efforts that could compromise permanent and effective change. 
 
More recently, the recommendations of the panel have started to be put in place as 
pilot projects under the coordination of the UNDG development group, testing in eight 
countries how the UN family – with its many and diverse agencies -- can deliver in a 
more coordinated way at country level. The label of the project, “One UN”, stands for 
one budget, one country office and one staff body for all the UN agencies involved in 
the field and its final objective is to ensure faster and more effective development 
operations and to accelerate progress towards the achievement of the so called, 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)2. 
                                                 
2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of 8 main objects set in 2000 by 194 States, 
UN Organizations and Bretton Woods Organisations, which embody “a concerted attack against the 
poverty and the problems of illiteracy, hunger, discrimination against women, unsafe water and 
degraded environment” (see www.un.org/millenniumgoals). 
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Moreover, relevant efforts have been putting in place in the harmonization of the 
business practices as well, in several areas such as HR management, accounting 
and accountability system, information technology for development, mainly by an 
interagency body called Chief Executive Board for Coordination, through its High 
Level Committee on Management HLCM).  
Further insights on the accountability area will be offered later but the main message 
for this paragraph is that the significance of UN system as object of observation relies 
on the tendency to create a coordinate system of organizations strictly integrated on 
programme and service delivery and homogeneous in relation to their operations, 
practices and procedures. This makes the UN system a unique environment to study 
the coordination and change processes related to management reforms in the IOs 
arena. 
 
 
1.3 The United Nations System: an Overview 
1.3.1 The Architecture of the United Nations System 
Until now the United Nations system has been described as a “black box”. It is now 
important to draw a picture of the overall architecture of the system in order to 
understand the specificities of each part of the system. 
It is worthwhile to notice that in this overview we are interested to explore the 
differences between the different organizations composing the UN system rather 
than to describe the various operative and governing bodies, their roles and 
capabilities.  
The United Nations System (Picture 1) It is formed by six principal organs of 
governance: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, 
the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat and the Economic and Social 
Council, which is the main body taking care of the development issues. 
Highly connected to the main governing bodies of the UN System3, and in particular 
to the General Assembly (UNGA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
                                                 
3 See United Nations System of Organizations at http://www.unsystem.org/  
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are the Funds and Programmes, such the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). They receive the regular funds directly to the 
UNGA and receive strategic directions from this organ and from the ECOSOC, to 
whom report directly at the end of each biennium, which is the regular administrative 
period of these organizations. 
Originally, the main difference between Funds and Programmes is that the first ones 
have been linked to a specific Fund, while usually the programmes are more 
differentiated and fragmented in terms of source of funding and areas of 
implementation. This difference appears not relevant anymore, since for example the 
UNICEF administers nowadays more than 200 trust funds open by single states, 
groups of them or private donors. 
Both Funds and Programmes are to some extent dependent on the UN Secretary as 
well. In particular, this organ is the administrative branch of the UNGA and 
coordinates some important administrative and support central services. 
On the contrary, connections between the governing bodies of the UN and the fifteen 
specialized agencies are more untied. In fact, these organizations are fully 
independent from the UNGA and are not necessarily bounded by the decision of the 
ECOSOC. They receive political inputs by their own representative organs (usually 
called General Assemblies or Conferences) and they are linked to the “institutional” 
part of the system through special protocols which includes the mandate and the 
activities of the Specialized agencies within the broader spectrum of the UN charter 
and prohibit the competition with the other UN system organizations. Specialised 
agencies born as the truly operative bodies of the system in the economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health and related fields. The majority of the Agencies born in 
the 60s’ and 70s’, in parallel with the quantitative growth of the system (UNIDO, 
UNESCO, etc.), others of the International Labour Organization and the Universal 
Postal Union- are older than the UN itself and chose later to join the system. 
More in general, in most of the coordination and common policies there is a constant 
and significant tension between the institutional part of the system (UN, UN 
Secretariat, Funds and Programmes) and the Specialised Agencies; while the first 
one try to impose their role as leading and “core” part of the system, the second ones 
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struggle to demonstrate their programmatic and operational independency and their 
superior efficiency and effectiveness on the field. 
Picture 1.1 shows the overall architecture of the UN system.. 
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Picture 1.1 The Architecture and Composition of the United Nations System 
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1.3.2 The Peculiar Nature of the United Nations Organizations 
One of the main debates in the management literature and among practitioners deals with 
the necessity to tailor the managerial practices and tools around different kind of 
organisations.  
Drawing from the relevant literature (Lee, Brewster 2003, 2004; Schneider, Barsoux, 2003; 
Bauer, Knill 2007) some of the main specificities of IOs relevant for the management 
practice design and implementation, which are explored further in the following paragraphs 
can be summarized as follows: 
− International nature: UN organizations are truly international organisations, usually 
with no home base and with large proportions of their employees at Headquarters 
being expatriates to the country in which the HQ is located. The HQ is usually 
proper of the hosting country (i.e. the well known Swiss culture of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross) while the field is dominated at the grass root level by 
the local culture; the HQ is closer to the bureaucratic and political centres of power 
while the field has a more operative and practical and interventionist perspective 
(Box 1 offers some quantitative evidences of the underlined dynamics). 
Consequently, there is usually a lack of a consistent and unified organizational 
culture and there is the strong possibility to experience severe conflicts between the 
organizational cultures of an organization at the HQ and in the field. 
− Peculiarity of the “mission” and absence of a single bottom line: IOs, as well as 
other public sector organizations, have not the profit maximisation as an objective; 
management of financial resources is critical but more as a mean than as an end. 
These organizations have broad missions concerned with alleviating hunger or 
poverty; providing medical support in times of crisis; controlling nuclear science; 
establishing internationally accepted rules, or a thousand other socially and ethically 
desirable purposes. This makes complex to define and to measure performances of 
the organizations as a whole and more complex to judge the contribution given to 
them by individuals and groups. 
− Politically driven organisations: these organizations have a public character: they 
are either intergovernmental organisations, or publicly and visibly managed NGOs. 
The effect is that these organizations are -with a large or a small “P”- politically 
managed. Without the simple “bottom line” measure, even the balance of objectives 
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within these organizations is subject of political negotiation (Handy, 1988; Hind, 
1995). 
− Centrality of values: personnel operating in these organizations is motivated by 
ethical and moral values more than by money. The relevant presence of volunteers 
and of NGOs staff collaborating with the UN agencies in the field accentuate this 
character. The co-presence of professionals and volunteers may for example make 
more difficult the implementation of some managerial tools such as the result-based 
management. 
− Clashes between political, professional and technical rationales: at the top level UN 
organizations are run by political personnel, representatives of their own countries’ 
interests; at the same time, the day by day management is held by professionals 
and line managers whose mindset is grounded in the respective technical areas 
(healthcare, engineering, psychology, etc.). When it comes in particular to the 
technical personnel, a variety of distinctive professional cultures needs to be 
accommodated, managed and controlled. Yet it is not unusual for the imperatives 
associated with any one of these different professional cultures to be diametrically 
opposed to those exhibited by other professional cultures present in the 
organisation at the same time (Bruce, 1998). Distinctive professional cultures found 
in these organizations are those of a) professionals directly involved in service 
provision (medical, nursing, social welfare professionals); b) professionals 
associated with a marketing, fundraising, sales and public relations alignment; c) 
policy prescription experts (development professionals, policy analysts and 
campaigners) and d) professionals commonly associated with administrative and 
general management. It is common to find each of these distinctive professional 
cultures existing side by side within international organisations. The presence of 
these three distinct rationales and mindset can create problems since concretely 
there is not a clear hierarchy among them in the real management of the IOs. 
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BOX 1.1 – A quantitative analysis of the UN system staff 
Tables 1-5 show the quantitative and qualitative profile of the United Nations System staff and is 
useful to understand the international nature of the IOs and its possible impacts on management 
practices (data from CEB Secretariat, 2005). 
Staff by Location 
 
Staff by Level 
 
Staff by Source of Funding 
 
Staff by Level and Years of Service 
 
Staff by Nationality – Top 10 State Donors and Other OECD Members 
 
 
Other OECD 
Countries
# Empl.
Austria 1080
Developing 
Countries
# Empl.
Philippines 1488
Kenya 1442
India 1414
Ethiopia 1090
 29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOX 1.1 (continues) 
The relative majority of UN staff (51%) is allocated in Regional and Country Offices other than in the HQ 
(41%); the rest of personnel is directly allocated in field projects (8%). Looking at the gender balance in 
terms of geographical allocation, it can be noticed that there is a relative prevalence of women in HQ and of 
men in decentralized offices and on projects. Here the percentage of “local” people tends to be much higher 
than in HQ, due to the direct involvement in service delivery. The more common situation in country offices 
and in the field projects is to have expatriates as project or programme manager (92% of professional and 
91% of Directors are expatriates) and as professionals with the “local” people employed as general staff.  
Under the professional qualification perspective, UN staff can be divided in three main categories: General 
Staff (assistants and administrative staff), Professionals (P1-P5 in relation to work experience, technical and 
professional experience and other parameters), and Directors (D1-D2-UG in relation to the position 
covered). There is a significant imbalance in favor of men in the higher positions of the organizations, while 
women cover General Staff positions in a higher percentage. 
As far as the length of service is concerned, a high percentage of short term experience staff in particular 
among the Professionals (49% of people with less than 5 years of service), in particular in the lower 
positions (P1-P3) and in the field, while among the General Staff and the Directors, especially at the HQ, a 
longer average length of service can be noticed. 
As previously mentioned, the low average length of service can be well explained by the escalation of the 
“extra-budgetary” resources, voluntary resources given by single or groups of member states for a limited 
amount of time for specific projects. The UN staff currently paid under voluntary contributions, which is in a 
higher percentage “local”, allocated on the field and “temporary” hired (usually 2 years) is quantitatively 
higher than the staff permanently hired and paid with ordinary resources or “regular budget” (54% versus 
46%).  
The national origin of staff is the last parameter taken into consideration; surprisingly enough, there is not a 
significant direct relation between the amount of States’ contribution and the nationality of staff: two over ten 
top donors of United Nations –Australia and China- have less than 700 representatives while three 
developing countries -Philippines, Kenya and India- have more than 1400 staff members. The most 
numerous national community is the French one (4052), followed by the one of the United States (3999). 
However, if we go a little deeper in the analysis, we will discover that the bulk of HR from developing 
countries are allocated in General Staff or low Professional positions in the field, while a relative majority of 
the developed countries employees fill up the General Staff position at HQ or the higher Professional 
positions in the field or at HQ. 
To summarize the main characteristics, in HQ there is a prevalence of western and developed countries 
staff, in particular in the General and Administrative Staff positions, with a higher female presence. On 
average, HQ have a more experienced and technical/bureaucratic staff, highly multinational at the top levels 
(D1-D2-D3) with the co-presence of very dissimilar national culture in terms of power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance (i.e. UK and Italy) or in terms of managerial practices and attitudes toward 
management by objectives (i.e. US and France) . 
The staff on the field is on average younger, with a higher incidence of men, more “local” at least at General 
Staff level, while the project management level is filled with expatriates; the majority of the temporary hired 
staff at the Professional level is located on the field, situation that creates a stronger link with the Region or 
Country of reference than with the HR or the organization itself. 
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1.3.3. Governance and Functioning of the United Nations System Organizations: 
Complementary Perspectives 
The purpose of the present paragraph is to describe and analyze the main elements and 
features of the governance of IOs. For this purpose and in light of the strong 
multidisciplinary approach which characterizes the study of the IOs, we collect here the 
contribution of thee main theoretic approaches, which can be used as complementary to 
explain the IOs’ governance features: the agency theory perspective, the rationalist 
perspective, and the “public value” paradigm.  
 
1.3.3.1. The Agency Theory Perspective 
A first important contribution is given by the agency theory. The main elements of the 
governance system in IOs, with a specific consideration of the United Nations (UN) 
organisations; could be represented as in Picture 2 and explained as follows: 
− A triadic relationship is in place among single member states, representative 
plenary Organs (General Assemblies or Conferences) and Executive Organs; 
states have direct access to the first organs, while there are peculiar appointment 
processes and rules for the second organs; the Representative Bodies -collecting 
the whole community of the member states- decide upon the general orientations of 
the organizations (economic resources, main areas of intervention), while the 
Executive Bodies –formed by a limited number of temporary appointed members 
chosen under different criteria- politically run the organization deciding the day by 
day strategies of the organization coherently with the general directives of the 
Representative Bodies. A “principal-agent” relationship is run, with the 
representative organs in the “principal” position and the executive organs in the 
“agent” one. In this perspective, the Executive Bodies have to be internally 
accountable for the actions performed and the results achieved within the autonomy 
conceded by the Representative Bodies.  
− Not all the IOs have own Representative Bodies in relation to their member states’ 
community; in particular, within the UN system Programmes and Funds depend 
collectively on the UN General Assembly, while Specialised Agencies have their 
own general assemblies.  
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− Technical/administrative structures receive inputs -political objectives and 
directives- from the Executive Bodies and handle autonomously financial and 
human resources to manage the organizations on a day by day basis –regulations, 
technical proposals, administrative procedures, project planning and 
implementation-. The relation is usually supervised by the Executive Head -called 
Director Secretary General/President- who represents the technical structure as a 
whole in front of the Executive branch and plays a role of mediator or facilitator 
between the political and professional side; under the expectation of result 
achievement; given the nature of the IO activity, these results are often difficult to 
measure. 
− The internal and external oversight bodies (auditors, evaluation bodies) operate in 
the interest of the community of member states, controlling the legitimacy of the 
executive and technical bodies’ activity consistently with the organization 
constitutions and regulation and with the international law, and sometimes judging 
the efficiency, and effectiveness of the operations. 
Even the external environment has an important role in shaping the institutional design 
and the actual functioning of the IOs; in particular: 
− Inter-organizational relations influence decision-making and operations. In the 
example of the UN system, the organizations belonging to the system are more or 
less dependent from the institutional part of the system, composed by the General 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council. The Specialised 
Agencies have a higher level of autonomy, their own Representative Bodies and do 
not have a direct hierarchical dependence on the central bodies of the UN. Funds 
and Programmes are on the contrary strictly dependent on the central bodies of the 
UN for internal regulations, strategic directives, monetary resources and doesn’t 
have own Representative Bodies. 
− Business organizations and NGOs play an important role at the “grassroot” level; as 
partners or “outsourcees” they play an important role in the project implementation, 
managing direct relationship with populations and institutional stakeholders in the 
field; as stakeholder represent significant transnational interests and can exert 
significant bargaining power over member states and IOs. 
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− Civil society and opinion groups play an important advocacy role, in particular in the 
situations where the IOs’ activities are more visible to the media or specific enlarged 
consultative processes are incorporate in the organisations’ decision making.
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Picture  1.2. The GovernanceSystem in the IOs: the UN System Perspective. Adapted from Jacobson, 1984. 
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1.3.3.2. The Rationalist Perspective 
A second, complementary contribution to the governance determinants’ classification in 
IOs comes from the Rationalist theorists (Koremenos and others 2001). The Rational 
theory, grounded in the International Relations studies, tries to understand why 
organizations are what they are, in relation to behaviours and objectives of their 
constituencies and other relevant external issues (uncertainty, information asymmetry, 
etc.). In this perspective, differences in governance systems are not random, but the result 
of conscious States’ choices tending to maximise their expected gains.  
IOs are seen as rational responses to the problems international actors face and are 
important since they can facilitate or impede the achievement of states’ objectives in trade, 
economic and social development. Within the IOs, nation states look to further their own 
goals in a cooperative way, when single states’ expected gains are stronger enough to 
support cooperative arrangements. In this light, states put attention to the corporate 
governance design as elements shaping the political game played within IOs. 
The present work does not take into account the relation between powers of the 
single/grop of states and governance features, which is on the contrary the main objective 
of this theoretical framework, but uses the main governance variables in the IO 
environment identified by the rationalist summarised by Table 1.1 as basis for a common 
understanding of the mechanisms regulating UN system organizations’ functioning: 
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Table 1.1. The Corporate Governance Variables in IOs Environment with Particular Reference to 
the UN System Organizations. Adapted from Koremenos and Others 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This theoretical perspective proposes a broader spectrum of governance variables to 
consider if compared with the agency theory. In particular, it proposes the centralization as 
one of the most important variables: Institutions, set of rules and agreements without  
centralised structure are opposed to Organizations, characterized by the presence of a 
formal (centralised) structure dedicated to international agreement management and 
service delivery. Decision making models are taken into consideration as well: simple 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ELEMENT 
OPERATIONALISATION 
Centralisation 
 Institution VS Organisation  
Decision Making Processes 
Voting Procedures Simple/weighted voting  
Decision Model Consensus, unanimity, majority, veto powers  
Control 
Directly Representative Organs Existence of a plenary organ for the decision making (“General Conference”)  
Organisational 
Interdependence 
Level of independence from other organizations of 
the system (Programmes and Funds VS Specialized 
Agencies) 
Accessibility to Member States 
to Executive Bodies 
Number, appointment and rotation of members in 
Executive Bodies 
Power of Executive Organs 
Executive Bodies’ level of autonomy: 
-  in decision making 
-  in receiving extra-budgetary resources 
Existence and Power of 
Oversight Bodies 
Inspection powers on executives and technical 
bodies 
Appointing arrangements (election from 
representative body, rotation) 
Flexibility 
 Organisation’s charter/regulations:  
- room for institutional re-design  
- flexibility of the basic agreements the 
organization is administering  
Stakeholder Management 
 Mechanisms for non state stakeholders participation 
in decision-making (NGOs, representative of 
beneficiary groups, companies, etc.) 
Mechanisms/bodies deputed to evaluate complaints 
by general people and interest groups affected by 
organisation’s decisions 
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voting is opposed to the weighted mechanism -weights are usually attributed based on 
member’s contribution capacity- and consensus building model – the most usual one, 
which means that decisions are took in absence of opposition to a proposal, is opposed to 
unanimity (rarely used, especially for amendments to charts or basic agreements), which 
indicates the agreement by the totality of the members; under the veto power regulation 
single members holder of this power can individually block any collective decision of an 
organ.  
The “control” and the “stakeholder management” dimensions mirror the variables 
considered by agency theory, while another peculiar element considered by the rationalists 
is the flexibility. This element may vary widely among organizations along two main 
dimensions: room left for institutional re-design in the basic texts constituting the 
organization (charter, regulations) and flexibility in the interpretation, management and 
amendment of the agreements and mandate of the organization. This is a really important 
characteristic since the mandate of IOs should have a dynamics consistent with the needs 
of the international community and the lack of flexibility can cause resistance and worsen 
the physiological “institutional inertia” of this kind of organizations. 
 
1.3.3.3. The Public Value Perspective 
A third interesting theoretical perspective to explore IOs governance mechanisms is the 
adoption of the “public value” paradigm (Moore, 2003). As Picture 3 shows, a 
confrontational relation between politics and managements seems to dominate the 
corporate governance features of IOs. This relation could be represented as well in terms 
of juxtaposition between the intergovernmental representation system, negotiating and 
producing plans and programs of intervention and agreements and the managerial system, 
purchasing and using physical, financial and human resources to produce the expected 
output (material and immaterial services, public and individual goods) and ultimately 
determining outcomes and impacts on the reality. 
As Moore suggests and several national authors pointed out in their works referred to 
domestic public sector organizations (Borgonovi 2005 who elaborates on, Meneguzzo, 
Rebora 1990, Mussari 1994 and Rebora 1999), the public value creation is given by a 
combination of: 
− The quality of the political action, which determines sound political agreement to be 
implemented, or realistic programmes and plans of actions as a result of the 
 37
political representation and the negotiation done through the established decision 
making mechanisms; 
− The efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the operational processes the 
organizations are using to transform resources in goods and services. 
Undoubtedly, an efficient service delivery is not sufficient without a sound political 
programming and planning, since the outputs will fail to address the intended outcomes. 
On the contrary, a qualitative political action not sustained by an efficient administrative 
machine and by effective processes and operation will waste public resources without 
producing results.  
Bearing in mind that this framework has been adapted by studies on domestic 
governmental organizations, the transposition to the reality of the IOs should take into 
account and incorporate: 
− The different constituencies and representative processes: domestic public sector 
organizations represent their citizens who delegated to them authority to perform 
public functions, while the constituent member states of the IOs do not accept a 
principle of delegation but simply of cooperation and the representative processes 
are auxiliary rather than exclusive. This difference influence the nature of the 
political negotiation processes involved in the intergovernmental  “representation 
system”; 
− The various mandates and operations of the IOS -technical cooperation projects, 
international agreements’ administration, studies and research, technical support for 
negotiation- which makes more difficult to measure efficiency (transformation of 
inputs into outputs) and effectiveness (inputs / outcomes) along the “managerial 
system”.  
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Picture 1.3. The Creation of Public Value between the Representation and the Managerial Systems in IOs. 
Adapted from Rebora, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, putting together the contributions of the three mentioned 
complementary theoretical approaches, the governance system of IOs is characterized by 
the dichotomy between politics and management, where: 
− Given the intrinsic political nature of IOs, management depends on the political 
decision making and the quality of political decisions taken is the first and main 
input to take into account; 
− Political bodies act as principals, defining the scope of the management mandate; 
− Political bodies are though extremely variable in terms of membership and 
orientations, while management is on average more stable and could impact more 
deeply on the organization. 
Several authors contested the dual nature of the IOs (Mearsheimer, 1994), affirming the 
primacy of the political and representative system over the managerial one and the 
inexistence of an autonomous management of these IOs. On the contrary, a pre-condition 
of the present work is that some “room for management” does exist in these organizations 
and the real point does not consist in defining this space, but perhaps in using it. 
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Having analyzed in depth the approaches to study the IOs, the possible classifications and 
definitions involved in it, and having clarified our choice for the United Nations system as 
the object of observation, the next chapter will approach the phenomenon at the center of 
the present work, the managerial reforms in UN system with particular reference to the 
dynamics and motivating factors interesting accountability and transparency of UN 
organizations.  
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Chapter 2 
Managerial Reforms and The Emergent Need of Accountability and 
Transparency 
 
The present chapter gives a broad picture of the main objective of observation of this 
study. Reforming the United Nations has been a common rhetoric since the early eighties, 
and different elements have been touched ever since: governance and funding 
mechanisms, renewal of administrative functions (accounting, HR management, ICT, etc.) 
service delivery systems, accountability and transparency tools. The present chapter offers 
a logical and chronological overview of the different elements of the so called “managerial 
reforms” and focuses in particular on the significant and contents of the dynamics related 
to accountability and transparency issues.  In particular, the chapter approaches the recent 
developments related to the transition towards the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards, the strengthening of methodological consistency of budgets and reports to 
extra-budgetary resources donors among organizations and the advancements towards a 
result-based reporting model. The transition towards a result based reporting has been 
selected as objective of observation for our empirical investigation, since it represents the 
most important example of the transition from a “traditional” model of accountability –input 
and compliance based- to a proactive, anticipatory and performance-based model.  
 
2.1. The Struggle for Reforming the United Nations: Governance and Managerial 
Reforms 
Since the birth of the United Nations “System” there has been a continuous stream of 
suggestions for changes in several different aspects of the organisation’s mission, 
structure, financing or operations.  
The reforms affecting the United Nations system in the past decades could be classified in 
two main streams: 
− Governance reforms; 
− Managerial reforms. 
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2.1.1 The Governance Reforms - Missing Opportunities and the Emergence of a 
New Order 
The first element refers in particular to the reforms processes related to the decision 
making in the UN Security Council, the improvements and revisions of the structure and 
functioning of the General Assembly and the reform of the membership and tasks of the 
Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee)4.  
It is possible to identify two main phases of the governance related reforms: the 1955-1989 
phase and the post 1989 phase. In the first phase the reforms initiative focused on the 
overcoming of the Russian/US bi-polar system and on the blocked situation experienced 
by the Security Council, the second one focused on the search of a new role and 
operational capacity for the Council and the General Assembly. Several areas were 
touched in this phase of reform: mainly the changes were applied to the voting 
mechanisms of the UN Security Council. Also, new tools became active with the 
establishment of peacekeeping operations. These measures allowed the UN System to be 
more flexible and effective while facing the multiple difficulties of the Cold War. The other 
visible result of the first phase is the enlargement of the number of players involved –at 
least formally- in the decision making: enlargement of the membership of the Council to 15 
members, improvement of the role of the fifth committee in deciding upon allocation of 
financial resources. These results showed their impacts in the following phase, where the 
global de-polarization made more relevant the difference between “north” and “south” (or 
between developed and developing countries) with the emergence of spontaneous 
aggregations of Developing Countries (the most famous experience is the “Group of 77” 
one) as opposed to the dominance of the Developed Countries (and specifically of the 
OECD countries). The numerical predominance of the developing countries posed 
significant problems to the Developed Countries, in particular within the General Assembly 
decision making and the developed countries started to ask for some compensatory 
mechanisms to take into account their contribution to the budget of the UN. Several 
proposals were made around the concept of weighted vote, recalling the mechanism 
traditionally in place in Development Banks such as the WB and IMF. These proposals 
culminated in the decision to put a ceiling on the contributions to the UN, traditionally 
based on a series of parameters linked to the GDP (in early 1990 the US Congress 
reiterated its decision to put a ceiling of 20% contribution on UN regular budget, between 5 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive overview see De Guttry, Pagani 2005, chapter IV 
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and 7% below the due rate). The other proposed reforms haven’t so far concretized and if 
on one side the observers noted the emergence of a “new order” based on the numerical 
preponderance of the developing countries in the UNGA, on the other side there is the 
perception of a disinvestment and loss of importance of the multilateralism in favour of a 
bilateral model of cooperation. One of the most significant data in this sense is the slow 
pace of the regular resources conceded to the UN system opposed to the steady increase 
of the voluntary resources given by single states for determined (and more directly 
controlled) projects. 
 
2.1.2. Managerial Reforms in United Nations System Organizations 
2.1.2.1. A Chronological Overview of the Managerial Reforms in UN system 
For the large majority of the observers (for a review cfr. Geri, 2001), the reforms of the 
governance and decision making were largely inconclusive from the point of view of 
making politically more effective and proactive the UN system. In this sense, management 
reforms have been often criticized to be “auxiliary” and pushed forward in substitution of 
the governance ones, politically too difficult to negotiate and put in place.  
The call for a more efficient, flexible and delivery oriented organizations became very 
pressing and repetitive from the 1980s, coinciding with the Reagan Administration in the 
United States of America, when administrative reforms were encouraged in order to 
increase the level of efficiency in UN institutions. The beginning of the long path of 
managerial reforms could be associated with the election, in 1997, of Kofi A. Annan as 
Secretary General and with the programmatic document “Renewing the United Nations: A 
Programme for Reform”, which established the programme for reform that was intended to 
be followed in order to facilitate the change. 
In this document, it was recognized and clearly stated that the UN organizations needed to 
be significantly reconfigured in order to better meet the needs of the international 
community. The idea was that changes could potentially improve administrative efficiency 
and therefore produce efficiency savings that could in the long run, have a positive impact 
on the United Nations’ ultimate goal of "alleviating poverty and enhancing the prospects of 
developing countries" (United Nations, 1997). In order to allow the organization to act with 
greater unity of purpose, coherence of efforts and agility in responding to challenges it 
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seemed necessary to go through a radical phase of major transformation of the leadership 
and management structure.  
The 1997 document is a compreheinsive programme for a managerial reform of the UN 
guided by two fundamental principles (United Nations, 1997):  
− Strengthening efficiency and effectiveness in resource allocation and use;  
− Strengthening transparency and accountability under both an “internal” perspective 
(decentralisation, debureaucratisation and delegation of authority, stronger relations 
between representative, executive and operative bodies) and an “external” one 
(transparency, capacity to evaluate the UN activity, access to information for third 
parties). 
The following phase of the UN managerial reform coincides with the document “An 
Agenda for Further Change” issued in 2002, where the SG tries to correct some 
trajectories of change and broaden the scope of the reform. 
At the 2005 World Summit, the Secretary-General opined to Member States that it was 
time for “bold decisions” and submitted his report “In Larger Freedom”. On management 
reform in particular, and the World Summit Outcome Document the Secretary-General was 
requested “to submit proposals for implementing management reforms to the General 
Assembly for consideration and decision in the first quarter of 2006.” He subsequently did 
so in his March 2007 reform report “Investing in the United Nations: For a stronger 
organization worldwide”. 
 
2.1.2.2. The Need of a Coordinated Approach to Managerial Reforms  
It should be upfront clarified that managerial reforms in the “institutional” part of the UN 
system (cfr. Chapter 1) directly involved the UN Secretariat and the main UN Funds and 
Programmes but had a significant impact on the managerial reform agenda of the rest of 
the UN system as well. For this reason, in the present paragraph we present the UN 
overall agenda for change as representative of the managerial reform contents in the On 
the other side, the change processes and dynamics were largely un-coordinated and 
reached different stages of development. It was in 2001, towards the Johannesburg 
meeting on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that the need for a coordinated 
action towards the managerial reforms was perceived as vital for the success of the 
initiative at the system level. The Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
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(ACABQ) was then transformed into the Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB) 
with the mandate to promote and concretely support the advancement of managerial 
reforms in a coordinated fashion.  
 
2.1.2.3 The Main Areas of the Managerial Reform in UN System 
Over the last decade the UN system has undergone a significant shift towards a 
managerial model, which had been envisaged since the late 80s’ (see Mathiason, 1987; 
Bertrand, 1988).  
The managerial reforms of the United Nation systems are mainly grounded in the rhetoric 
of the New Public Management (NPM) (Pollit, Boukaert, 2000) and the related currents 
(i.e. Osborne, Gaebler, 1992). This paradigm describes the wave of public sector reforms 
that occurred around the world starting in the 1980s. This stream of reform was intended 
to make the public sector organizations able to provide goods and services at market 
conditions, without sacrificing the delivery of public value, through the institutional 
decision-making processes. Some of the common elements of the NPM paradigm 
identifiable in the UN managerial reforms are the following: downsizing and externalization 
of the service delivery, outsourcing of non-core operations, encouragement of competition 
for extra-budgetary financial resources by the main donors. 
More precisely, taking into account the broad managerial reform movement in the UN 
system, it is possible to identify three main areas of intervention:  
− Service delivering and partnerships; 
− Management systems and organizational features; 
− Accountability, oversight and transparency. 
 
Service delivering and partnerships 
In the first area of intervention the three main elements were taken into consideration: 
− Restructuring of headquarter and field operations; UN organizations has always 
been struggling to make their intervention in field operations effective and efficient, 
such as the dismantling or reduction of these operations when needed (solution of 
an internal crisis). However, in the past decades the UN staff in the field seemed to 
grow incrementally and in a stratified way instead of smoothly transiting from one 
country of intervention to the next one. This is in part due to the historical policy to 
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hire locally and the rigidity of the contractual arrangements. The managerial reforms 
in this area encouraged the downsizing and the use of temporary contracts, mainly 
linked to the extra-budgetary resources given by the donors for single projects and 
hence inherently limited in time. On the headquarter side, some outsourcing and 
out-posting of administrative services exercises have been recently carried out. If 
the outsourcing of non core services (i.e. maintenance, IT services, etc.) does not 
seem particularly critical, the out posting exercises are attracting attention and 
critics. With out posting we identify a mechanism used to relocate a branch of the 
organization, usually the administrative one, away from the HQ, possibly in several 
regional hubs or in a new central hub. In the practical studies done for IOs on the 
subject advantages of this exercise are the possibility to lower the cost of labor, 
locating the administrative staff in developing countries, provide an increase in 
service levels through specialization, unified processes and leveraging the benefits 
offered by modern technology, including a force to accelerate necessary 
standardization, separate the administrative and support centres from the political 
ones (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Among the disadvantages, it should be 
included the complexity of the exchange between headquarters, administrative hub 
and field and the loss of an organic organizational culture. The most well known 
exercise in this area has been performed by UNHCR (for a comprehensive report 
on the change process cfr. UNHCR, 2006a and 2006b). 
- Partnership with NGOs and implementing partners – in operative terms, in the UN 
system there are regulative and research organizations (such as UNEP), financial 
transferring organizations (i.e. IFAD, WB, IMF), whose function is to finance 
implementing agencies (i.e. UNDP) and implementing organizations (i.e. UNICEF, 
UNHCR, UNRWA). These organizations are competing more and more directly for 
resources with other non state actors, both NGOs, foundations (i.e. Ford Foundation 
and Gates Foundation) and philanthropic branches of business organizations. The 
official position of the UN implementing organizations is that their neutrality and 
public institutional nature differentiate and protect them from the competition with the 
other actors of the development sector, but at the same time they are also 
considering the selective strategic outsourcing as one of the opportunities for 
restructuring at the field level, gaining efficiency and better coordinate with the actors 
already present on the field. In this perspective it is very important to maintain, 
strengthen the quality of action and control over operation, since: i) the UN agencies 
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are ultimately responsible for the outcome delivery and ii) the conservation of their 
actual role in the “value chain” of the Development Sector depends on their capacity 
to control and deliver results (Scott - DFID, 2004). This trend is obviously more 
pronounced among the lending agencies (IFAD, World Bank), which for their very 
nature just monitor and supervise the development project they finance. For 
example, As of January 2004, about 1000 NGOs had been involved in IFAD-
supported projects compared to 173 in 1993. The shift toward an indirect model of 
service delivery is as well noticeable in the implementing agencies: following a recent 
UN CEB statistics the financial transfers by the five “ex-COM” agencies has grown by 
13% in the past years. 
The other major initiative to transform the UN system in an open system is the 
“Global Compact” initiative, which can be synthetically explained as strategic 
partnership between UN, civil society and multinational business organizations to 
reach the MDGs 5. The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument; it relies on 
public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, 
labor and civil society to initiate and share substantive actions in pursuing the 
principles upon which the Global Compact is based. Through collective actions, the 
Global Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate citizenship so that business 
can be part of the solutions to the challenges of Globalization. 
It is probably too early to judge the concrete usefulness of this initiative as means to 
realize the community empowerment towards the MDGs, but the main risk lies in the 
fact that the participation of business and non governmental organizations is a CSR-
image indirect marketing related strategy which takes advantage of the voluntary 
nature of the coalition. 
                                                 
5 It is a global voluntary network formed by private corporations that represents a framework for businesses 
committed to align their operations and strategies with the following 10 principles:: 
1. Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; 
2. Businesses should be not complicit in human rights abuses;  
3. Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 
4. Businesses should support the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
5. Businesses should support the effective abolition of child labour;  
6. Business should promote the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; 
7. Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 
8. Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility;  
9. Businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of environmental-friendly technologies; 
10. Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms. 
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- UN Coherence: “Delivery as One” and “One UN” initiative: one of the major criticisms 
to the UN system organizations in the last decade has been the proliferation and 
duplication of organizations with similar and competing mandates in the field. In 
2005, a comprehensive study issued the UN High Level Panel on System Wide 
Coherence identified some way forward to unify and strengthen the capacity of action 
of the UN at the field level which has been identified with the “Delivery as One” 
principles. In the last years several initiatives have been undergone, among which it 
is worthwhile to mention the strengthening of the role of the UNDP resident 
coordinator for the development agencies6, the renewal of the mechanisms and 
practices of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA7; the new role 
of the High Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) within the UNCEB in 
strengthening the consistency of the strategic planning of the implementing agencies 
and most of all the “One UN” initiative. This initiative started with the specific purpose 
to test in eight countries how the UN System could deliver in a more coordinated way 
at country level. The objective is to ensure faster and more effective development 
operations in order to accelerate progress to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals by establishing a consolidated UN presence with one programme and one 
budgetary framework and an enhanced role of the UN Resident Coordinator while 
building on strengths and comparative advantages of the different entities of the UN 
family. The programme was launched in eight developing countries, namely: Albania, 
Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam, 
which voluntary decided to become “One UN” pilots. During the next years, the eight 
countries will pilot different models to deliver as “One”, unifying development 
activities at country level, reducing the need of coordination within agencies at upper 
levels (mainly regional level) and, as a result, leading to considerable savings of 
resources, enhancing local participation in development programmes and boosting 
                                                 
6 The UN Resident Coordinator System is aimed at strengthening coordination among UN agencies, to 
achieve a better focus and enhance the impact of their activities at country level. With a separate budget and 
a specific work plan, this system promotes a multidisciplinary approach to the needs of recipient countries, 
under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator. The coordination of operational activities is based on 
the comparative advantages of each UN agency or programme in its area of expertise and includes sharing 
of information, joint planning for collaborative activities, common approaches to cross-cutting issues and 
harmonization of programme cycles. (see UN Resident Coordinator System at 
http://www.un.ro/coordinator.html). 
7 OCHA carries out its coordination functions primarily through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). 
Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross 
Movement and NGOs. The IASC ensures inter-agency decision-making in response to complex 
emergencies. These responses include needs assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination 
arrangements and the development of humanitarian policies 
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the overall quality of operations. The initiative is managed by the United Nations 
Development Group (UNDG) created in 1997, to improve the effectiveness of UN 
activities at the country level, bringing together the operational agencies working on 
development8. Even if it is too early to express an opinion on these different 
initiatives, a significant effort to gain consistency through the adoption of common 
frameworks and interagency body’s activity is visible; the main risk related to this 
strategy consists in adding a further layer of negotiation and bureaucracy to the 
functioning of the system instead of facilitating its consolidation and quantitative 
reduction.  
- Peacekeeping, Peace-building, and Protection mechanisms: A High-Level Panel, 
chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, conducted a comprehensive review of the UN’s peace 
operations in 2000, what was to be later called the “Brahimi Report”. This has also 
resulted in a major strengthening of the Organization’s planning and staffing capacity, 
its rapid deployment capability and its ability to draw on the lessons learned from the 
large number of field missions deployed over the last 15 years. Concrete 
improvements include the ability to draw on pre-positioned “strategic deployment 
stocks” and the development of a capacity for training and deploying civilian police to 
the missions. The UN’s operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone – commonly 
                                                 
8 The UNDG is an interagency body for coordination, originally formed by the so called “Ex-COM agencies” 
(UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP) and now enlarged to 28 members (http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=13); 
UNDG develops policies and procedures that allow member agencies to work together, analyze country 
issues, plan support strategies, implement support programmes, monitor results and advocate for change. 
These initiatives are intended to increase the UN impact in helping countries to achieve the MDGs. Activities 
of the UN Development Group are managed by a number of sub-groups8, namely: 
• The UNDG Executive Committee, which is formed by its "founding members" (UNICEF, UNFPA, 
WFP and UNDP). It focuses on reforming the work methods of the funds and programmes and 
manages the mechanisms of the UNDG; 
• The Support Group, which is the forum through which all member organizations and observers 
contribute to preparing the UNDG programme of work and issues for UNDG decisions; 
•  The Management Group, which focuses its activities on improving the efficiency of the Resident 
Coordinator System8 and address the simplification and harmonization of programme procedures 
including preparation, approval, execution, and financing; 
• The Programme Group, which develops policies, guidelines and procedures to improve the quality 
and effectiveness of UN Country Team programme collaboration, particularly in support of national 
efforts to implement the Millennium Declaration and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
• The Country Programme Support Group, which monitors the implementation of UNDG programme 
policy, tools and procedures at country and regional levels. It also makes recommendations to the 
UNDG Management and Programme groups on strategic results, lessons learned and best practices 
for enhanced simplification and streamlining of UN programming, as determined by UN reform 
directives. 
The main governing organ of the UNDG is the Development Group Office (UNDGO), which is UNDG 
Secretariat. It works with member agencies to prepare issues, policies and guidelines for decision by the 
UNDG and its Executive Committee. 
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regarded as successful missions – have benefited from clearer mandates and better 
management systems and capacities. 
 
Managerial functions and systems  
The principles of the reform were translated into major changes, which involved all the 
main administrative functions (United Nations, 2002; Joint Inspection Unit, 1995, 1999): 
− Procurement of Goods and Services; 
− Human Resources Management; 
− Information technology; 
− Ethics and Internal Justice; 
− Staff Security in field operations; 
− Finance, Budget and Accountability Reforms. 
In particular, HR management, IT management and finance and budget reforms can be 
seen as the most important ones in the perspective of contributing to the managerial 
theory and practice in a comparative fashion with the national civil service experiences 
(United Nations, 2007).  
In this paragraph we will offer a brief review of the literature on managerial reforms in UN 
system in the first two areas, leaving for the next paragraph an in depht analysis of the 
reforms involving accountability issues. 
The Human Resource management area. In the resource management areas, several 
studies have been intended to present the state of the art of the practices (Brewster, 
Ommeren and Farndale, 1999; Lee, Brewster, 2004), while other studies tried to 
understand the main differences of the HR management in IOs in comparisons with the 
reality of the business organizations (Brewster, Lee, 2006). In particular, these scholars 
point out that a contingency approach to HR management in IOs should be adopted to 
take into consideration the peculiar governance mechanisms, the difficulty to measure 
individual and team staff contribution to the end goals of the organization, the links 
between politic and managerial rationalities, the traditional rigidity given by the public 
nature of the organizations. This is as well the focus of the most recent emphirical studies 
on the main areas of HR management reforms which interested the following areas: 
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− Proactive Workforce planning opposed to a reactive succession management; 
United Nations Secretariat is one of the pilot organizations in this area: at the 
central level, human resources department identifies the relevant profiles and 
workforce trends in the Secretariat matching them with the expected competencies 
and skills that the organization needs to face in the future challenges. Starting from 
this analysis, at the department level, managers realize and implement the so called 
HR action plans including two main elements: i) The development of the human 
resources within the department (succession of the present posts, profiles to 
hire/include, etc.) and ii) The implementation and customization of the HR tools. 
The main difficulty in this exercise is the formal nature of the succession and 
promotion process which limits the scope and the flexibility of the workforce 
planning exercise to formal succession processes for retirees (United Nations 
Secretary General, 2006); 
− Balanced career development system opposed to a promotion-focused one; 
Opposite to the idea that career development corresponds with the obtainment of a 
series of salary increase and formal progressions in the organisational hierarchy, 
Career Development system should be composed by an integrated cycle of four 
main complementary components: Training, Performance Evaluation, Mobility and 
Promotion. Such a career development system enables determined career path and 
releases non monetary rewards (such as work flexibility, mobility and specific 
training) based on past performance, qualifications, attitudes and behaviours 
demonstrated by employees. World Trade Organization is one of the organizations 
trying to implement such a system, facing difficulties related to the staff culture, the 
unpreparednes of the supervisors and of the organization to facilitate the new 
career development system (Figuerola, 2005; Figuerola, Alesani, 2006); 
− Sound employees performance evaluation system (PES) to effectively align 
behaviors to organization’s objectives and strategies; several specialised agencies 
tried to implement such a system –i.e. World Trade Organization, International 
Labour Organization- experiencing difficulties related both to design and to the 
process of implementation of the PES. In the design of the system the main issues 
are related to the significance of the performance measures at the individual and 
staff level for administrative, financial transferring and research based 
organizations; to the risk of bureaucratization and disalignement with the field office 
operations of the PES, to the confusion between activity/process and performance 
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measures in non-implementing organizations, to the redundancy of the system. 
Process related issues are for example the upreparedness and the lack of interests 
of the supervisors towards the system, the traditional predominance of technical 
skills over organizational and leadership behaviors and the automatic link with the 
salary and the compensation systems in highly political and bureaucratic contexts 
(Hennes, Joint Inspection Unit, 1995, United Nations, A/60/883, 2006). 
− Internal and external mobility system to avoid the plateau effect9 and to motivate 
employees: Mobility in the broad sense it is a mechanism to facilitate the 
enrichment of working experience and employees’ skills, in other functions within 
the same organization or the UN common system. Several organizations with 
relevant field operations (the so called “implementing agencies”) are in the first line 
in this policy –UNICEF, UNHCR-, some of them enforced a mandatory “rotation”, as 
internal mobility policy, between field and headquarter offices in order to promote 
the integration of staff and the development of a strong and unified organziational 
culture (UNHCR, 2006). The main difficulty the UN organizations are encountering 
in this area is to establish a real market for mobility and to include this element as 
career development choices parameter: mobility is starting to be appreciated at the 
operational and field level, even if is often seen as a punishment mechanism, 
people subject to mobility encounter difficulties in pursuing their career in their 
organization of origin and the high specialization of professionals profiles may limit 
the exchange mechanisms (CEB, 2005); 
− Job grading system: In the UN family there are three main categories of posts, 
linked to progressive salary scales: i) general staff (GS), or administrative and 
support positions; ii) professionals (P) and iii) Directors. Under the traditional job 
grading system career advancements are linked to achievement of managerial 
positions (from P to D); significant efforts have been made to break this 
consequentiality, drawing specific career paths for excellent professionals, 
recognizing that excellent professionals could be paid more than managers and 
aligning salaries and treatments with the external market, and re-grouping the job 
categories in few broad-banded positions belonging to job families. The most 
relevant experience of this is represented by the Development Banks, outside the 
UN system, with particular reference to EBRD (Jugand, 2007), and to OECD 
                                                 
9 The so called plateau effect characterizes the mid career employees laying for several years in their 
positions looking for assuming managerial positions. 
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(Poels, 2007), while the UN system organizations are still in the vision phase of this 
change management process.  
The Information Technology area. Drawing from the CEB approach to this area, the main 
developments of reform can be listed as follows: i) automatization of workflow through the 
implementation of the so called Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) information 
management systems; ii) implementation of management information systems to support 
the decision making and iii) exploitation of the potentiality of the IT for development 
applications. In particular, the ERP systems are supposed to help the organizations to 
better control their administrative transactions (finance and accounting system, planning 
and budget, human capital management, payroll, procurement, asset and stock 
management, supply chain management, project management, travel management), to 
gain efficiency, make faster the administrative workload and empower the organizations’ 
information management. From a survey realised in 2006 (CEB, 2006) the large majority 
of the UN organizations adopted the ERP system, with a differential approach in terms of 
modules and providers. The main difficulty so far seems related to the change 
management process involved in the adoption of the ERP, from a silo mentality to an 
integrated workload (2006 ERP Survey, business process experience paragraph) and to 
the need to make useful the adoption of the new systems in the managerial perspective. 
The main risk is related to the lack of customization of the IT system originally thought for 
business organizations, on one side, and the waste of the potentiality of these systems 
caused by the lack of preparedness of the organizations on the other side.  
The IT for development applications are various and differentiated: e-justice, e-health, 
distance learning constitutes just few examples. This element of the reform is not strictly 
linked to the functioning of the organizations but rather to their effectiveness in terms of 
empowerment of beneficiary countries and communities. Several experiences and reports 
are available on this topic (United Nations, A/60/323, 2006). 
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2.2 The Emergence of Accountability and Transparency Issues in the Stream of 
Managerial Reforms 
If these reforms were mainly intended to strenghten efficiency and effectiveness, the 
enhancement of transparency and accountability has been a major managerial reform 
trend as well. From the early eighities, the main stakeholders of the UN organizations and 
specifically the member states as main donors have been asking the United Nation 
organizations for a more anticipatory and proactive model of accountability, especially 
regarding the “public” and “performance related” accountability type directed to the 
constituencies’ community opposed to the one directed to single constituencies.  
These request coincided with a severe crisis of legitimation of the multilateral system of 
development and technical cooperation with at its center the UN family. The visible sign of 
this crisis is demonstrated by the significant shift between regular and extra-budgetary 
resources, which in the last ten years double their percentage on the total resources, 
reaching 70% in 2003.  
In this light, the accountability and transparency related reforms can be seen: 
− On one side as a reaction to the lack of trust on the implementing agencies by their 
main constituencies and as an attempt to demonstrate that the multilateral system 
of cooperation could produce the expected results and that the single organizations 
are reliable on their results and sustainability; 
− On the other side as regulator of the “competition” for the voluntary resources 
between UN system organizations. 
On a complementary note, the accountability and transparency reforms could be seen as 
an attempt to adequate the languages and codes for external communication with the new 
roles and structures of the United Nations system. In the last decades the UN system and 
the development and cooperation sectors as a whole have been subject of an incremental 
complexification and enrichment. This inevitably shaped the environment of the 
development agencies, pushing forward the expectations and the information requests of 
donor organizations and suggesting an enrichment of the communication modules.  
The three main aspects of the managerial reforms of UN linked to accountability and 
transparency can be listed as follows: 
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− Transition to accrual accounting and more precisely to the International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards; 
− Coordination and revision of the extra-budgetary and voluntary activities’ budget 
structure and presentation to the member states (transition to voluntary resources); 
− Result-based budgeting and reporting (RBB and RBR), as part of a more 
comprehensive transition towards a result based management model (RBM). 
These are three complementary aspects. The transition to IPSAS is expected to enrich the 
financial reporting system of the UN organizations with information regarding cost of the 
services, economic sustainability in the middle run, asset value towards the main external 
stakeholders –member states and other donors-. This is expected to support “externally” 
more informed decisions on regular financing of these organizations and “internally” a 
better financial management and information on costs of services as input for the RBM. 
The coordination of the extra-budgetary activities’ budget structure is expected to improve 
the level of transparency in relation to the negotiation for the voluntary funding from state 
and non state donors and to guarantee a fair competition among agencies for these funds. 
The transition towards a result-based management model is expected to make more 
meaningful the communication with the main constituencies, strengthening their capacity 
to evaluate the organizations’ effectiveness.  
 
2.2.1 The Transition Towards The International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
2.2.1.1 The Long Journey from UNSAS to IPSAS 
United Nations system organizations have traditionally adopted a commitment accounting 
system without a homogeneous approach. This situation, traditionally justified with the 
peculiarities of the single organizations, progressively changed thanks to the call of the 
member states for a more transparent and homogeneous financial communication by the 
UN system organizations. In particular, the first significant step forward can be considered 
the adoption, in 1993, of a common body of accounting standards, called UNSAS (United 
Nations Accounting Standards). This body of principles, grounded in the commitment 
accounting with the co-presence of some elements typical of the accrual accounting –i.e. 
recognition of some categories of assets in the balance sheet, recognition of pension and 
other after retirement services liabilities- (UNAS, VII, 2006).  
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This was the first attempt to progressively and incrementally promote a homogenization of 
the UN system organizations accounts, without subverting the traditional and consolidated 
accounting systems (UN ACC, 2001). However, observers and practitioner pointed out that 
for their very nature the UNSAS were too loose to effectively promote the homogenization 
(WFP, 2005; Steccolini, Alesani, 2006): they for example left the organizations free to 
choose the interest rate between a monthly market rate, a yearly budgeted UN rate or a 
monthly rate fixed by the organization and they leave the option for asset evaluation 
between historical cost, replacement value or historical price10. These commentators also 
noticed the incompleteness of the transition towards the accrual accounting; for example, 
the UNAS do not request to account for asset depreciation, they allow organizations to 
expend important assets of implementing agencies such as machinery, inventories and 
vehicles and do not request the recognition of payables and receivables.  
The critiques towards this regime were also accompanied by critiques towards the 
“modified cash” system: in a period where the central and local government organizations 
of the main developed nations and some of the other IOs adopted the full accrual system –
i.e. EU, OECD- the fact that the UN system was still adopting the traditional public sector 
accounting system was seen as a lack of transparency and accountability towards the 
main constituencies. In this sense, the adoption of a full accrual system has been 
stimulated and provoked both by internal dissatisfaction with the homogenization process 
realized through the UNAS and with external pressure for a transition to the full accrual 
system.  
From 2003 to 2006 the main UN system advisory bodies for administrative and financial 
matters discussed the adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, 
evaluating in particular the suitability of the new standards in relation to the peculiar 
operational and administrative nature of the UN system organizations.  
The main doubts around the adequateness of the IPSAS principles were the following: 
− Under the technical perspective, the problems related to the customization of the 
standards to the reality of the public sector organizations –i.e. presence of revenues 
from non-exchange transactions, peculiar nature of employee benefits, peculiar 
nature of asset ownership, concept of “asset control” in the implementing and 
financial transferring organizations, presentation of the financial statements and 
disclosure of resource allocation by destination-. IPSAS were derived by the IFRS 
                                                 
10 This should be put in context of the UN organizations asset management regimes, where several assets 
as buildings and lands are conceded for a symbolical value to the organizations. 
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(International Financial Reporting Standards) for the business organizations and at 
the time of the discussion upon their adoption these standards were still in the 
development phase; on the same page,  some scholars observed that the IPSAS 
were born without a specific conceptual framework but just adapted the business 
organizations’ one (Ellwood 2003; Chan 2004) falling short in interpreting public 
sector peculiarities and heading towards a commercialization of the adopting 
organizations’ accounts. 
− Under the administrative perspective, the adoption of a full accrual accounting 
system would have generated the need for significant additional administrative 
workload, mainly in relation to the notion of “control” –i.e. expenses for financial 
transferring organizations should be recognized only when the beneficiary 
organization expended the sum- and “ownership” –i.e. assets bought for project 
implementations (vehicles, machines, shelters) are property of the organizations 
after the project but they are often not managed maintained or even inventoried 
because “meant” to remain on the field,; other asset are usually not inventoried or 
evaluated-. 
− Under the cultural and organizational perspective, the transition to accrual 
accounting generates the need of specific technical skills traditionally not present in 
the organizations, information management systems, and specific procedures. 
2.2.1.2. The Adoption of IPSAS: Expected Benefits and Open Issues 
In 2005, the interagency Task Force on Accounting Standards recommended the adoption 
of IPSAS. After the CEB Finance and Budget Network endorsement, the HLCM approved 
IPSAS adoption on 30 November 2005 and in 2006 the UNGA resolved to adopt the 
IPSAS (UNGA; 2006, A/RES/60/283). Under this resolution, all United Nations System 
organizations plan to adopt International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) 
effective no later than 2010.  
Determinants of this decision were: i) external political pressures by some national 
governments which had already undertaken the full accrual accounting reform; ii) the 
significant development of the body of IPSAS standards in the period 2002-2005 and iii) 
the acceptance of UN system representatives as members (with observatory status) of the 
IPSAS Board. 
Benefits expected from the IPSAS adoption are both on the internal and external 
accountability. In particular, drawing on the consolidated literature on this topic the main 
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benefits can be summarized as follows (Anessi 2001, 2007; Anessi Steccolini 2005; FEE 
2007): 
− Better financial management:  
• Improvement of the asset management practices; organizations should be more 
sensitive to manage assets controlled and/or owned than when they directly 
expended them to the projects and activities; 
• Recognition of revenues and expenditures consistently with the project 
realizations and real utilization of the service/good, leading to a better control 
and project costs management; 
• Better financing of the organization in relation to the long term financial 
obligations of the organizations. 
- Improved meaningfulness of the financial statements: 
• Recognition of the fair value of the organization’s assets and the “net asset” as 
its economic value as a whole and as independent item of the accounts; 
• Recognition of the actual costs sustained by the organization for the delivery of 
its services and recognition of the real value of projects and activities realized in 
a certain period; 
• Recognition of the pressure on the current expenditures given by the increasing 
after service related expenditures; 
• Recognition of the liabilities accumulated yearly towards employees and 
collaborators; 
• Better understanding of the provisions needed to manage on a continuous base 
the organizations; 
- Improved credibility of the accounts and confidence on them: 
• Alignment with the accounting system recently adopted by developed countries’ 
governments and by other intergovernmental organizations, i.e. EU and OECD; 
• Possibility to audit and certify the financial statements under internationally 
recognized standards; 
• Actual homogenization of the accounts of the UN organizations as opposed to 
the incremental and unsatisfactory one realized by the UNSAS and the 
possibility to consolidate the UN system organizations accounts;  
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On the other hand, some main concerns regarding the achievement of the expected 
benefits can be drawn from the international literature on the accrual accounting system 
adoption for the domestic public sector organizations, from the experience of the 
implementing governmental organizations and from the IPSAS implementation processes 
(next paragraph). 
A substantive body of literature (Guthrie and Johnson 1994, Monsen and Nasi 1998, 
Monsen 2002, Christiaens and Rommel 2006) suggests that the cash/commitment 
accounting is more in line with the proper ends of the public sector organizations bringing 
in a number of different reasons. Cash system is seen as in line with the authoritative 
resource allocation function of the accounting systems in this environment; cash 
accounting allows to better link resources allocated to specific purposes with expenses.  
The misalignment between costs and expenses –which makes interesting accrual 
accounting under a cost management perspective- is not so relevant, especially for non 
implementing organizations, i.e. organizations working as political forums, research and 
financial transferring organizations; IOs have a limited amount of “exchange” transactions, 
typical of the business organizations.  
Inconsistency should be noticed between some concepts of the accrual accounting, in 
particular financial provision for asset depreciation, and presence of financial transfers for 
specific capital expenses. Moreover, there is a risk of inadequacy of the accrual 
accounting financial statements structure in relation to the user needs of the 
constituencies’ (in this case member states’) representatives; more precisely, if the 
financial accounting statements show resource allocation by destination and areas of 
intervention, accrual accounting statements show this allocation by nature of the 
inputs/factors of production. Lack of usefulness of some of the basic concepts of the 
accrual accounting as “profit”, and of the main indices as liquidity and solidity indices, 
under the assumption that these concepts are linked willingness to pay of the member 
states more than on the actual current position of the IO.  
On some of the “theoretical” points mentioned above a substantial body of literature states 
on the opposite direction: for example, the authoritative nature of financial resources 
allocation is not incompatible with the nature of the accrual accounting. The concept of 
profit does not apply but the need to preserve the organizations from economic losses is a 
condition of sustainability, expressing the balance between resources requested from the 
community of the member states and resources used by the organization in the fulfillment 
of its mandate. The “net asset value” is as well a significant element for IOs as residual 
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economic value of the organization as independent subject (for a complete reference of 
these arguments see Anessi, 2007) 
Some other points seem to be particularly present in the current debates among the UN 
system professionals and commentators.  
As first, accrual accounting system for its very nature requests suppositions and estimates 
and is potentially a richer object of manipulation. It re-presents a new language for the 
main constituencies of the UN organizations, who are still unprepared to catch the 
richness of the system and may interpret the use of some figures and mechanisms 
(depreciation, provision for accrued liabilities, provision for risks and eventualities) as an 
attempt to make less transparent the organizations’ accounts and as an obstacle for the 
substantive homogenization of the UN system organizations’ accounts.  
Secondly, many financial management advantages of the transition to accrual accounting 
(i.e. better cost recognition and management) seem to be linked to the abandonment of 
cash system in favor of the full accrual system and to the development of management 
accounting systems in accrual accounting. This has not always been the case in the 
previous reforms of domestic public sector, where often the cash system continued to be 
the main form of registration and a parallel system of cash and accrual accounting has 
been maintained or the financial statements in accrual accounting were simply derived by 
the cash system. 
In other words, the adoption of IPSAS do not guarantee by itself that the accrual 
accounting become the main form of accounting and the main language for management 
accounting; it requires a radical cultural change in managerial attitudes and to some extent 
managerial culture.  
To this extent, another relevant issue currently at the stake is the adoption of an accrual 
budgeting model. This document is the main institutional tool for resource allocation used; 
for this document the observations that the cash accounting is in line with the ends of the 
public institutions and the information needs of the decision makers (financial resources 
allocated by destination/area of intervention) are particularly relevant. On the other hand, 
the consistency between budgeting and reporting is one of the most relevant success 
factors mentioned in the literature and in the practice of the accounting reforms (Anessi, 
Steccolini, 2005). The adoption of the accrual accounting is still under debate by the UN 
system representatives and different designs are at the study to preserve the “institutional” 
significance of the document (CEB, 2007). 
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A final concern regards the usefulness of the information provided by the accrual 
accounting in terms of costs and asset management: many organizations do not have 
significant service delivery processes nor significant productive assets: organizations such 
as WTO, UNEP, FAO, IFAD are research or financial transferring organizations and do not 
base their value creation on service or good production/distribution/delivery, contrarily to 
the so called implementing agencies (i.e. WFP, UNIDO, UNHCR). Still for these 
organizations a relevant benefit of the accrual accounting standards implementation may 
derive from: i) the information about the inputs “used” rather than “acquired” –some 
organizations tend to - and ii) from the financial transfers to NGOs and other implementing 
partners actually expended by the beneficiaries, as opposed to the received ones.  
 
2.2.1.3. IPSAS Implementation by UN System Organizations: Technical and Political 
Processes 
The decision of the UNGA to implement the IPSAS was bounded on the “need to further 
tailor and specify the IPSAS where needed”, meaning on the intention to identify specific 
UN system accounting policies to make IPSAS more tailored to the UN system 
organizations. In particular, the task force on IPSAS started in 2006 its work to produce 
guidance and policy papers on the various IPSAS principles and on some aspects non 
contemplated in the standards but integral part of the current accounting system of the UN 
organizations (i.e. fund accounting). In August 2007, the majority of the principles and 
accounting aspects were covered by specific papers issued by the CEB finance and 
budget network on a task force, where two main kind of papers have been released by the 
task force: 
− “Accounting policies”, addressing explicit options within IPSAS. United Nations 
System organizations will be expected to comply with accounting policy decisions 
stated in these documents.  
− “Authoritative guidance”, supporting organizations’ understanding of IPSAS. 
Authoritative guidance has an important role in supporting IPSAS compliance and 
system-wide consistency.  They do not address options within standards, but 
explain what a standard means.  
The accounting policies are in this sense a stronger tool to address the organizations 
towards a homogeneous behavior than the authoritative guidance. It is interesting to 
comment the merit of the choice between the two instruments operated by the UN system 
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organizations. On one side, the “softer” instrument is apparently being used where the 
different operational nature of the organizations impacts on the accounting policies and 
makes difficult or not advisable a unified approach to the accounting policy. On the other 
side, the differentiation mirrors the negotiation process undergone among the specialized 
agencies and their preferred options. An example could help to clarify this point: fund 
accounting is an element not contemplated by the IPSAS standards but clearly out of the 
principle of uniqueness of the enterprises encompassed in the principles. The result of the 
FB network negotiation was an authoritative guidance explaining the alternative ways to 
represent the accounts for the funds other than the main financial statements but without 
prohibiting the organizations to keep them in. As a matter of fact, some organizations 
mainly manage regular resources granted by the community of the member states for 
each biennium (ex. UN Secretariat). Other UN organizations, on the contrary, manage a 
significant number of funds and grants with resources given by donors and other 
constituencies and dedicated to special purposes and projects. For example, in 2003-2004 
UNDP managed 216 different funds and the UNHCR quota of extra-budgetary resources 
represents the 96% of the organization’s total budget. To this extent, if for the first kind of 
organizations consolidating the results of the funds in a single statement and eliminating 
the statements for specific funds as integral part of the organization’s balance sheet would 
not cause any problem, for the second one this would mean changing dramatically the 
communication with the main constituencies and would impact on the very perception of 
the organization as a series of funds administered by a Secretariat instead of a unified 
organization managing its mandate on different grounds. 
In the light of this example, the quality and of the guidance papers in operationalizing the 
IPSAS principles into the UN organizations’ specificities and their effectiveness in 
homogenizing policies and practices will contribute to qualifying the final result of the 
actual IPSAS implementation process.  
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2.2.2. The Harmonization of the Extra-Budgetary Projects’ Documents 
Financial resources of UN system organziations can be categorized in two broad classes: 
the budgetary resources (also called core or ordinary resources), approved by the UN 
General Assemblies and the extra-budgetary resources, which donors voluntarily concede 
to organizations for specific projects consistent with their mandate: 
− Between biennium 1996-1997 and biennium 2004-2005 the extra-budgetary 
resources incremented on average by 21%, while the budgetary resources only by 
9%; 
− In relative terms, the percentage of “core” resources lowered from 48% resources in 
1996 to 32% in 2003, while the “other” resources, including the extra-budgetary 
ones and the peacekeeping operations increased correspondingly from 52% to 68% 
(figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 Shift in the Relative Percentage of “Core” and “Other” Economic Resources within 
the UN System. Source: UN Chief Executive Board for Coordination Website 
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resources, to a bilateral model which directly involves the single donors and the 
implementing agencies.  
In this context, in the past years donors and member states have often denounced the lack 
of transparency and consistency in these practices and policies, encouraged donors to 
look for what appeared to be the “best conditions in the market” to implement projects they 
want to fund. In this direction, often organizations played to lower che charges for indirect 
support costs, to make the organizations looking more efficient to donors. In the 
perspective of some organizations, this situation created an unfair competition on 
voluntary resources, not based on distinctive competencies of the organizations but on the 
ability and flexibility to maneuvre their accounts, leading to a growing financial 
unsustainability. In fact, the rationale behind the recovery of a percentage of support and 
administrative costs through a percentage of the extrabudgetary project revenues lies on 
the fact that the central and regional services an organization often work to support the 
realization of extra-budgetary projects; the shift towards voluntary resources and the 
competition to lower the “project support cost recovery charges” (PSC rates) creates a 
pressure on the administrative and support costs financed by ordinary resources 
threatening the capacity of the organizations to realize the ordinary/core programmes.  
Consequently, growing attention has been given by the coordination bodies to the 
homogenization of the budget proposals structure for voluntarily funded activities (the so-
called “extra-budgetary activities”) and to the harmonization of UN system organizations’ 
policies on cost recovery for these activities. 
In 2002, the Joint Inspection Unit report on “Support Costs related to Extra Budgetary 
Activities in Organizations of the United Nations System” reviewed policies and practices 
in this area. The report raised a number of issues, among which the multiplicity of budget 
structures and PSC rates among the UN organizations and the lack of harmonization of 
the principles upon which these rates are based-. 
In response to the pressure placed on UN system organizations, various HLCM and UN 
Development Group (UNDG) working groups were activated between 2003 and 2007. A 
first result of this work has been the agreement on a broad level cost categorization and a 
set of cost recovery principles: direct costs, indirect variable costs and indirect fixed 
costs11. Organizations agreed on the principle that direct costs are recoverable and should 
                                                 
11 Three main cost categories were identified (CEB/2004/HLCM/8: 
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be charged directly to the projects; fixed indirect costs should be financed by regular/core 
resources (except for the organizations that do not have core resources); variable indirect 
costs should be totally recovered from extra-budgetary projects in one way or another, as 
a percentage rate or even as a cost component of the project direct costs 
(CEB/2005/HLCM/R.22). 
In 2005, the UNDG management group agreed on a common support cost recovery rate 
(PSC) of 13%, with the possibility for certain projects to lower that at 7%, obtaining the 
consensus of the Excom agencies on Multi-Donors Trust Funds initiative but failing so far 
to align the organizations to that rate as a general behaviour. 
There are two main lackages in the state of the art of this reform at 2007: on one side the 
agreed PSC rate policy has been originally decided and shared just among the 
organizations belonging to the UNDG, on the other side, they were based on a broad cost 
categorization without a common understanding on what type of costs belonged to what 
category. This made impossible both a common and shared identification of the costs 
behind the PSC rates and an homogeneous structure of the budget proposals for extra-
budgetary activities.  
A new working group has been created in 2007 with the mandate to further explore the 
cost classification practices of the UN organizations, to discuss the main differences and 
homogenization issues and to produce ad hoc guidelines. In particular: 
− Guidelines on cost classification and cost accounting methodologies related to PSC 
calculation - drawing from the analysis of the state of the art and the existing 
differences between organizations the working group could try to find a 
convergence on practices related to classification of costs  as direct costs or indirect 
                                                                                                                                                                  
- Direct Costs are incurred for and can be traced in full to an organization’s activities, projects and 
programmes in fulfilment of its mandate. Included are costs of project personnel, equipment, project 
premises, travel and any other input necessary to achieve the results and objectives set out in 
programmes and projects. 
- Fixed Indirect Costs are incurred by the organization, regardless of the scope and level of its 
activities, which cannot be traced unequivocally to specific activities, projects or programmes. These 
costs typically include the top management of an organization, its corporate costs and statutory 
bodies not related to service provision. 
- Variable Indirect Costs, usually referred to as Programme Support Costs, are incurred by the 
organization as a function and in support of its activities, projects and programmes, and cannot be 
traced unequivocally to specific activities, project or programmes. These costs typically include 
service and administrative units, as well as their related system and operating costs. 
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variable costs and should try to identify a common approach to calculate the PSC 
rates starting from the quantification of IVC and DC; 
− Guidelines on extra-budgetary activities budget structure, to ensure an overall 
consistency between the organizations on the categories of costs considered as 
direct costs of the XB activity and the categories considered as “lumped in” the PSC 
rate – of course this is a sensible issue and we could aspire to have a list of costs 
by nature classified as “direct” and a list of them classified as “indirect” and a list of 
conditions to consider as “direct” or “Indirect” the most controversial ones (cfr. 
Results of table 2a). 
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2.2.3 The Transition Towards a Result Based Management and Reporting Model  
The transition towards RBM indicates a broad brench of managerial reform grounded in 
the NPM principles and paradigms and intended to improve management capacity and to 
align individual and team behaviours towards efficiency and effectiveness; this is done 
through the identification and monitoring of logical frameworks setting final goals, expected 
resuls and meaninful strategies to realize them, tailored for the implementing organizations 
and their internal environment. These frameworks are extensively used in decision making 
and in particular in resource allocation and human resource management decision12.  
The UN system organizations progressively introduced RBM tools and systems from the 
mid nineties. Some of the main characteristics underlined by the emphirical stuies in this 
area can be summarized as follows (Mitzutani, 2004; CEB, 200713): 
− Development of ad hoc logical frameworks sytimulated a reflection by the single 
organizations on their positioning and contribution potential towards the 
achievement of common stragetic objectives represented by the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
− Fragmented and not systematic adoption of the RBM model; RBM is intended to be 
a continuous cycle of managerial learning and improvement, where performance 
measures are constantly refined and targets are progressively tailored to the needs 
of the organizations and where commitment towards the achievement of results is 
stimulated through proper management of incentives and internal communication 
process. 
                                                 
12 Drawing from a review of studies and practices issued by OECD in 1999, key elements of RBM include: 
- Identifying clear and miserable objectives (results), with the aid of conceptual frameworks tailored for 
the mandates and mission of the organizations; 
- Selecting indicators that would be used to measure progress towards each objective; 
- Setting explicit targets for each indicator, used to judge performance; 
- Developing performance monitoring systems to collect data on actual results on a regular basis; 
- Analyzing and reporting actual results vis-a-vis the targets; 
- Integrating evaluations to provide complementary performance information not readily available from 
performance monitoring systems; 
- Using performance information for internal management learning and decision making and for 
external reporting. 
13 The work done by MItzutani, incorporated in a Joint Inspection Unit report is an early exercise exploring 
the RBB practices of the United Nation Organizations. The Finance and Budget Network of the United 
Nations CEB started in 2006 a Community of Practices in RBM; one of the first activities of the Community 
has been the realization of the survey on the state of the art of the RBM of the participant organizations –
ILO; UNESCO; ICAO; WHO; ITU; WIPO; IFAD; UNIDO; IAEA; UNDP; UNOPS; UNFPA; UNRWA; UNHCR; 
UNEP; WFP; UN-ESCAP; UN-HABITAT-. The synthesis is taken from the main points of this second work, 
and some comparative analyses are realized with the earlier study. 
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− Focus on specific tools rather than on the RBM process at large, in particular on the 
budgeting side. The abandonment of an input budget and the adoption of the 
programme and results-based budgeting has been chronologically speaking the first 
meaningful step towards the RBM model; RBB is supposed to provide a more 
meaningful allocation of resources and responsabilization of management on 
significant programme items and allows the organization to link monetary resources 
to quantifiable objectives; 
− Need to further develop the performance measurement system both in the 
designing phase –ability to tailor target measures in relation to the adopted logical 
frameworks and to adopt a relevant and non-redundant set of measures both at the 
field/operational level and at the corporate level- and in the implementation phase –
capacity to monitor and report on the results on a regular base with a sustainable 
workload-. For this reason, the introduction of the results-based reporting (RBR) 
happened more recently and the majority of the UN organizations began to produce 
these documents between 2000 and 2002; 
− On the management information systems pesrpective, significant improvements are 
expected from the adoption of the accrual accounting systems and the ERP 
systems, in order to add meaningful information on cost of activities and services 
(efficiency perspective) and to make easier the monitoring phase; 
− Lack of precise organizational collocation for units in charge of managing and 
feeding the information system behind the RBM tools and consequent lack of 
proper internal recognition for the RBM function, coupled with the progressive but 
still limited buy-in of the system by the line managers; 
− Embryonic design of the links between RBM and the system of incentives and in 
particular lack of meaningful link between performance measures in RBM, 
employees performance evaluation systems and consequent monetary 
compensation policies.  
 
Focusing the attention on the main tool of the RBM model, the result-based reporting 
represents a shift in the model of accountability used by the UN organizations which can 
be analysed both under an “internal” and an “external” perspective.   
Under the “internal” perspective, a shift is envisaged from a “traditional” to a “performance-
based” model of accountability, involving the evolution from bureaucratic to managerial 
controls. In other words, the responsibility for compliance -involving enforcement of rules, 
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formal legitimacy and inspective control- has to be replaced with a professional and 
anticipatory accountability, related to pro-active initiatives, capacity to pursue organisation 
outcomes and to act within an adaptive context, where the control function is shaped as a 
guide, rather than an inspection (Joint Inspection Unit, 1993; Abraszewski and others, 
1995).  
In the new model, accountability essentially means responsibility to someone for ones’ 
actions taken and results obtained: this refers to the responsibility of international civil 
servants to executive heads and to governing bodies and the latter’s responsibility in turn 
to member States and citizens. Obviously, the new model of accountability needs 
mechanisms to enforce the principle of responsibility, such as delegation of authority, 
flexibility of procedures and organisation processes, information systems supporting 
decision-making and management control, renewed competencies and attitudes by 
internal oversight services, effective programming and feed-back mechanisms, explicit 
mechanisms for evaluating resources and objectives. In this sense, organizations have 
adopted differentiated approaches and tools (Joint Inspection Unit, 1999). 
Under the “external” perspective, the reform aims at addressing the issue of weak 
connections among planning, programming, monitoring and evaluating phases, which 
affect the traditional external accountability of UN organisations. The reform requires 
organizations to design and implement a clear “accountability cycle”, where: i) member 
States in representative bodies focus primarily on setting measurable and time-bound 
goals, objectives and targets for the organization; ii) executive bodies ensure that the 
established goals and objectives are translated into effective programmes and activities 
and that resources are used efficiently for those purposes; iii) oversight bodies, both 
internal and external, satisfy member States’ information needs, while observing their 
respective mandates; iv) technical structures give a comprehensive reporting on 
discretionary resource allocation, financial performance and goals reached, coherently 
with the strategic framewok built up, activating feed-back mechanisms from the executive 
and representative bodies. 
Consequently, UN organizations have in the last few years reviewed the entire 
programming and reporting cycle, with the following trends: 
− Development of strategic frameworks embedded in medium-long term strategic 
plans (3 to 7 years), in which organizations fix the expected outcomes in relation to 
the Millennium Development Goals, common targets for the UN system; 
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− Evolution from an input-based budget to a result-oriented budget, which requests a 
radical change of the structure of financial statements (the appropriations are 
expressed by programmes and objectives rather than by the nature of economic 
factors) and a set of non-financial objectives operationalising the expected results of 
the organisation; 
− Development of a comprehensive reporting disclosing financial and non-financial 
performances. 
So far, the result based reporting may be considered the best example of the “anticipatory” 
accountability model envisaged by the managerial reform of the UN system. Professionals 
and constituencies demonstrated to appreciate this new tool; in the recent years specific 
guidelines have been developed for result based budgeting and reporting (RBB, RBR) in 
UN system14 in relation to the specificity of the organizational goals, the measurability of 
the results and the capacity to adapt the consolidated organizational culture. The donors’ 
community as well recently developed interest towards these practices and started to link 
their funding to the level of transparency and accountability, often considered as one of the 
proxies of the agency’s effectiveness15. 
For the mentioned reasons, we adopt the RBR as objective of our empirical study on 
factors inpacting on performance accountability of UN system organizations, which will be 
developed in the rest of the present work. 
                                                 
14 For further reference see for example CEB (2005).  
15 For example, the British Department for Foreign Interests (DFIF) developed a specific methodology to rate 
the development agencies’ effectiveness including the meaningfulness f the RBR as one of the main 
determinants: cfr. Scott A. (2005). 
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Chapter 3 
Factors Affecting Accountability: Development of the Hypotheses from 
Contingency and Legitimacy Theory Perspectives  
 
 
In the present chapter, we look for the identification of the relevant theoretical paradigms 
which can be used to explain the differences in the level of accountability of the IOs. The 
chapter proposes first a brief review of the relevant literature on the theoretical 
approaches, two related theoretical perspective, the contingency and the legitimacy 
theories are then adopted. These approaches have been traditionally considered as 
opposite or mutually exclusive, but the chapter points out the possibility so see them to 
some extent as complementary and to some extent alternative in terms of assumptions 
and rationales, mutually enriching the possible explanations for accountability trends. 
The two theories are analyzed in their logical and chronological development, their main 
criticisms are explained and the application to accounting clarified. The main findings of 
the literature drawn by the two theories are then used to develop a series of hypotheses 
regarding the factors influencing the IOs accountability both in terms of identification of the 
relevant influencing variables and of the direct or reverse relation between these and the 
level of accountability.  
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3.1 Theoretical Approaches to Accountability 
3.1.1. Theoretical Approaches to Accountability: an Overview 
Several rationales have been suggested to explain the level of transparency, 
accountability and disclosure of the enterprise. The main rationales taken into 
consideration in this study are decision usefulness, positive accounting theory, political 
economy theory, stakeholder theory. contingency theory and legitimacy theory. These 
frameworks are often strictly interrelated and complementary.  
The decision usefulness approach refers to a huge body of literature (see Gray and others, 
1995 for a review) which deals, from both a positive and a normative point of view, with the 
importance attributed by users to reporting information and in relation with their decision-
making. In this sense, reporting contents and presentation depend on the managerial 
perceptions of the main recipients’ needs. As extension of this postulate, the contents of 
financial reporting are also set in relation to the capacity of the recipients to understand 
different levels of information in a continuum between technical and non technical 
information.   
The positive accounting approach (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) develops a theory of the 
determination of accounting standards by studying lobbying behavior based on the 
assumption that self-interested managers will maximize a company’s wealth; an extension 
of this approach suggests that disclosure may by used by managers to pursuit their own 
wealth interests and it is hence related to the agency theory (for an analysis and critique, 
see Milne and Patten, 2002).  
According to the political economy of accounting approach, corporate disclosure can be 
designed to set the agenda and to mediate, mystify and shape the world (for instance, see 
Woodward and others, 2001). In this view, grounded on the notion of class contrasts, 
management uses accounting as a language to shape the desired image of the exchanges 
between the organization and its environment, in order to manipulate the political and 
economic agenda and to make the relevant interest converging on the company.  
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) is based on the idea that each company has a large 
number of counterparts, in addition to its shareholders. If this assumption holds, it is 
necessary to supply information to all these stakeholders, and to enlarge the functions of 
the company and corporate stewardship beyond its focus on shareholders (see Roberts, 
1992 for a review). In this sense, accountability features will be design in such a way to 
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maximize the expected contribution to the realization of its mission obtainable by the 
company in the relations with each relevant stakeholder category. In that, links with 
decision usefulness are quite visible. Consequently, the analysis of the information that the 
various stakeholder categories expect to find in organizations’ reporting and their impact 
on the content of relations with the organizations constitutes the basis for the design of the 
reporting contents.   
Legitimacy theory (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) is based on the idea that, in order to continue 
operating successfully, enterprises must act within the bounds of what society identifies as 
socially acceptable behavior (Richardson, 1997). This implies that a corporation will want 
its ‘social’ activities and impacts, at least, to appear (partly by means of disclosure) to be 
consistent with what society regards as appropriate and acceptable, so that they can be 
considered legitimate, thus enabling them to continue operating successfully (Davidson, 
1991; Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Contingency theory is based upon the assumption that 
organizations adapt their structures and systems to face the contingencies that their 
external environment poses to them (Chandler, 1962). Accounting is one of these systems 
and as such its main features tend to adapt to the relevant elements of the environment –
societal variables, stability and competitiveness of the environment; technology and 
industry, user characteristics and other sources of information, organizational attributes 
both “structural” (i.e. centralization) and “soft” (i.e. culture, nationality, leadership style) to 
maximize the impact on the performances of the enterprise (Thomas, 1991). 
 
3.1.2. Relations Between the Relevant Theories - Contingency and Legitimacy as 
Complementary Approaches to Accountability 
The last two theories are the most used in the managerial literature to interpret 
accountability trends; in particular within the literature dealing with the variables affecting 
organizational reporting (Merchant, 1981, 1984, Chenhall, 1994, O’Donovan, 2002, 
Thomas, 1999, Adams, 2002), contingency and legitimacy theories represent two of the 
main theoretical approaches adopted or tested. As the theoretical literature explains 
(Deegan 2002), these theories are strictly related as well. They both a refer to the political 
economy view of the enterprise and they belong to the so called system–oriented theories.  
System-oriented view of the organization permits to focus on the role of information  
(disclosure) and organizational systems in determining the relationships between 
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enterprises and its environment (Gray, 1996, Maurer and others, 1997). Within a system 
oriented perspective, the entity is assumed to be influenced by, and in turn to have 
influence upon, the society in which it operates. The perspective embraced in political 
economy theory and in all system oriented approaches is that society, politics and 
economics are inseparable and economic issues cannot be meaningfully investigated in 
the absence of considerations about the political, social and institutional framework in 
which the economic activity takes place. In particular, under these approaches, accounting 
reports are social, political and economic documents. They serve as a tool for 
constructing, sustaining and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, institutions 
and ideological themes for a pluralistic set of report recipients. 
If we take into consideration the stakeholder approach as a "descriptive" framework -
organizations are trying to maximize the relations with their relevant stakeholders, 
controlling core resources for the organizations, through managerial actions (such as 
disclosure) in order to survive-, stakeholder approach could be considered the logical 
bridge between legitimacy and contingency theory. Under the legitimacy approach, 
managers have an incentive to disclose information about their various programmes and 
initiatives to particular stakeholders (operationalizing the "society at large" stakeholder 
category) to indicate that they are conforming to the stakeholders' expectations to gain 
resources of legitimacy. Under a contingent point of view, relevant stakeholders shape and 
define the environment of an enterprise; in turn, the organization adapts the main features 
of its disclosure to fit with their interests, capabilities and needs and organizational 
complexity and activity; the fit with the environment ensure the survival of the enterprise. 
Consequently, legitimacy and contingency theories gives interrelated but complementary 
explanation of the accountability. 
On the legitimacy side the accountability is a tool to maximize and make up for the societal 
requests of a larger transparency and to avoid critics and legitimacy crises. Organizations 
hence put in action exogenous and often "cosmetic" adaptation strategies to constantly 
supply the legitimating resource. On the contingency side, this comes as "rational" 
adaptation of the accounting systems to more complex and competitive environment, 
requesting a larger disclosure and transparency, a more accurate accountability, a finer 
control. 
Because there is a deal of overlap between these two theories, and because they can 
provide slightly different and useful insights, there has been a move by some researchers 
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to use more than one theory to provide an explanation for managerial actions (i.e. Fiedler 
and Geegan, 2002).  
This is the analytical approach we will undertake in the present work, combining the main 
assumptions and statements of the theories to develop our hypothesis regarding the main 
factors affecting accountability in UN system environment. 
 
 
 
3.2. The Contingency Theory 
3.2.1 Overview of the Theory and Applications by International Literature 
 
3.2.1.1. The Paradigm 
The contingency theory approach to the study of organizations developed beginning in the 
1950's as a response to prior theories of management -from Scientific Management to the 
Human Relations movement to the Human Resources movement- that, despite their 
diversity, commonly emphasized "one best way to organize.  
This approach is summarized by Szilagyi and Wallace (1980): 
"The contingency approach attempts to understand the interrelationships within and 
among organizational subsystems as well as between the organizational systems as an 
entity and its environments. It emphasizes the multivariate nature of organizations and 
attempts to interpret and understand how they operate under varying conditions ..." 
Contingency theory has been developed in accordance with the open system theory, by 
which an enterprise interacts with, adapts to and seek to control its environment in order to 
survive and reach its goals. In particular, contingency theory postulates that the 
effectiveness of the organization in coping with the demands of its environment is 
contingent upon the elements of its various subsystems being designed in accordance 
with the demands of the environment which they interact with (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
The ability of an organization to implement, maintain and develop its subsystem 
accordingly with the “contingent” elements of its specific environment influences its ability 
to perform. Hence, the influencing variables, or “contingencies”, identified by the 
contingency theorists are expected to affect organizational performance to the extent that 
the design and implementation of the organization structure and subsystems (strategy, 
accounting, HR management tools) fit with the identified contingencies.  
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To this extent, several early studies attempted to operationalize and measure these 
influencing variables and determine their effects on performance. Seminal studies were 
done by researchers such as Lawrence and Lorsch 1967 (influence of the environment on 
organizational integration and differentiation), Burns and Stalker 1961 (influence of 
environment on organization structure), and Woodward 1965 (influence of the technology 
on organizational structure). 
There are a number of important assumptions in the contingency approach, some explicitly 
stated and others left implicit. Some of the important ones are listed in summary form 
below. 
− Fit. The better the fit among contingent factors (e.g. technology and organizational 
structure) and between them and the external environment determines, the better 
the performance of the organization. Performance is generally defined as a function 
of financial variables such as return on investment, profit or net wealth; 
− Rationality. Organizational actors perform in ways that are always in concert with 
the Super-ordinate goal of organizational effectiveness. As a consequence, there is 
always goal consensus among decision makers within an organization; 
− Situational determinism. For example, the environment is given and managers and 
thus organizations cannot influence it; 
− Deterministic models. Clear causal inference is often made; 
− Cross-sectional and non-historical empirical methods. Contingency theory 
applications use longitudinal studies strictly limited in time to demonstrate the 
envisaged relations; 
− Linear model of contingency variables. Most contingency studies rely on statistical 
methods which are based on the general linear model, e.g., regression. 
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3.2.1.2 The Concept of Fit 
The concept of fit is perhaps the most important theoretical assumption of the theory and 
its operationalization and application one of the most sensible elements; it should therefore 
be explored further. Drawing by the relevant literature (for a comprehensive review see 
Gerdin, Greve, 2003) many different forms of fit have been used in different streams of the 
theory. To explore these differences is important to understand the richness of the theory 
but at the same time its inherent diversity.  
A first distinction is made between a Cartesian approach and a Configuration approach. 
This division originates from the debate between advocates of a traditional “structural 
contingency theory” and their critics. The traditionalists argue that fit between context and 
structure is a continuum that allows frequent, small movements by organizations from one 
state of fit to another (see e.g. Donaldson, 1996). By contrast, analysts advocating a 
Configuration approach hold that there are only a few states of fit between context and 
structure, with organizations having to make “quantum jumps” from one state of fit to 
another (Meyer and others, 1993; Otley, 1980 and Mintzberg, 1983).  
The next distinction derives from Drazin and Van de Ven's (1985) division between a 
Congruence approach and a Contingency approach. The former assumes that only the 
best-performing organizations survive and therefore can be observed. Hence, the research 
task explores the nature of context-structure relationships without examining whether they 
affect performance. Under a Contingency approach, it is assumed that organizations may 
have varying degrees of fit. Thus, the researcher must show that a higher degree of fit is 
associated with better performance. In other words, fir is understood as a positive impact 
on performance due to certain combinations of context and structure. Accordingly, high 
performing as well as low performing firms do exist as a result of more or less successful 
combinations of context and structure (or by extension, organizational subsystems). 
A further distinction in the concept of fit is between Moderation and Mediation (Luft & 
Shields, 1999 and Shields, Shields, 1998). The former specifies that the effects of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable are a function of a moderating variable. In 
other words, it is assumed that the impact of an independent variable on the dependent 
variable is contingent on the level of a third variable, the so-called “moderator”. That is, the 
underlying theory specifies that the third variable moderates the effect that the 
independent variable has on the dependent variable (Luft, Shields, 1999 and 
Venkatraman, 1989). For example, different business strategies employed by firms may 
moderate the degree by which a certain management accounting design affects 
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performance. Significantly enough, following the theory, the moderator is not theoretically 
related with either the dependent or the independent variable (Shields and Shields, 1998). 
The mediation form of fit specifies the existence of a significant intervening mechanism 
between an independent variable and the dependent variable (Venkatraman, 1989). In 
contrast with the previous, it allows that one or more variables influencing performance 
can be dependent on each other, i.e. the design of management accounting system is 
dependent on the strategy, which, consistently with its degree of fitting with the 
environment, determine a good or bad performance. In this case, there is an assumption 
that management accounting system could be more or less significant and reliable in 
relation to a determined strategy, which in turn fits or do not fit with the contingency of the 
enterprise environment determining performances.  
Finally, the concept of fit is divided into two groups based on whether it depicts the 
strength of a relationship between variables, or its form (see i.e. Hartmann & Moers, 1999 
and Venkatraman, 1989). An example could better clarify the differences of the two 
perspectives. In a strategy-management accounting application, under a moderation 
model of fit, when researchers claim that the predictive ability/reliability of management 
accounting systems (MAS) on performance differs across different strategies, this 
proposition reflects the strength of the moderation. The “value” of correlation between 
MAS and performance for different strategies expresses the strength of predictive power. 
When researchers argue that the direction of the impact of MAS on performance differs 
across different strategies, they are making a statement about the form of the moderation.  
To summarize, many different forms of fit have been used in the strategy-MAS literature. 
Some conceptualizations are “mutually exclusive” inasmuch as their theoretical meanings 
are so different that results based on one form must not be related to results of the other 
(cf. the Cartesian and Configuration forms of fit). Other conceptualizations may be 
complementary—fit in one form reduces the probability of fitting in another form (cf. the 
Congruence and Contingency approaches). Finally, there are forms of fit that may result in 
corresponding results. However, there is no reason to expect that they should do so (cf. 
the strength and form variants of moderation fit). 
 
3.2.1.3 Development of the Theory and Applications 
The contingency theory is one of the most known and applied theories in managerial 
sciences. The development of contingency theory may be seen in terms of its historical 
evolution as an “ever expanding” theory. 
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Contingency theory was originally thought as an organizational theory whose explicative 
power was tailored on structural aspects of the organization and progressively expanded 
to embrace the main management tools and systems (information systems, accounting, 
human resource systems, risk management, etc.) the so-called organizational sub-
systems. In parallel with the expansion of the scope of the analysis, the chain of contingent 
factors influencing the organizational system has been enlarged to create a chain of 
influencing and “mediating” organizational factors explaining the association between 
environment and performance. 
 
The earliest work on the subject by Burns and Stalker (1961) emphasized the influence of 
environmental conditions, such as technological uncertainty, on organizational form. 
Around the same time, Woodward (1965) emphasized the technology employed by the 
firm as a key contingent variable. An example of such contingency would be the type of 
production system used in the firm. In the literature that followed, the list of contingencies 
was extended: to corporate strategy by Chandler (1962), and to market environment by 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). The more recent work of Anderson and Lanen (1999) 
emphasizes both the national culture and competitive strategy as having major effects on 
the organizational form. The scope of the contingency theory framework continues to 
expand both in terms of contingent variables and organizational systems object of 
investigation.  
The contingent perspective of organizational strategy developed along the assumption that 
“for a certain set of organizational and environmental conditions, an optimal strategy 
exists” (Harvey, 1982). In this sense, strategy has been viewed by some as adaptive and 
dependent variable or “the strategic response to independent contextual variables”, both 
external –environment features such as level of competition, stage of the product life cycle, 
exposure to international markets and new technologies- and internal –organizational 
features- (Schoonhoven, 1981, Harrigan, 1980). If, for some, strategy is conceptualized as 
a pattern of responses to the organizational and environmental contingencies, for others 
the choice of strategy itself is an important contingency for many administrative decisions 
such as organization structure, management systems, and choice of key accounting and 
HR management features (Ginsberg, Venkatraman, 1985). This is understandable in the 
light of the fact that given the complexity of the strategy concept (Ginsberg, 1984, 
Hambrick, 1980) researchers generally have focused their attention on exploring 
complementing “middle range” relationships. The general consequence of this branch of 
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literature is that improved business performance requires an organizational structure, 
information systems and management styles that are related to a firm specific strategy 
which in turn is fitting with the external environment (Miles and Snow, 1978; Hoque, 2004, 
Hofer 1975).  
The literature on contingency approaches of business strategy can be seen as pivotal to 
the development of the contingency theory as well. In fact, the recent literature focused on 
the impact of contingent organizational and environmental variables on the organizational 
subsystem as management information systems, accounting systems, human resources 
management systems (Miller 1992). The focus of these studies mainly concerns the 
effective design of these managerial systems in relation with the contingencies of the 
organization, and, while some of the studies are of a positive nature (see for example 
Nicolau 2000 on management information systems) most of them are of a prescriptive 
nature. In these applications, many of the organizational conditions of the enterprise –
management style, organizational culture, organizational structure, level of centralization 
and coordination/integration, governance and control- are intended as independent 
variables, sometimes second level ones, because influenced by other variables –
environment and technology- (mediation model), sometimes at the same level of the 
external ones (moderation model). Wide variations can be seen in the contingent 
organizational variables used by these studies, which is understandable in the light of the 
fact that many possible relations between organizational systems could be considered as 
relevant object of study.  
Among the most important studies of this category it is worth to remember the study of 
Kaplan and Mackey (1992), linking organizational structures and the relative level of 
centralization, line management autonomy and coordination among organization units to 
the design of the performance evaluation systems.  
Other relevant applications of the contingency theory on organizational subsystem concern 
for example the design of HR management systems and in particular the 
compensation/pay for performance strategies, in relation to environmental and technologic 
pressures (exposure to industry competition, obsolescence of technical knowledge), where 
the main elements of the strategy –balance between monetary and non monetary 
incentives, scale of monetary compensation, design of the performance evaluation 
appraisal measures- were considered as dependent variables (Balkin, Gomez-Mejia, 
1997). In the area of MIS the main dependent variable at the stake is the level of 
integration and automatization of the information systems, to be seen in relation with the 
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“technology” (nature of core operational processes) on one side, the business model 
(strategy) and the level of centralization and coordination on the other.  
The application to the management accounting systems and the financial reporting 
systems is the other main functional area where the theory has been applied, with different 
interests, ranging from the design of the management accounting systems to the 
periodicity and transparency of the financial reporting. This will be treated separately in the 
following paragraph.  
Regarding the sector of analysis, the literature on the public sector has largely used the 
contingency theory: 
− In a positive way, to explain and argument the need for a tailored approach to 
managerial systems and tools in the public sector organizations; 
− In a more prescriptive way, to explain some of the main shortfalls of the managerial 
reforms in the public organizations in the light of the poor customization of the 
traditional managerial tools to the reality and the environment of the public 
organizations.  
In this sense, the contingent variables have been often operationalized in the public sector 
environment differently from the typical business environment. In terms of external 
variables; the main elements taken into consideration are: i) the clash between political 
and technical rationalities on governance mechanisms; ii) the organizational culture and 
managerial styles, grounded in the bureaucracy model; iii) the lack of preparedness to 
change and iv) the incompatibility of some of the main features of managerial tools in 
business with the nature and the mission of the public sector organizations (Borgonovi, 
2000, 2005; Del Vecchio 2001). The contingent approach has been used for example to 
indicate the design of the performance evaluation systems in a consistent way with the 
absence of a single bottom line and the presence of a “triple bottom line” (Elkington, 1997), 
to draw attention on the link between (personnel) performance appraisal and monetary 
compensation strategies, to discuss the usefulness and the meaning of the transition to 
accrual accounting and to performance based budgeting and reporting models (Anessi, 
Steccolini 2005), to evaluate internalization/externalization options on the delivery of public 
services.  
Given the scope of this work, we have chosen to not even try to synthesize the use of the 
contingent approach in the public management literature, but just to offer some of the main 
references drawn from the Italian and international literature.  
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3.2.1.4. The Criticisms 
The contingency approach has been widely used and extensively developed over the 
years; it has been heavily criticized as well. Drawing by the relevant literature (Dent, 1990; 
Fisher, 1995; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1994; Langfield and Smith, 1997; Otley, 1980) the 
main criticisms can be summarized as follows: 
− Lack of empirical evidences on the relation between identified contingent factors 
and enterprises’ performances, coupled with the poorness of the methodologies 
used to test the relevant hypotheses, contrasting with the monotone and direct 
relations envisaged by the theory; 
− Ill defined concept of “fit” between contingencies (independent variables) and 
organizational systems/subsystems (dependent variables); 
− Fragmentation of the theory’s assumption and the lack of an overall framework for 
the analysis of the relationship between contingent factors and main features of 
accounting systems given by the contradictory results achieved over the years by 
different studies; 
− Lack of recognition of the possibility of non-rational objectives contributing to shape 
the organizational systems; 
− Fragmented operationalization of the contingency variables influencing the 
organizational systems –societal and environmental variables, technology and 
industry- and undecided relation between external and internal independent factors 
(see the differentiation between mediation and moderation approach in the previous 
paragraph). 
The over-riding criticism is that the contingency variables account for only a small 
percentage of the variance in performance. The presence of intermediate variables 
shaping the relationship between performance and organizational systems/subsystems 
counterbalance this criticisms; it is stronger for the studies belonging to the mediation 
approach and is often motivated by the fact that studies with a limited number of 
observations try to draw linear relations based on regression models. 
The critics argue that the weak empirical support to the main assumptions of the theory 
can be traced back to the ill-defined concept of "fit" and performance. In particular, we 
previously examined the differentiated operationalizations of the concept of fit in the 
various streams of the contingency theory –cartesian VS configuration model; congruence 
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VS contingency model; moderation VS mediation model; strength VS form model-, 
resulting in the difficulty to relate to findings of different streams and in claims of 
contradictory findings when is not necessarily the case (Gerdin, Greve, 2003).  
On the point of fragmentation, contingency theory has been criticized for being both too 
macro and too micro in its approach. Argyris (1977) point out that it is not possible to leave 
people out of the analysis. They argue that research must become more micro and bring in 
the values, perceptions, and attitudes of players. These shape behavior and ignoring them 
is to look at organizations as disembodied units. 
Critical theorists point out that contingency theory is too narrowly managerial and rational, 
of extreme positivist nature and underpinned with the firm belief in the existence of a 
measurable, albeit illusive, objective reality. They pointed out that contingency approach 
systematically excludes discussions of, for example, subjective judgement, non strictly 
rational objectives brought by powerful decision makers and class domination issues 
(Braverman, 1974, Edwards, 1979, Benson 83).  
On the absence of an overall framework, in an empirical test of the assumptions of 
contingency theory based on the work of Galbraith, Schoonhoven presented a number of 
damaging criticisms (Schoonhoven 1981). These include the lack of clarity in contingency 
theory arising from the ambiguous nature of statements used. Schoonhoven argues that 
contingency theory is not a theory at all but an orientating strategy with no substance.  
Trying to summarize all the various criticism to the theory, the most relevant lack of the 
theory seems grounded in the fact that, while general relations between organization, 
environment and performance seems to be founded and while the detailed relations 
between organizational subsystems and contingent variables seems reasonable and 
rationally grounded, there is a severe lack of empirical evidences of the association at this 
detailed level with the performance and hence a scarce explicative/predictive power of the 
theory in its more developed applications (for a review see Chapman, 1994). 
 
3.2.2 Use of Contingency Theory in the Accounting Literature 
3.2.2.1. Overview 
In accounting theory a traditional dilemma exists; on the one hand, there are those who 
seeks universal laws relating to the measurement of income, valuation of assets, etc. At 
the other extreme, there are those who argue that management has an incentive to select 
accounting methods under internal or external conditions suggesting the adoption of 
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determinate features. For example, the positive theory of accounting framework, argues 
that management has an incentive to select accounting methods which maximize 
shareholders’ wealth and that these depend on their relative income effects (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). The contingency perspective can be seen as an intermediate position 
in this dilemma, in that it provides an alternative to “universal truths” and standard settings 
on one hand and unique situational approaches on the other.  
The most prominent postulate of the contingency theory is that the design of the 
organization “subsystems” should be tailored on “contingent elements” such as 
environmental uncertainty, technology and organizational size. This has led several 
authors to suggest that a contingency framework may provide a more holistic approach to 
the design of financial and management accounting systems (Gordon and Miller, 1976, 
Hayes 1977; Waterhouse and Tissen 1978). The logical extension of these developments 
in organization theory is that variations in these influencing factors give rise to differences 
in corporate financial reporting systems (Thomas, 1986).  
According to contingency theory, the effectiveness of an organization in coping with its 
environment is contingent on its own interaction with different internal and external 
organizational sub-systems (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 
1967). Financial reporting represents one of these sub-systems with which the 
organization interacts and which in turn determines its organisational structure (Burrel and 
Morgan, 1979, Thomas, 1999, 1986). This contingent holistic approach to management 
accounting and corporate financial reporting is based on the assumption that there is no 
universally appropriate accounting and reporting system applicable equally to all 
organizations in all circumstances (Gordon and Miller, 1976, Hayes, 1977, Waterhouse 
and Tiessen, 1978, Emmanuel and others, 1990). In fact, the features of an appropriate 
system will depend on the specific circumstances in which an organization finds itself. How 
effective the design of the system depends on the organization’s ability to adapt to 
changes in external and internal factors (Haldma and Laats, 2002). Corporate financial 
reporting practices, forms and contents are then contingent on both internal and external 
constraints, such as organizational size, environmental uncertainty and technology 
(Thomas, 1999, Chenhall, 1994).  
The purpose of the two following paragraphs is to clarify the main conceptual elements of 
the contingency theory: the influencing variables and the main affected features of the 
financial reporting systems. The operationalization of the influencing factors and the 
relations between influencing variables and the features of accounting will be then further 
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explored in the hypothesis development paragraph, bringing together the assumptions of 
contingency and legitimacy theories. 
 
3.2.2.2. The Nature of Contingency Variables Influencing the Accounting Systems 
The most pervasive contingency theories of accounting identify a number of different 
classes or types of variables and a homogeneous classification is hard to find. For 
example, Gordon and Miller (1976) provide a framework comprising: environment; 
organization and decision making style. Similarly, Hayes (1977) cites three major 
contingencies, which consist of: environmental, interdependence (level of dependence of 
the organization from its environment) and internal. Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) 
develop a model based on two contextual variables, namely technology and environment.  
Drawing from the relevant literature and based on the review done by Thomas (1991) 
there are four main classes of contingent variables that may affect financial reporting 
systems, which consist of: i) societal variables; ii) the environment of the enterprise; iii) 
organizational attributes. The first category refers to elements of the economic, legal and 
political systems where enterprises operates; the economic system is often conceptualized 
in terms of methods of ownership of the means of production, the legal system in term of 
degree of codification (common/civil law), political systems are categorized on a continuum 
between democracy and oligarchic. Obviously this category of factors become relevant in 
comparison “across the border”, while for studies on national enterprises or heavily 
international organizations does not seem a relevant variable because of the difficulty to 
differentiate between players.  
The environment of the enterprise has been traditionally conceptualized in terms of 
“uncertainty”, having at least two dimensions: a “stable-dynamic” dimension and a 
“homogeneous-heterogeneous” dimension. Level of systematic risk and degree of 
competition contributes to both dimensions. 
There is some confusion in the contingency literature concerning the distinction between 
environmental variables and organizational attributes, understandable in the light of the 
difficulties in defining an organization. Generally speaking, organizational attributes are 
conceptualized in relation to the kind and amount of resource available for an enterprise 
and to the ways these are organized. Originally, in the contingency theory this mainly 
includes organizational size and technology, where the last variable was conceptualized 
as a proxy of the sector where the enterprises operate in terms of balance between 
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capital/labor intensive operations and in terms of core processes responsible for the value 
creation of the enterprise. In the development of the theory, the relevant elements of the 
corporate governance systems were included in this category of factors, such as for 
example the level of engagement of the stakeholder in the decision making, the presence 
of warranty mechanisms for legitimate interests, the concentration of ownership, the 
management style.  
Each of the mentioned variables has been operationalized in different ways; in the 
hypotheses development paragraph we will go through the relevant literature to find the 
right fit in relation to the reality of international public sector organizations. 
 
 
3.2.2.3. The Attributes of Accounting Systems Affected by Contingent Variables 
The main interest of the contingency literature has been towards financial reporting. 
Relying again on the review done by Thomas, 1991, the main affected characteristics can 
be summarized as follows: 
− Disclosure, classification, presentation, valuation and measurement requirements of 
different countries; 
− Frequency of the reporting, methods of measuring events, time element of 
information (i.e. forecasts), degree of aggregation and decentralization 
(consolidated accounts and segmental reporting), cost allocation methods 
(expenses versus capitalization, period of amortization) and disclosure of special 
purpose reports such as value added statements, employment reports and other 
forms of social accounting 
− Methods of reporting (e.g. statements, charters and diagram), its cognitive 
complexity (readability) and disclosure of certain special purpose reports, such as 
simplified accounts.  
Management and performance reporting has been analyzed (Chenhall and Morris, 1986, 
2003; Covaleski 1996) in terms of: kinds of performance measures 
(quantitative/qualitative), structure and detail of the reporting; kinds of recipients and 
periodicity of the reporting; reliance of the performance measures in relation to the 
organizational goals and strategies.  
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3.3. The Legitimacy Theory 
3.3.1 Overview of the Theory and Applications by International Literature 
3.3.1.1. The Paradigm 
Legitimacy theory is built upon the construct of the political economy theory and the 
resource dependence theory. Consistently with the view that organizations are part of a 
broader social system, the perspectives provided by legitimacy theory indicate that 
organizations are not considered to have an inherent right to resources or, in fact, to exist. 
Organizations exist to the extent that a particular society confers upon the organization the 
state of legitimacy. This is consistent with Mathews (1993) who states: “the social contract 
would exist between corporations and individual members of society. Society provides 
corporations with their legal standing and attributes and the authority to own and use 
natural resources and to hire employees”.  
In other words, the idea of "legitimacy" can be directly related to the concept of a "social 
contract" as referred to above by Matthews. Specifically, it is considered that an 
organization's survival will be threatened if society perceives that the organization has 
breached its social contract. Where society is not satisfied that the organization is 
operating in an acceptable, or legitimate, manner, then society will effectively revoke the 
organization's "contract" to continue its operations. As a theoretical construct, the terms (or 
clauses) of its social contract cannot be known with any precision, and different managers 
will have different perceptions about the various terms of the contract(s).  
Gray (1996) suggests that legal requirements provide some explicit terms of the contract, 
while other non legislated societal expectations embody the implicit terms of the "contract". 
It is in relation to the composition of the implicit terms of the "contract" that we can expect 
managers' perceptions to vary greatly. Legitimacy itself has been defined. 
Legitimacy is considered to be a resource on which an organization is dependent on for 
survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975); however, it is a "resource" that the organization can 
impact or manipulate (Woodward and others, 2001). Consistently with the resource 
dependence theory, legitimacy theory would suggest that whenever managers consider 
that the supply of a particular resource is vital to organizational survival, then they will 
pursue strategies to ensure the continued supply of the resource. In relation to legitimacy, 
the organization can (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002): 
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− Adapt its output, goals and methods of operation to conform to prevailing definitions 
of legitimacy; 
− Attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of social legitimacy so that it 
conforms to the organization's present practices, outputs and values; 
− Attempt, through communication, to become identified with symbols, values or 
institutions which have a strong base of legitimacy. 
In other words, an organization could employ substantive or symbolic means to seek 
legitimacy. While the substantive management produces actual changes by or within the 
organization, symbolic management refers to the attempt to appear consistent with one’s 
external expectations in order to be able to continue business as usual (see i.e. Ashforth 
and others, 1990, Richardson, 1995). 
Returning to the idea of a social contract, which is central to the notion of organizational 
legitimacy, there are often several contracts to whom the managers perceived to be linked, 
in relation with the different interests, stakeholders within the broad category of the society 
at large (employers, environmentalists, local communities where the organizations 
operates) and elements defining the concession of the legitimacy to operate.   
The concept of legitimacy is dynamic in itself and is linked to management perceptions 
(Lindblom 1994). An organization's level of legitimacy may change or be lowered for 
several reasons: societal perceptions and expectations about externalities generated by 
certain industries or operational processes, events detrimental for the reputation of the 
organization or the industry, adverse social or environmental events that are linked to the 
operations of the organization, media and public opinion attention. Sethi (1977) for 
example, suggests that the source of a legitimacy gap may involve changing societal 
expectations resulting from a gradual awareness of some matters (Tobacco companies, 
started coming under fire as more information was gleaned about the potential health 
effects of cigarette smoking). Alternatively, a legitimacy gap may arise out of new 
information suddenly gained about an organization, particularly if it differs from the 
organization’s image (Miles and Camerun, 1982). In this sense, when a legitimacy gap is 
perceived by managers a legitimacy strategy is activated. Moreover, the greater the 
probability of diverse shifts in the social perceptions of how organization is acting, the 
greater the likelihood for managers to attempt to manage these shifts in social perception 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, Lindblom, 1994).  
This view is expanded and enriched by some scholars (i.e. O’Donovan, 2002) who 
envisage that specific legitimating strategies can be differently addressed and tailored to 
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recover, maintain or strengthen the legitimacy level of the organization. 
 
3.3.1.2. Development of the Theory and Applications 
The legitimacy theory has not developed as a contingent theory but as an umbrella of 
concepts stemming from a variety of disciplines, ranging from resource dependence theory 
over new institutionalism to management theory (for an overview, see Suchman, 1995); 
hereby we offer two examples concerning two main aspects of the theory. 
Two main different “traditions” of legitimacy approaches have explained the motivations 
behind the research for legitimacy have been analyzed and developed differently by the 
legitimacy theorists belonging to the “strategic” and “institutional” approaches. From a 
strategic point of view, the focus rests on the organization (managers looking out) and 
assumes a relatively high degree of managerial control over the legitimating process 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994, Perrow 1961); this is the closer branch to the 
managerial, resource dependence and stakeholder theories. In the institutionalist tradition, 
a broader perspective is taken (society looking in) focusing on how organizations or 
groups of organizations adapt to their institutional environments in order to manage 
legitimacy. Here legitimacy is not seen as a resource but rather as a set of external 
constraints forming the actions of the organization (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983, Hahn, 
2004, Suchman, 1995, Zucher, 1987). 
The second aspect is strictly related to the first one, depending on the different theoretical 
arrays, the concept of legitimacy and its perception vary widely and a number of subtypes 
of organizational legitimacy have been identified. A distinction can be made between 
pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). While 
the first type is grounded in the self interest of the organization’s stakeholders, aiming for 
influence or a tangible return in exchange for granting legitimacy, moral legitimacy is 
based on a conscious judgment of the audience whether the actions of the organizations 
should be granted with moral approval or not. In contrast with the pragmatic legitimacy, the 
decision is not merely based on self-interest calculations (Hahn, 2005). The third type, 
cognitive legitimacy, is fundamentally different from the former two in that it is not the result 
of a communicative discourse between the organization and/or its stakeholders (Scott, 
1995). Instead, it is based on cognition, either because the organization itself or its actions 
are comprehensible or are taken for granted (Suchman, 1995). To this extent, two main 
kind of legitimacy process exists, the “preconscious” (taken for granted approach) and the 
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“post-conscious” (based on an evaluation process). 
 
3.3.1.3. The Criticisms 
Legitimacy theory has been widely used to analyze social and environmental reporting and 
a mounting evidence that managers adopt legitimating strategies have been brought in the 
last twenty years of literature.  
One of the main critics moved to some applications of the legitimacy theory is the creation 
of strong causal relations between social/environmental performance and legitimizing 
behaviors while hiding intermediate factors. One of the general assumptions of the theory 
is that the extent of information provided by organizations in their reports is a function of 
exposure to public pressure in the social and political environment. Based on this theory, 
enterprises facing greater exposure, as firms with poorer environmental performance are 
assumed to do, would be expected to provide more extensive disclosure in an attempt to 
address the increased threats to their legitimacy as “citizens”. As such, a negative 
association between an enterprise’s social performance and its environmental disclosure 
is posited to exist. However, examinations of the performance/disclosure relation report 
mixed results. Patten (2002), for example, reviews the earlier investigation of the relation 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure and notes that, in 
general, these studies fail to document any significant relation, positive or negative, 
between performance and disclosure. This is because, other scholars argument 
(O’Donovan 2002; Patten, 2002), these studies fail to take into account other important 
intermediate factors impacting on the perceived legitimacy of the enterprise, such as 
industry, media attention, particular events and scandals. Significant part of the following 
literature has developed in this direction. 
In second, as a theory based on managers’ perceptions of social contracts and potential 
breaches thereof, legitimacy theory does suffer resultant problems in relation to precision 
of prediction, linked for example to the difficulty to foresee the sensitivity to legitimacy 
threats (Deegan, 2002). Further, even if managers were to agree on when and whether 
there is a legitimacy threat, conceivably different managers will adopt different legitimizing 
strategies from the array of possibilities that would be available – and again any prediction 
would be problematic. Along these lines, critics of this point state that legitimacy theory 
does arguably provide useful insights into the managerial decision-making process, which 
is left largely unexplored by the theory. 
Finally, while legitimacy theory might provide useful insights, it can still be considered an 
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underdeveloped theory. There are many gaps in the literature which embraces legitimacy 
theory (Deegan, 2002). For example, do legitimizing activities actually work and if so, 
which forms of disclosure media are more successful in changing community views about 
an organization (see Milne, Patten 2002)? Further, there is still a general lack of 
knowledge about whether particular groups in society are relatively more influenced by 
legitimizing disclosures than others, or indeed, whether managers think particular groups 
are more readily influenced than others. Also, how do managers most effectively become 
aware of community concerns and therefore, the terms of the “social contract”? How do 
managers determine which segment of society (referred to as “conferring publics” by 
O’Donovan 2002 or “relevant publics” by Lindblom, 1993) are conferring the much needed 
legitimacy? What is the relative explicative power of legitimacy in relation to alternative 
approaches to accountability such as contingency theory? These questions are for the 
future literature to answer,  
 
3.3.2 Use of Legitimacy Theory in the Accounting Literature 
3.3.2.1. Overview 
Legitimacy theory is grounded on social and political theory studies (Cooper and Sherer, 
1984; Deegan and others, 2002; Gray and others, 1995; Gray, 2002; Tilt, 1994; Tinker and 
others, 1991, Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005). It posits that organizations are 
continually seeking to ensure that they operate within the bounds and norms of society 
(Blomquist and Deegan, 2000). Consistently, Richardson (1987) asserts that accounting is 
a legitimating institution and provides means to link social values with economic actions.  
Because the theory is based on perceptions, any remedial strategies implemented by the 
manager, to have any effect on external parties must be accompanied by disclosure. The 
Information is in fact necessary to change societal ad stakeholder perceptions.  
Remedial actions which are not publicized will not be effective in changing perceptions 
(Comier and Gordon, 2001). This perspective highlights the strategic importance and 
power of corporate disclosures, such as those made within annual reports, "performance 
reports" or "social and environmental reports", which have always been the main object of 
observation of the legitimacy theorists.  
According to the legitimacy theory, disclosure is the main tool because, being the 
legitimacy process based on perceptions, both the substantive and cosmetic initiatives are 
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communicated though company reports. More in general, through disclosure organization 
can seek to (Lindblom, 1994): 
− Educate and inform relevant publics about actual changes in the organization's 
performance and activities; 
− Change perceptions of the relevant publics but not change its actual behaviors; 
− Manipulate perceptions by deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other 
related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols, or 
− Change external expectations on its performances. 
The legitimacy literature has been mainly focused on the social and environmental 
accounting and reporting (SEA and SER) issued by the private companies, both 
incorporate in the annual reports or as a separate document. More recently, the legitimacy 
approach or related approaches (accountability as managerial fashion tool) has been 
applied to performance budgeting and reporting issued by domestic public sector 
organizations (Carlin and Guthrie 2003; P. Aucoin, R. Heintzman 2000; Marcuccio, 
Steccolini 2005). 
The interest of the legitimacy literature on the SEA has been strongly influenced by an 
early paper from Guthrie and Parker (1989). The authors sought to match the disclosure 
practices of BHP across the period 1885-1995 with an historical account of major events 
relating to BHP’s history. The argument was that if corporate disclosure policies are 
reactive to major social and environmental events, then there should be correspondence 
between peaks of disclosure and events which are significant in BHP’s history.  Whilst the 
paper does not provide evidence supportive of the legitimacy theory, a large number of 
subsequent research studies have been used to refine their arguments (Patten, 2002, 
1995; Gray 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan And Gordon, 1996; Walden and 
Shwarts.  
Two main areas of research and interest are the identification of the most effective means 
of communication managers can use to change societal perspectives on the company 
(Milne, Patten 2002) and the identification of the most effective groups within the society in 
conferring legitimacy to the enterprise (this branch of the literature has significant 
overlapping with the stakeholder theorists, see i.e. Mitchell and others, 1997). Other topic 
heavily assessed by the literature focusing on quantitative research methodology is the 
demonstration of the inverse relation between disclosure and social/environmental 
performance; Patten presents a critical review of this studies, stating that they miss to 
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consider other important intermediate variables influencing SEA and SE disclosure 
(industry, scandals and exceptional events, dynamic of societal expectation, change in 
management, etc.; Halme, Huse, 1997). Another part of the literature build on and try to 
demonstrate that managers’ legitimizing strategies will conceivably differ depending upon 
whether they are trying to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy of their organization –to 
maintain is easier than to repair or to gain- and that different organizations have different 
levels of legitimacy to maintain with the implication that the more the organization relies on 
its level of legitimacy to reach its bottom line or institutional goals, the more vigilant it 
needs to be to potential legitimacy threats (i.e. O’Donovan, 2002). Here it comes the part 
of the literature closer to the managerial behavior and decision-making process: some 
scholars concentrated on managers’ and investors’ reaction to particular events 
(O’Donovan 2002; Milne and Patten 2002). These studies are often simulation of 
managerial and investment decisions (for which data are from primary or secondary 
resources) to raise the predictive power of the theory in the causal relation between 
contingencies and legitimating strategies. A related but independent focus of the literature 
consists in exploring the managerial perceptions about motivations for corporate societal 
reporting; these studies are mainly intended to understand the relevance of social 
pressures and to assess the explicative power of the legitimacy approach (Mohamed and 
others, 1999; Neu and others, 1998). 
 
3.3.2.2. The Nature of the Legitimizing Factors Affecting Accountability 
Similarly to contingency literature, the strategic branch of the legitimacy theory recognizes 
that the main factors affecting the extent and the nature of ethical, social and 
environmental reporting are size, industry, political and social issues, economic context 
and internal processes (for a review see Adams, 2002; Halme, Huse, 1997). In particular, 
some scholars as Patten (see the author’s review at 2002) state how societal expectations 
towards companies in terms of sustainability, corporate social responsibility, etc., which 
are directly determined by the political and social context where the enterprise operates, 
can be directly related to the size, the sensitivity of the industry in relation to the main 
externalities, the peculiar technology, materials and human resources implied in the core 
operational and support processes. As some scholars suggest (i.e. O’Donovan, 2002) 
managerial changes and perceptions could also be strongly influential factors to take into 
consideration, even if difficult to operationalize and measure.  
In this sense, as we will see more in depth in the next paragraph, several influencing 
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variables are the same of the contingency theory, -internal organizational variables, 
external contingency variables- but the motivating factors for the disclosure are often 
opposite or alternative.  
 
3.3.2.3. The Attributes of Accounting Systems Affected by Legitimizing Factors 
The legitimacy literature has traditionally analyzed the extent of social and environmental 
disclosure released by the analyzed companies. Some researches used the extent of 
social and environmental information intended as “other” or residual elements, intended to 
distract attention on the main economic indicators and performance financial (Deegan, 
2002). A considerable amount of researches focus exclusively on the environmental 
contents of the disclosure and it is often the case that the notion of “social” disclosure 
encompasses the environmental aspects as well (see for example the analysis by 
Lindblom, 1984, McGavin, 1991). Several studies drawn from the legitimacy approach 
uses the content analysis method to identify some sort of accountability indexes (i.e. Van 
Staden, Hooks, 2007); some of these studies try to link main accountability features to 
some relevant stakeholders’ information interests and level of technical understanding 
(see for example Mitchell and others, 1996; Guthrie and others, 2003).  
An interesting part of this literature focuses on the content of the disclosure in relation to 
what is “true” or in relation to the balance between what is said and what reporting avoid to 
mention (Deegan, Rankin, 1996).  
In relation to the process involved in Social Environmental Reporting (SER), scholars 
analyzed the existence and the depth of a social and environmental accounting system as 
indicator of substantive strategies as opposed to a cosmetic SER. A further interesting 
analytical perspective is the effectiveness of the disclosure/communication tool -internet 
site, paper based, etc.-.  
If compared with the contingency theory, legitimacy seems to focus mainly on the SEA and 
related disclosure, being of main interest both the extent and the kind information provided 
by the organizations and the balance between substantial disclosure and cosmetic 
communication strategies to raise stakeholders’ perceptions on the level of transparency 
of an organization.  
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3.4 Factors Affecting Accountability: Development of Hypotheses from 
Contingency and Legitimacy Literature 
The two analyzed bodies of literature identify different, sometimes overlapping, categories 
of factors affecting external reporting and often identify divergent causal relations. As 
analyzed in the previous paragraphs, literature applying contingency and legitimacy theory 
to accounting systems categorized in different ways and at different levels of detail the 
factors influencing the organizational subsystems of an enterprise.  
In the present work we try to offer a reasoned and balanced categorization of these 
factors, re-classifying the factors mentioned by the relevant existing literature in three 
broad categories: 
− Organizational, concerned with general characteristics of an organization;  
− Corporate governance, more specifically related to the ownership, the stakeholder 
access to governance and the main decision making rules; 
− External, regarding environmental and technological characteristics outside the 
organization. As showed further in the paper, these categories can be helpful to 
systematize factors under both a contingency and a legitimacy perspective.  
In the following three sub-sections we will proceed in the following way:  
− We will identify and explain the relevant factors affecting reporting features, drawing 
both by contingency and legitimacy theory;  
− We will state the kind of relation – direct or reverse- envisaged by the two theories 
for each of the identified influencing variables;  
− We will formalize the envisaged relations as relevant hypothesis for the present 
study, with the intent to understand the explicative power of each of them in the 
analyzed environment.  
As a methodological note, it should be noted that in the hypotheses development we do 
not consider accountability level as a whole, but we follow a more specific distinction 
between “financial” accountability and “non financial” accountability.  
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3.4.1 Organizational Factors  
According to contingency approaches, managerial choice of corporate financial reporting 
practices is considered as being contingent upon internal and external constraints 
(Thomas, 1999), such as organizational attributes (resources available to an organization), 
organizational structure (specialization, standardization, centralization, etc.), size, etc. (see 
Cowen and others 1987, Deegan and Gordon 1996, Grey et al 1995, Hackson and Milne 
1996, Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Trotman and Bradley 1981; Merchant, 1981, 1984; 
Mia and Chenhall, 1994, Chenhall, 2003).  
As organizations become larger, the need for handling and providing greater quantities of 
information increases and leads to richer and more detailed control and reporting tools 
(Khandwalla, 1972, Child and Mansfield, 1972, Burns and Waterhouse, 1975, Merchant, 
1981, Anderson and Lanen, 1999, Haldma and Loots,  2002).  
The general concept of dimension can assume different meanings, but mainly develops in 
two ways: 
− As organization’s size, expressed in terms of resource availability; 
− As organization’s complexity. 
The organization’s size is traditionally translated into resource availability. Organizational 
size can affect the choice of accounting methods and disclosure practices. In fact, a higher 
amount of resources to manage requires more structured administrative processes, which 
in turn determines greater attention to the organizations’ accountability.  
Size is a variable traditionally used by the contingency theory. However, it should be noted 
that some of the legitimacy studies used the size in an instrumental way to demonstrate 
that the biggest companies, being more visible, exposed and impacted to the societal and 
media opinion, are more sensitive towards SER and adopt more aggressive legitimizing 
strategies. In this sense, the legitimacy theory goes in the same direction predicting that 
the bigger enterprises will disclose more information regarding social and environmental 
aspects, so basically non financial aspects. 
Organizational complexity has been operationalized in various ways by the previous 
literature as organizational model adopted (divisional, matrix, etc.) level of independence 
of divisions, geographical dispersion of the enterprise. In the present study we chose to 
measure complexity with the number of employees, which can be considered a good proxy 
of administrative complexity, is a fairly “objective” measure and has been used by several 
studies. As the complexity grows it might be expected that: i) the volume of information 
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needed to manage the organization and that ii) the volume of information request for 
disclosure related to personnel grows in parallel (i.e. positions, tasks, gender information, 
etc.) (Adams, 2002, Thomas, 1999, Trotman and Bradley,1981, Adams and others, 1998, 
Cowen and others, 1987, Hackson and Milne, 1996, Patten, 1991). Thus, it may be 
hypothesized: 
 
Hp1  a) The higher the resource availability for an organization, the higher the amount 
of financial information disclosed in the report. 
 b) The higher the resource availability for an organization, the higher the amount 
of non financial information disclosed in the report. 
 c) the higher the level of organizational complexity in terms of number of people 
employed by the organization, the higher the amount of non-financial information 
disclosed in the report. 
 
According to contingency theory, the degree of decentralization can be considered a 
further factor influencing disclosure. (Chenhall & Morris, 1986, Chia, 1995, Libby & 
Waterhouse, 1996, Tornqvist, 1999, Berland, 2001). More decentralized organizations 
must control more complex flows of information and processes and eventually are 
themselves more complex. Consistently with this literature, the amount of externally 
disclosed information (both financial and non-financial) is expected to be positively related 
to the level of organizational decentralization: 
 
Hp2  a) The higher the organizational level of decentralization, the higher the amount of 
financial information disclosed in the report. 
b) The higher the organizational level of decentralization, the higher the amount of 
non-financial information disclosed in the report. 
 
Finally, according to contingency theory financial performance –differently measured in the 
private company environment in terms of profit, return on asset or investments, etc.- 
represents the final result of the fit between organizational and environmental variables. 
Basically, the theory predicts that organizations with a higher level of accountability are 
better adapting organizations and are consequently better performing organizations. 
In the reality of the public sector organizations the absence of a single bottom line does 
not allow to consider the equivalent of “profit” -or, expressing the concept in cash terms, 
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the amount of savings the organization is able to realize- as a measure of financial 
performance. This variable can be further specified in two dimensions: 
1 organizational capacity to attract financial resources; 
2 organizational capacity to use the available financial resources. 
Briefly, for a public organization the financial performance could be measured with the 
capacity to attract resources to be spent for its objectives (the increment of resources 
spent in the public interest is the proxy of performance in this case). Alternatively, the 
traditional measure used by the public sector accounting literature (Anessi and Steccolini 
2005) is the capacity to fully use the available financial resources. 
As a consequence, the following hypotheses can be formulated:  
 
Hp3  a) The better the organization’s past performance in attracting financial resources, 
the higher the amount of financial information in the report. 
b) The better the organization’s past performance in attracting financial resources, 
the higher the amount of non-financial information in the report. 
c) The better the organization’s past performance in using financial resources, the 
higher the amount of financial information in the report. 
d) The better the organization’s past performance in using financial resources, the 
higher the amount of non-financial information in the report. 
It should be noted that the outlined hypotheses 3b) and 3d) clash with the legitimacy 
theory perspective (see for example Edwards, 1998; Hackson and Milne, 1996, Roberts, 
1992), which predicts that a bad financial performance -in our case is a bad performance 
in attracting or using financial resources- is associated with higher disclosure on peripheral 
elements (such as social and environmental policies) in order to “justify” the organization’s 
results and re-orient stakeholders’ attention. 
 
3.4.2. Corporate Governance Factors 
Corporate governance has been addressed both by authors referring to contingency and 
legitimacy theory, and is generally related to ownership and internal functioning (Thomas, 
1999, Adams, 2002). 
The literature suggests that good corporate governance is associated with increased 
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transparency and clear financial disclosures (Whittington, 1993, Forker and Green, 2000, 
Mallin, 2002, Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005). An emerging body of literature identifies 
links between governance style and legal, financial and accounting systems (Carlin and 
Meyer, 1999; Bushman and Smith, 2000). In general, corporate governance attributes 
identified as affecting external reporting include: the ownership structure (Craswell and 
Taylor 1992; Mckinnon and Dalimunthe 1993; Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; Raffournier 
1995, Halme and Huse, 1997), the existence of dominant personalities outside the formal 
ownership structure and composition (Millstain, 1992, Ruland and others, 1990), the 
proportion or existence of independent directors (Forker, 1992; Malone and others, 1993), 
the appointment of a non-executive director as chairman and the existence of an audit 
committee (Forker 1992). 
Although mandatory disclosure rules ensure equal access to basic information, they have 
to be supported by voluntary disclosure of the firms and information provided by 
intermediaries (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Malone and others, 1993; Raffournier 1995; 
Lang and Lundholm 1996). There are many market incentives to disclose information 
voluntarily and managers’ attitudes change according to the perceived relationship of the 
costs and benefits involved (Gray and others, 1990; Healy and Palepu 1995; Simon and 
Kar Shun Wong 2001). Bushman and Smith (2000) see financial reporting as the outcome 
of financial and legal aspects of corporate governance. Legal protection of investors and 
concentration of ownership are identified as fundamental elements which characterize 
corporate governance systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Coffee, 1999). They have 
traditionally been found to be negatively related (Franks and Mayer, 1998). Wang and 
Coffey (1992) propose a positive relationship between ownership dispersion and the 
diffusion of environmental issues from the organization. Nevertheless, different authors 
(Blair, 1995; Monks and Minow, 1995; Jensen, 1989) have claimed that an active and 
concentrated ownership can make the organizations consider environmental issues as 
important in order to improve reputation and gain more public legitimacy under a long-term 
strategy.  
Therefore, two different relationships can be identified drawing on the two different 
theories at the stake. According to contingency theory, the concentration of ownership and 
the existence of dominant personalities among stakeholders are expected to lead to 
fragmented information and to align reporting contents to prevailing clusters of interests, 
with a consequent lower degree of accountability. This is given by the fact that the most 
prominent personalities are directly involved in the decision making and do not need 
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formal disclosure to satisfy their needs. On the opposite, consistently with a legitimacy 
view, a higher organization’s bargaining power is expected to be associated with greater 
attention to external disclosure. This would be consistent with a long-term legitimating 
strategy of the organization’s dominant personalities, seeking to legitimize their operate 
and to maintain high collection of contributions levels or low levels of arrears. 
 
Hp4 a) The higher the concentration of ownership, the lower the amount of financial 
information disclosed in the report.  
b) The higher the concentration of ownership, the lower the amount of non-financial 
information disclosed in the report.   
c) The higher the organization’s bargaining power towards its stakeholders, the 
higher the amount of financial information disclosed in the report.  
d) The higher the organization’s bargaining power towards its stakeholders, the 
higher the amount of non-financial information disclosed in the report.   
 
Moreover, drawing from a “rational” contingency perspective, we expect the presence of 
investors’ legal protection mechanisms to be positively associated with organizational 
accountability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Coffee, 1999). We could say that, more in 
general, the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies and decision-making 
activities is expected to be associated with a higher degree of organizational accountability 
thanks to the higher allowed involvement. Similarly, the presence of interest warranty 
mechanisms for stakeholders not represented in executive bodies might increase 
organizational disclosure because of this warranty function.  
 
Hp5  a) The higher the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies and decision-
making activities, the higher the amount of financial information disclosed in the 
report. 
b) The higher the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies and decision-
making activities, the higher the amount of non-financial information disclosed in the 
report. 
c) The presence of interest warranty mechanisms for stakeholder not represented in 
executive organs enhances the amount of financial information disclosed in the 
report. 
d) The presence of interest warranty mechanisms for stakeholder not represented 
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in executive organs enhances the amount of non-financial information disclosed in 
the report. 
 
3.4.3. External Factors 
The main external factors examined at the organizational level in accounting research are 
related to environmental uncertainty and technology (Khandwalla, 1977; Merchant, 1990; 
Chapmann, 1997; Hartmann, 2000; Thomas, 1999; Adams, 2002; Chenhall, 2003).  
As far as the former is concerned, Merchant (1990) shows that environmental uncertainty 
generates a trade-off between the pressure to meet financial targets and the flexibility due 
to a higher possibility of information manipulation. According to contingency theory, 
environmental uncertainty can be operationalized through two main dimensions (Thomas, 
1999):  
− stable vs. dynamic -the degree to which external factors affecting organization’s 
decision-making processes remain basically the same over time-;  
− homogeneous vs. heterogeneous -the degree to which external factors affecting 
organization’s decision-making processes are few and similar-. 
In the contingency approach of the organization, environmental dynamism creates the 
need for the organizations to manage different conditions and different relations in a short 
period of time, this in turn stimulates the accounting and reporting systems (Thomas, 
1986). Consequently, financial reporting is expected to exhibit: i) greater disclosure of non-
financial information on organizational activities (e.g. changes in market conditions); ii) 
increased frequency (interim reports with more information, segmental or consolidated 
reports); iii) disclosure of more forecast information relating to the organization’s future 
perspectives (profit forecasts, proposed capital expenditure) and iv) greater conservatism 
in the allocation of expenses.  
Furthermore, when environmental heterogeneity increases the reporting system will be 
adapted to specific environmental sub-segments and information will be 
compartmentalized to enable investors to evaluate the contribution given by the different 
areas of activity, which fosters the production of segmental reports. Drawing on the 
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existing contingency literature we investigate the following relationships16: 
Hp6  a) The higher the environmental uncertainty, the higher the amount of financial 
information disclosed in the report. 
b) The higher the environmental uncertainty, the higher the amount of non-financial 
information disclosed in the report. 
 
The level of market dependence seems to be important under both legitimacy and 
contingency views. According to the former approach, the growing capitalization of a 
company and the differentiation of the sources of funding positively influence the amount 
of information disclosed to the public (Thomas, 1999, Adams, 2002). Milne and Patten 
(2002) have shown that the amount of disclosure positively influences market investment 
decisions, at least in the long run. Thus, we expect organizations with a higher amount of 
resources obtained from the market to disclose a higher amount of information disclosed in 
their reports. 
 
Hp7  a) The higher the organization’s market dependence, the higher the amount of 
financial information disclosed in the report.  
b) The higher the organization’s market dependence, the higher the amount of non-
financial information disclosed in the report. 
 
Finally, drawing on contingency theory, the so called technological factors are considered; 
these factors include for example the nature of the production process, its degree of 
routines and the variety of tasks (Emmanuel, and others, 1990, Haldma and Loots,  2002). 
Drawing on the concept of technology, a new not investigated variable is proposed which 
further specifies organizational tasks: the type of performed activity. In the literature on 
public sector organizations, three main types of activities are acknowledged (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Anessi Pessina, 2002, Borgonovi, 2004): (i) regulation, which in 
administrative bureaucracies has changed its focus over time shifting from a “rowing” 
                                                 
16 It was not possible to find in legitimacy literature studies of hypotheses concerning environmental 
uncertainty; at the same time, environmental situation in terms of media attention and societal perception of 
the company are main concerns of the legitimacy theory. In a dynamic and non homogeneous environment, 
an organization is expected to have a more aggressive approach to defend its legitimacy and is expected to 
face more severe threats in this perspective. Consequently, the assumptions drawn by legitimacy theory 
would be consistent with the ones of the contingency theory on non financial disclosure. This is one of cases 
where contingency and legitimacy theories come up with similar statements regarding the factors affecting 
accountability, even though motivating them with opposite rationales. We chose not to extend this hypothesis 
to the legitimacy theory, to the extent that there is no existing legitimacy literature actually proposing or 
testing this hypothesis, which is nonetheless a logical extension of the theoretical framework assumptions. 
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function to a “steering” one; (ii) financial transferring, which represents the traditional 
function of resources re-allocation exerted by public administrations; (iii) direct 
action/intervention. 
The first two dimensions are the ones which specifically qualify the activities of public 
sector organizations and IOs. In fact, the large majority of UN system organizations 
perform to various extent implementation activities, while there usually is a clearer 
distinction between organizations with a prevailing regulative or financial transferring 
nature.  
Drawing on a contingent perspective, a regulative activity is expected to be accompanied 
by a focus on the provision of financial data, because of the difficulty to measure the 
results of such activity in terms of outputs and outcome. Also the transfer of financial 
resources might lead to an increased focus on financial information. As a consequence, 
we hypothesize: 
 
 
Hp8  a) When an organization performs a prevailing regulative activity, this is 
associated with a prevailing amount of financial information displayed in the 
report.  
b) When an organization performs a prevailing financial transferring activity, this is 
associated with a prevailing amount of financial information displayed in the report. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables proposed by literature and their expected 
relationships with the UN external disclosure. As we can see, in many cases legitimacy 
theory and contingency theory give complementary assumptions regarding the factors 
affecting the various aspects of accountability; in some cases, the same hypotheses can 
be drawn from both theories, even if as a consequence of different causal relationships. 
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Table 3.1 – Expected Effects of the Variables on Organizational External Reporting: a Summary 
 
 
Variable Organizational Factors Corporate Governance 
Factors 
External Factors 
Resources managed by the 
organization (contingency -
financial- and legitimacy –
non financial-) 
+ (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
  
Organizational complexity 
(contingency) 
+ (non financial)   
Organizational 
decentralization 
(contingency) 
+ (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
  
Organization’s past  
performance in  
attracting financial  
resources  
(contingency) 
+ (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
  
Organization’s past 
performance in using 
financial resources 
(contingency) 
(legitimacy) 
+ (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
- (financial) 
- (non financial) 
  
Concentration of  
ownership  
(contingency)  
 - (financial) 
- (non financial) 
 
Organization’s bargaining 
power (legitimacy) 
 + (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
 
Accessibility for 
stakeholders to executive 
bodies and decision-making 
activities (contingency) 
 + (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
 
Presence of interest 
warranty mechanisms 
(contingency) 
 + (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
 
Environmental uncertainty 
(contingency) 
  + (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
Organization’s market 
dependence (legitimacy) 
  + (financial) 
+ (non financial) 
Organization’s prevailing 
regulative activity  
(contingency)   
  + (financial) 
Organization’s prevailing 
financial transferring activity 
(contingency) 
  + (financial) 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methods 
 
In the first two chapters we analysed the broad context of this study –International 
Organizations and emergence of the accountability issue within the broad movement of 
Managerial Reforms in IOs-; in the previous chapter we clarified our research question: 
which organizational, governance and external factors, drawn from the relevant 
contingency and legitimacy theory, are most effectively orienting the level of financial and 
non financial accountability of the UN system organizations. The understanding of the 
explicative power of the two alternative theories of accountability is a strictly related 
objective of the work.  
In the present chapter we present the main criteria and methods used in the present 
research. In particular, the following paragraphs report on: i) operationalisation of the 
factors considered relevant in affecting accountability in the specific environment of 
international organizations; ii) identification of the target population of international 
organizations to be analysed and the specific way of analysis; iii) selection of the reporting 
documents suitable for the analysis, iv) development of a tool to analyse the contents of 
reporting documents, on the basis of the literature on disclosure and accountability indices; 
v) use of the cluster analysis as the main tool to analyse the emerging trends between 
influencing factors and accountability levels.  
 
4.1 Target International Organizations’ Population: UN System Organizations 
In the first chapter we clarified that the IOs universe is rather complex and difficult to 
classify. We explained that IOs can be grouped in “families” accordingly to different 
criteria, such as the operational nature -implementing technical cooperation agencies, 
regulative agencies, financial intermediaries-, their membership -global or regional-, the 
appartenance to systems of organizations –United Nations, International Financial 
Institutions, European Commission and its agencies, etc.-. We also recalled that, while 
these classifications give overlapping results and a single organization may belong to one 
or more identified categories, it is not possible to treat the IOs as homogeneous group of 
organizations, because of the wide differences in terms of governance structures, 
operational arrangements and mission statements within the group.  
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In the light of a review of the basic constitutive texts and the international literature on IOs, 
the organizations of the United Nations system seemed the first and most suitable group of 
organizations for a system-wide analysis on dynamics regarding aspects related to the 
managerial reforms (in this case the accountability trends). These are the main reasons: 
− Size of the UN system: United Nations system is the largest “system” of IOs; it is 
infact significantly larger than the other formally recognized systems (specialised 
agencies of the European Communities and International Financial Institutions); 
− Comparability of the main independent variables selected for the study, due to the 
similarities in functioning and decision making mechanisms: For example, United 
Nations organizations share a common body of basic texts regulating the process 
for resource attribution and allocation (i.e. notion of regular and extra-budgetary 
resources) and share the same mechanisms for member representation within the 
executive boards and the same basic decision-making principles (i.e. the so called 
consensus building); 
− Similarity of the pattern of managerial reforms and membership, making 
comparable the internal and external environment (i.e. in terms of pressure for 
accountability and reform) faced by the examined organizations. This should be 
considered a very important characteristic, since the two theoretical frameworks 
taken into consideration come out from the system-oriented approach to 
organizations (contingency and legitimacy approach) and the political economy 
theory (legitimacy approach) and consider the social, political and economic 
environment of the organization as fundamental variable.  
− Attention given by the international literature to the UN system reforms; while 
governance reforms have been extensively investigated by the social scientists (i.e. 
Gordon, 1994; Russet, 1996; Weiss, 2006), managerial reforms are still under 
investigated and only recently they kept the attention of the researchers (Childers, 
Urquart, 1994; Bauer, Knill, 2007). On the contrary, managerial reforms in UN kept 
practitioners’ attention, witnessed by the abundance of official documentation (for 
further reference see Chapter 2 of the present work). From here the interest to 
bridge a current lack in the literature regarding managerial reforms applied to public 
sector organizations.  
In synthesis, the UN system has been considered the first and most important object of 
study, since they represent the biggest and most homogeneous system of IOs and given 
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the growing attention of the practice and the international literature to the managerial 
stream of reforms. In the research design phase, we tried at first to take into account a 
larger population of IOs than the only UN system, such as Development Banks, Bretton 
Woords Instituttions and Supranational Organisations, like the European Union. Given the 
significant differences between the UN population and the other IOs in terms of mission, 
mandate and intervention areas, functioning processes and governance rules, this option 
was finally abandoned in favour of an exclusive focus on UN system population.  
The present work takes into consideration the entire population of UN orgnisations, 
composed by twenty one organizations, between funds, programmes and specialised 
agencies.  
As we previously mentioned, the UN system organizations share common rules, 
procedures, business processes and general environment -for example in terms of political 
agenda and main stakeholder categories-. On the other side, they still present a good 
diversity in relation to the above identified influencing factors. In particular, it is worth to 
notice that the UN system is composed of two different kinds of organisations, i.e. twelve 
Specialised Agencies and nine Funds and Programmes. These two kind of organizations 
are fairly specific in relation to: (i) composition of representative and executive bodies, (ii) 
level of autonomy and self-determination within the UN system, (iii) accountability and 
hierarchical dependency from other UN bodies (central Services and Offices, UN 
Secretariat, UN General Assembly). The first type of organizations has a higher level of 
autonomy, a specific representative body and does not have a direct hierarchical 
dependence on the central bodies of the UN. The second type of organizations is strictly 
dependent on what we previously called the Institutional part of the UN system, for internal 
regulations, strategic directives, monetary resources and does not have direct 
representative bodies. In this sense the UN system present an interesting “universe” of 
organizations for the scope of this work.  
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4.2 Operationalisation of the Factors Influencing Accountability: the Case of UN 
System Organizations 
In the present paragraph we operationalise the main factors identified by the contingency 
and legitimacy literature into measures fitting with the specific environment of the UN 
system organizations. During this exercise, in some cases we have been drawn the 
measures by the existing literature and slightly adapted them; in other cases, such as the 
corporate governance and the external environment factors, we proposed original 
measures capturing the concept behind the factors identified by the pre-existing literature 
but significant in the the UN environment. For example, we translated the “technology” 
variable -indicating the industry or the core process characterizing the organization- into 
the type of performed activity, marking a general differentiation between 
regulative/informative and financial transferring nature organizations. This exercise, 
reviewed in the following paragraphs, allowed us to have a set of measures consistent with 
the previous private and public sector literature and at the same time significant for the 
selected object of study. It should be noticed that we based our measurement on the 
biennium 2002-2003 data –the most updated data at the time of our research-, often in 
comparison with the previous biennium 2001-200217.  
 
4.2.1. Organizational Factors 
With reference to the organisational factors, the resource availability of an organisation is 
generally measured in the private organizations’ environment with the sales volume, 
turnover or asset value/ capital amployed. These measures are usually strictly related, so 
that the accounting literature often used them interchangeably, without a specific 
preference for one of them (Hossain, 1995; Cowen, 1987). 
In the UN environment, the closest measure to the sales volume is the total amount of 
resources available for an organisation within a financial period, which is normally a two 
years period. The total budget of an organization is given by the sum of regular and extra-
                                                 
17 The data collection and analysis was particularly time consuming and requested the commitment of 4 
researchers; the analysis started in October 2005 and was completed in late 2006; the most updated data 
available at the time we started the research referred to the administrative period 2002-2003. Often the 
selected measures compare current and historical data, where the latter are always referred to the previous 
biennium. In several case a longer historical comparison could have been beneficial for the analysis, but 
many organizations stared issuing performance reporting documents in late 90s’, making impossible to refer 
to periods antecedent to 2000-2001.  
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budgetary resources; even if the latter ones are higly volatile and their actual impact on the 
organization has been debated, the overall budget seems the only proper measure to 
capture the size of an organization. The first reason for the inclusion of the extra-budgetary 
resources in the parameter lies in the quantitative significance of this kind of resources, 
which in the biennium 2002-2003 represented almost the 70% of the overall resources of 
the UN system. Secondly, the fact that organizations rely more and more heavily on the 
extra-budgetary resources actually makes these resources affecting the organization. On 
this point, it should be noted that more and more staff is hired under financing of extra-
budgetary resources and temporarily renovated from period to period; moreover, the 
volume of administrative transactions is actually significantly affected by the volume of 
procedures caused by the extra-budgetary projects.  
The information about the total amount of resources available has been obtained from the 
organisations’ financial reporting.  
The organizational complexity has been operationalized by the previous literature in 
various ways as organizational model adopted (divisional, matrix, etc.) level of 
independence of divisions, geographical dispersion of the enterprise, concentration of the 
industry (Adams 1998), diversification of the business areas (Hackson, Milne; 1996), level 
of systematic risk18 (Trotman and Bradley 1981, Roberts 1992), etc. The measure adopted 
for the present work is the number of employees; this measure has obviously both 
advantages and disadvantages. Clearly it is not the most comprehensive measure for 
organizational complexity, it is though a good proxy of the administrative complexity of an 
enterprise, it is simple to measure, it is more objective than other measures which implies 
a judgment of the researcher on the level of complexity of different organizational forms 
(i.e. matrix is more complex than divisional organization) and it has been used by some 
previous studies (Adams 2002, Gray, 1995). In the reality of the international 
organizations, alternative measures could have been for example the number of 
hierarchical level of the organization, the number of geographical areas of intervention or 
the adopted model for service delivery. The measure we chose is though simpler, highly 
comparable and more objective, and has been obtained from official website of the 
organization. 
                                                 
18 The systematic risk of an enterprise is a measure of the inherent risk of the core processes and operations 
and more in general an inherent risk of the business model itself. It has been calculated in different ways 
(Trotman and Bradley 1981). 
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The information regarding the number of employees was found in the organizations’ 
websites or has alternatively been searched in the notes to the financial statements. 
The level of decentralisation of a UN organisation has been differently measured in the 
private sector literature with indicators expressing the amount of resources spent/earned 
abroad (i.e. export on sales ratio, Raffournier 1995) or with some proxy of geographical 
distribution of the firm, such as the number of countries where the company has 
operations or selling activities (Cooke, 1989) or countries where the organization issue 
reports (Roberts, 1992). 
In the present work we measured this variable with the amount of financial resources 
spent by the organization away from the headquarter, in the country and regional offices. 
This choice is given by the fact that: i) on the revenue side, it is difficult to find measures 
linked to the level decentralisation19 and ii) the available measures of geographical 
dispersion -such as the number of regional and country offices held by the organization- 
does not take into account the relative size of the operations performed by the 
organization in the field (liason offices are different from operative/implementing offices) 
and their weighting is complex and does not offer objective results.  
The amount of resources spent away from the headquarter is on the contrary a good 
measure of the level of decentralisation, intended as the amount of operations performed 
away from the headquarter; in IOs, financial resources are usually heavily related to 
personnel distribution and size of operations; one of the disadvantages it is that is not a 
measure of geographical distribution of the firm (resources could be spent in few regional 
offices as well as a moltitude of country offices). 
The amount of decentralised expenditures, overall and by world Region20, is normally 
included in the performance reporting documents issued by executive bodies or in notes of 
the financial statements. 
In the previous chapter (development of hypotheses), we stated that in the private sector 
the financial performance is traditionally measured by profit or return on investments ratios 
(Cowen et al, 1987; Patten, 1991, Roberts, 1992). In the public sector, given the absence 
of a single bottom line, the financial performance variable could be operationalized into two 
                                                 
19 The extra-budgetary resources are allocated to specific projects on the field but is not possible to find a 
comprehensive measure taking into consideration the whole amount of available resources. 
20 In the UN classification the World is divided into five main Regions, accordingly to a geo-political criterion: 
North America and Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Arab States, Africa, Central and Pacific Asia. 
Each region is then subdivided in sub-region (i.e. North Africa, Western Africa, etc.) which are the 
geographical basis for the so-called “regional offices”. 
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relevant factors: i) the capacity to attract resources and ii) the capacity to use available 
financial resources.  
In the UN organizations’ environment, the former can be measured by the rate of increase 
in “extra-budgetary resources”21; this kind of resources is the more volatile for the 
organization, because it depends on its capacity to compete for voluntary resources with 
other technical cooperation agencies, both from within and outside the UN system. The 
rate of the increase, as opposed to the absolute amount of resources of a given 
administrative period, is indicative of the level of success of the competitive efforts made 
by an organization to raise voluntary resources to fulfill its core mission. We measured the 
increase in extra-budgetary resources in two subsequent biennia (increment of 2002-2003 
in relation with 2000-2001); this choice was obliged by the fact that only recently UN 
organizations have started to report sistematically this kind of resources; a longer time 
series would have perhaps allowed an even more significant measure. 
Regarding the second factor we mentioned, the traditional public sector literature identifies 
financial performance as the capacity to use and commit money to the budgeted 
programmes (Wildavsky, 1992; Borgonovi, 1996; Anessi and Steccolini, 2005; Jacobsen, 
2006); the rationale behind this is that constituencies give public sector organizations 
resources to manage the public needs; as a consequence, the percentage of obligated 
resources over the budgeted resources within a financial period could be considered a 
proxy of the organizational capacity to realise the core programmes and hence of the 
financial performance of the organization. 
We found the information about the rate of increase in extra-budgetary resources in the 
notes of the 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 financial statements; the information about the 
percentage of obligated resources over the budgeted ones was found on the document 
“budget execution”, annex to the financial reports of the organizations.  
 
                                                 
21 UN organizations typically manage two different kinds of resources: (i) the so-called “ordinary resources”, 
conferred by the member states in the representative bodies (Specialised Agencies) or by the central bodies 
-UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council- (Programs and Funds) to realise the regular 
programme of the organisation; (ii) the “extra-budgetary resources”, given voluntarily by single states, groups 
of them or members of the civil society to fund specific projects and activities.  
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4.2.2. Corporate Governance Factors 
Turning to corporate governance factors, the peculiar nature of the UN system 
organizations requires a partial adaptation of the definitions of such variables.  
Looking at the basis components of the governance system, member states and other non 
state donors may be considered as constituents of an IO and they can be reckoned as its 
“shareholders”. Much debate is still going on about this point within the community of 
professionals and diplomats. On one side, infact, there are some who refuse a “corporate 
view” of the IOs, to the estension that these organizations are independent democratic fora 
regulated by consensus rather than corporations. In this view, IOs are autonomous 
organizations and the voting rights of the member states can not be assimilated to 
ownership shares of IOs The alternative view, on which the present work holds, suggests 
that member states are shareholders of the organizations, in that they are the only direct 
constituencies of the organizations and substantially determine their holding rights in 
relation to a series of factors such as their financing capacity and their relative political 
power within the formal and informal decision making mechanisms. Some organizations 
actually function through a system linking the financing capacity to a weighted voting rights 
system, with the decision making rights weighted for the financing rates on the 
organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund); for these organizations, the 
association between states and shareholders becomes natural. The majority of the other 
IOs normally works on a consensus basis; even for these organizations, though, governing 
bodies are occupied -on a rotation basis- by representatives of the most influential 
member states, acting like “shareholders” and sometimes representing the interest of 
some of the other minor holders which cannot be represented in the governing bodies.  
In this sense, the most convincing assonance between member states and shareholders is 
that governments of member states are the only directly recognizable constituencies of the 
IOs and directly exert their powers as constituencies through the formal and informal 
decision making mechanisms.  
Given the mentioned assumptions, the variable “concentration of ownership” has been 
measured through the concentration of contributions and the percentage of ordinary 
resources offered by the first ten contributors to total ordinary resources. Infact, as a first 
proxy, we can assume that the contributive capacity of a member state determine its 
substantial power in the decision-making structure, if not directly, thanks to the indirect 
power given by the capacity to stop contributing to the organization through missed 
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payments. In this sense, the contributing capacity of a member states gives to its 
government a greater influencing power, especially in relation to the technical and 
administrative part of the organization.  
Previous private sector literature calculates the concentration of ownership in different 
ways (cfr. table 2 below); we took into consideration the percentage of shares owned by 
the first 10 shareholders (Hossein and others 1994) as a reference point; in the UN entity 
this measure has been translated into the percentage of ordinary resources given by the 
first ten state contributors. We intentionally excluded extra-budgetary resources from this 
measure; the main reason is that the most eminent donors of this kind of resources are 
non state subjects (organizations such as Ford Fundation, Turner Fundation and Bill & 
Melinda Gates Fundation contributed massively in the last years to the UN budget); under 
our previous reasonement they cannot be considered as shareholders of the organizations 
-they do not even participate to the formal decision making of the organizations, even if 
substantially orient a part of their activities through the concesison of extra-budgetary 
funds-.  
The “accessibility of shareholders to executive bodies” has been operationalized in the 
previous private sector literature with the presence or absence of shareholders’ warranty 
and minority rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); the literature interested in IOs translated 
this measure into the balance of stakeholders’ power (Mearsheimer, 1994), a qualitative 
parameter related to the presence of check and balances systems in the decision-making 
mechanisms (i.e. consensus building as opposed to qualified majority mechanisms; 
relative size of executive organs, relative powers of plenary committees opposed to 
elective ones, etc.). This measure has been considered complex and difficult to capture in 
numerical terms. For this reason, in the present work the accessibility to executive organs 
has been translated into the level accessibility of member states to organizations’ 
governing bodies and measured by the number of years needed for a complete rotation of 
members within the executive bodies. Usually, the number of years range from 1 to 4, 
while some organizations do not present rotation mechanisms. The higher the rotation, the 
higher the accessibility: score 1 was attributed to organizations with rotation each year; 
score 4 to organizations with rotation every four years; score 5 has been attributed to 
organizations for which the executive bodies’ membership does not rotate. 
The “presence of warranty mechanisms” for members not represented on executive 
bodies has been trasitionally measured in the private sector literature as the presence of a 
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corporate social reporting committee (Cowen and others, 1987) or the existance of legal 
protection mechanisms for investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Coffee, 1999).  
In the reality of UN system organizations, the presence of a representative body that is a 
direct expression of all the member states -UN organizations may have a different number 
of members, ranging from 50 to 194- constitutes the closest measure to the one identified 
by the previous literature. Such bodies are usually called General assemblies or General 
Conferences and are divided into committees, whose membership can be plenary (for 
example the fifth commission on budgetary matters of the UNGA) or based on a 
geopolitical representation elective principle. Such organs are always present in the 
Specialised Agencies, but they cannot be found in Programmes or Funds. These 
organizations regularly refer to the UNGA and have their executive bodies elected from 
their membership, which could be remarkably different from the United Nations one (i.e. 
The United Nations Environmental Programme has just 52 members). This is inherently a 
binomial nature variable, where the presence of the intended mechanisms scores “1” and 
their absence scores “0”.   
Finally, the “bargaining power” of an organization has typically been related to the specific 
technological and economic context or to the locus of power of the organization at the 
stake (Dunlop and Healy, 1953). An alternative view of the power is linked to the need and 
consequent ownership of critical resources; the so called resource-based power (Yan and 
Gray, 1994). In studies focusing on multinational groups, power has been linked to the 
level of organizational interdependence in relation to the holding and other organizations of 
the group (Thompson, 1967). In studies focused on single industries, power has been 
linked to the relative shares of the market detained by the firm or to the number of firms in 
the industry –hypothesis of quasi-perfect competition where size does not actually matter 
in terms of power- (Paroter, 1980; Sherer, 1980). Power has as well been linked to the 
level of technical leadership, intensity of investments and export capability (Lecraw, 1984) 
or property rights (Hart, 1995), which can effectively constitute barriers at entry and source 
of power for companies. Other studies linked power to the political influence exerted by the 
firms -in particular to the money spent by the enteriprise to sustain e political action 
committee to political campaigns (Roberts, 1992)- or more in general to the social ties and 
networks constituted by organizations (Coff and Blyler, 2003). 
To measure the bargaining power of the UN organizations we mainly followed a resource 
dependence approach. We chose the capacity to collect the resources pledged or 
promised by member States as parameter. The power of the organisation is inversely 
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related to the total amount of arrears concerning contributions, so that we operazionalised 
it as the percentage of contributions collected by the organization in the financial period 
2002-2003 in relation to the total amount of resources approved and or pledged by 
member states. The higher the percentage, the higher the power. It should be noted that 
we considered the total amount of resources as base of this indicator; infact, even if 
organizations have the most relevant difficulties in collecting ordinary resources, the 
increase in extra-budgetary resources caused a growing phenomenon of non-collected 
(pledged but not received) resources. 
Regarding the source of information, all the corporate governance variables related 
measures have been drawn from the Basic texts of the organisations, such as the 
Constitution and the Rules of procedures of the Governing Bodies, or from the financial 
reports (for exsample the case of arrears). 
 
4.2.3. External Factors 
With reference to the third category of variables, the external factors, environmental 
uncertainty has been measured in several ways.  
At first, there are two ways to look at the uncertainty: it is possible to link it to the 
perceptions of the most relevant stakeholders or trying to link it to more “objective” 
characteristics of the external environment. The first option measures the perceived 
environmental uncertainty of suppliers, competitors, customers, financial markets, 
government and regulatory agencies, labor unions, mainly through surveys or content 
analysis of official documents (Ireland and others, 1987). Perceived uncertainty could be 
operationalised in different ways depending on the scope of the analysis and can focus on 
government policies, macroeconomic variables, market conditions and competition 
(Werner and others, 1996). 
Among those who tried to assess environmental uncertainty in a more “objective” way we 
found a conceptual differentiation between two characteristics of uncertainty: 
environmental dynamism –or the probability of an environment to change repetedly in a 
short period of time- and environmental complexity –measuring the level of complexity of 
the competitive and socio-political environment-. In the private sector context, 
environmental dynamism has been measured through the volatility of net sales in an 
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industry and the volatility of operating income (Keats and Hitt, 1988). Complexity has been 
linked to the variety and range of organization’s activities i.e. divisionalization, and 
concentration/dispersion of firm in an industry (Dess and Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972, 
Keats and Hitt, 1988). 
In the present work, we operationalised environmental uncertainty as the weigthed 
percentage of the decentralised resources (or resources spent on the field). The rationale 
behind this choice is that we tried to understand and measure the level of exposure to the 
environmental risk represented by the field conditions the organizations face in their core 
operations. Intuitively, implementing agencies working in emergency areas in eastern 
Africa or middle east (i.e. UNHCR, WFP) face a higher risk than regulative agencies with 
the majority of their operations in the headquarters (i.e. WIPO, ILO). On the other side, it 
has been proven difficult to quantify objectively the level of uncertainty actually faced by 
the organizations. We relied on the information regarding the resource allocation in the 
different “regions” of the world and we tried to find a measure of political/social uncertainty 
of each region. We proceded in the following way: we rated the the level of “political 
instability” of each country where the UN organizations have operations consistently with  
the classification on instability drawn from a specialised website (www.ppu.org.uk)22. Each 
world region has been awarded with a weigth representing the simple average of the 
uncertainty level of the countries comprised in each region; as a result, the regions were 
ranked in a1 to 5 scale North America and Europe scored 1, Asia and Pacific 2; Arab 
States 3; Africa 4; Latin America and the Caribbeans 5. Consequently, the weigthed 
percentage of the decentralised resources has been calculated as a percentage on a scale 
1-5 attributing to the percentage of resource spent by the single organization in each world 
region its relative weigth. For example, if an organization spent 20% of the decentralised 
resources in Europe and Commonwealth, 20% in Asia and Pacific, 30% in Arab States, 
0% in Africa, and 50% in Latin America and the Caribbeans the level of risk is: (0,2*1 + 
0,2*2 + 0,3*3 + 0,5*5)/5 = 4/5 = 80%. The percentual value recalls the level of risk reached 
by the organization in relation to the maximum one (potentially reachable by organizations 
with a resource allocation 100% decentrated in the most risky region, Latin America and 
the Caribbeans).  
                                                 
22 We intended instability as a comprehensive parameter including the risk of war and civil disorder, the 
existence of militaristic and autocratic political systems, the internal or external situation of population 
displacement. 
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In the private sector literature, the market dependence has been linked to the level of 
reliance on debit and financial markets to finance the company activity: the two most used 
measures are the average debt to equity ratio over time (Roberts, 1992) and the net 
amount that has been raised from external capital markets (Adam, 2002) given by the 
cash flow.  
UN organizations usually do not rely to financial markets to raise funds, excluding in some 
very limited use made by the IFIs. The real market of the UN organizations is represented 
by the voluntary contributions issued by member states and other non state donors. We do 
not consider the ordinary resources as part of the market sources for the UN 
organizations, because it is really unlikely that an organization does not get an incremental 
flow of these resources from period to period (usually the assignements are based on 
percentual increment on the historical amount of nominal resources).  
Consequently, market dependence has been associated to the reliance on “market”or “non 
captive” resources, and more specifically to the percentage of extra-budgetary resources 
over the total resources of the organization. In the present study, we took into account a 
single biennuim (2002-2003); given the significant dynamicity and volatiliy of the extra-
budgetary resources, it could have been beneficial to consider a longer period of time. 
Unfortunately, organizations just recently began to measure and report the extra-
budgetary resources in public reports.  
Finally, we have taken into account the factor “technology”, mainly taken from the 
contingency literature. This factor conceptually refers to the industry and kind of 
core/operational processes of the organizations.  
In these terms we can note a significant differentiation among the UN system 
organisations. Infact, they share the common mission to “contribute to bring, keep and 
maintain global peace and wellbeing” in different fields, such as economic and social 
development, education and culture, healthcare, environmental protection. However, each 
institution has specific “means” to contribute to this mission. Some perform mostly 
regulative and informative activities -international agreements, technical advice to state 
governments, research, study and information activities-. Others carry out activities which 
are predominantly of a financial transferring nature -grants to member States, contributions 
and grants to partners for managing projects on the field-. Many organizations have an 
implementing nature, meaning that they directly or indirectly perform technical cooperation 
projects. It is though often difficult to identify the boundaries between the implementing 
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and the financial transferring nature of organizations, since many organizations maintain 
both natures and since in the recent years many organizations passed from a direct to an 
indirect delivery.  
For these reasons, we split up the UN population into two groups: organizations with 
prevalence of regulative nature and organizations with prevalence of financial transferring 
nature. Given the lack of quantitative information about the financial resources spent on 
the different activities, we just distinguished between “high”, “medium” and “low” level of 
regulative/informative activities and financial transferring activities, based on organizations’ 
official documents. In particular, we examined the constitutions and the strategic plans of 
the organizations in the parts concerning the means of implementation of the institutional 
mission. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the measures identified to operationalise the factors which are 
likely to affect IOs’ external accountability. 
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Table 4.1- Operationalisation of Factors Likely to Affect Accountability in the UN Environment 
Influencing 
Factors 
Literature Measures – 
 UN environment 
Organisational factors  
resource 
availability 
Gross Income/Turnover (Hossain and others1995) 
Profit (Cowen and others 1987) 
Total monetary resources (regular 
and extrabudget) available for 
biennium 2002-2003 
Complexity 
Number of employees in relation to sector and industry composition (Adams 2002, Gray, 
1995) 
Diversification: number of business areas/markets (Hackson and Milne, 1996) 
Industry "membership" (i.e. concentration) (Adams, 1998) 
Systematic risk (Trotman and Bradley 1981, Roberts 1992) 
Overall number of employees  
decentralisation 
Export on sales ratio (Raffournier, 1995) 
Number of countries company has operations or selling activities (Cooke, 1989) 
Countries in which the organisation reports and country of ultimate ownership (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1990, Roberts 1990) 
Percentage of monetary resources 
spent “on the field” (away from the 
headquarter) 
Financial 
performance -  
capacity to attract 
monetary 
resources 
Consolidate or current profit (Cowen et al, 1987; Patten, 1991, Roberts, 1992) 
Percentual increase in extra-
budgetary resources collected on 
total resources available (two 
consecutive biennia: 2000-
2001/2002-2003) 
Financial 
performance .- 
capacity to use 
monetary res. 
Available 
Expenditure rate as financial efficiency (Jacobsen, 2006; Wildavsky, 1992; Borgonovi, 2004; 
Anessi and Steccolini, 2005) 
Percentage of “obligated” 
resources on total resources 
available for biennium 2002-2003 
Corporate governance factors  
concentration of 
ownership 
Type of ownership: private companies/public listed companies shares ownership 
diffusion/dispersion (Raffournier 1995) 
Percentage of shares owned by the first 10 shareholders (Hossein and others 1994) 
% of corporation owened by management and by indivudual shareholders owing more than 
5% of out standing shares (Roberts, 1992) 
 Total percentage of shares that are owned by corporations, which hold more than 10% of 
the outstanding shares of the company ( Adam, 2002) 
Percentage of ordinary resources 
given by the first ten contributors 
(member States) 
accessibility of 
stakeholders to 
executive bodies 
Balance of stakeholders’ power (Mearsheimer, 1994) 
Shareholders’ warranty and minority rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Stability/rotation of member States 
in executive bodies (year/s needed 
for entire rotation of members in 
executive organ) 
presence of 
warranty 
mechanisms for 
members not 
represented in 
executive bodies 
Presence of a corporate social reporting committee (Cowen and others, 1987) 
Existance of legal protection mechanisms for investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Coffee, 
1999) 
Presence of representative bodies 
composed by all member States 
attending the organisation ( “1” if 
the representative organ is 
present; “0” if it is absent) 
organisation’s 
bargaining power 
Typically related to the specific technological and economic context and locus of power 
(Dunlop and Healy, 1953) 
Level of organizational interdependence (Thompson, 1967) 
Number of firms in an industry group and relative shares (Paroter, 1980; Sherer, 1980) 
Technical leadership, intensityof investments, export capability (Lecraw, 1984) 
Dollars contributed by corporate political action committee to political campaigns (Roberts, 
1992) 
Context based vs. resource based power (Yan and Gray, 1994) 
Property rights (Hart, 1995) 
Social ties and networks (Coff and Blyler, 2003)  
Percentage of resources collected 
on total resources pledged and 
promised by contributors (1 – % of 
total arrears left from current and 
previous years contributions on 
total resources available for 
biennium 2002-2003) 
External factors  
environment 
uncertainty 
Perceived environmental uncertainty about: suppliers, competitors, customers, financial 
markets, government and regulatory agencies, labor unions (Ireland and others, 1987)  
Perceived environmental uncertainty and international risk about: government policies, 
macroeconomic trends, market conditions and competition (Werner and others, 1996) 
Environmental dynamism: volatility of net sales in an industry, and volatility of operating 
income (Keats and Hitt, 1988) 
Environmental complexity: variety and range of organization’s activities i.e. divisionalization, 
and concentration/dispersion of firm in an industry (Dess and Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972, 
Keats and Hitt, 1988) 
Weighted percentage of 
“decentralised” resources (weight 
ascribed to the % of resources 
spent in every world Region 
conssitently with the political 
unstability of the Region) of 
biennium 2002-2003 
market 
dependence 
Average debt to equity ratio over time (Roberts, 1992) 
Financing net cash flow as the net amount that has been raised from external capital 
markets (Adam, 2002) 
Percentage of extra-budgetary 
resources on total available 
resources for biennium 2002-2003 
type of activity 
performed 
Regulative, financial transferring and direct intervention activities  (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Anessi Pessina, 2002, Borgonovi, 2004) 
Qualitative assessment of the 
prevailing nature of organisation: 
(i) regulative-informative; (ii) 
financial transferring 
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4.3 The Selection of Reporting Documents – a Stakeholder Perspective 
UN system organizations issue a multitude of different reports to address the information 
needs of the various stakeholder categories. The scope of the present work required to 
choose the kind of document which is most representative of the corporate performance 
accountability of the organization to the competent public. 
To explain the choice we made in relation to the mentioned dimensions, we need to 
introduce a stakeholder approach to the IOs and to give a brief overview of the different 
kind of documents issues by the UN organizations in these terms. 
Application of stakeholder theory traditionally missed to focus on the reality of the IOs; 
these organizations are often taken into considerations as significant stakeholders of 
multinational companies (i.e. Mitchell, Agle, Wood, 1997; Doh, Guay, 2006) and NGOs 
(Unerman, O’Dwyer, 2006) but are rarely put on the spot as nexus of the stakeholder 
relationship to be studied (among the rare examples see Udall, 1998; Nelson, 2001). 
 
Picture 4.1: The Adoption of Stakeholder Theory: Put the International Organizations on the 
Spot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if it is hard to find a common definition in the existing literature, in general terms, 
stakeholders of IOs can be defined as “all the subject which affect and/or are affected by 
the activity of the organization and have a vested or at least legitimate interest in the 
organization” (Gray, 1995).  
Main stakeholder categories of the IOs and content of relationship with them can be 
summarised as follows (United Nations, 2007; Hemmati, 2002): 
National and 
Multinational 
companies 
International 
Organizations/
NGOs 
International 
Organizations/NGOs 
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− Member states: constituencies (or shareholders) of the organization, national 
governments represent the domestic interests but at the same time participate to 
the IOs to promote the international cooperation and development and are 
interested in pursuing foreign policy programmes through their participation to IOs 
(national governments as donors and givers of technical knowledge). On the other 
side, national governments can be considered the main category of direct 
beneficiaries of the IOs’ technical cooperation and capacity building activities 
(national governments as beneficiaries and takers of knowledge). In the perspective 
of the IOs, the shift towards the extra-budgetary resources makes the single 
national governments (donors) more and more influent face to the community of the 
member states as a whole.  
− Other non state donors, and notably other international organizations, NGOs and 
private foundations. These organizations’ contributions to IOs are growing 
increasingly and consequently their capacity to influence recipients’ politics and 
strategies is more and more significant, even if this kind of donors cannot 
participate to the formal decision making of the organizations (i.e. negotiation of the 
agreements and of the regular budget). 
− Beneficiaries and subjects affected by the core activity of the organization: the final 
beneficiary of IOs’ activity are the citizens and local communities affected by them. 
In the technical cooperation projects, national governments are the intermediaries 
while communities are the final beneficiaries, influenced by the domestic public 
policies. This is particularly the case of the IFIs’ lending activity, always linked to 
public sector or domestic reforms. In the emergency/healthcare/industry 
development projects, local communities are directly affected and targeted by the 
IOs in their field activities. It is commonly believed that this kind of stakeholder just 
appreciate the “positive” impacts of the IOs’ activity (i.e. promotion of development, 
health and security, while there is a growing movement towards giving voice and 
rights to the local communities who directly or indirectly experiencing the “negative” 
impacts of the IOs’ activity. In this direction, UN has recently created an appellation 
body for physical subjects who believe to be damaged or who, in light of a vested 
interest in the UN activity, wants to be heard directly. This new kind of 
direct/democratic hearing should be considered a promising example of the growing 
importance of this stakeholder for the UN system, in the direction of changing the 
traditional relation citizens/national governments/IOs regulated by the political 
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representative process. Further interesting subjects affected by the IOs’ activity are 
the multinational companies, with particular reference to externalities intensive 
sectors (i.e. chemicals, pharmaceuticals). These organizations can be affected by 
regulations, standards and agreements regarding their activity –i.e. standards of 
ethical conduct and respect of human rights, regulations about the core processes 
and/or against emissions- and consequently lobby with their national governments 
for that. In the UN system there are some formal mechanisms of representation of 
these interests (i.e. ILO contemplates a tripartite decision making structure, where 
representative of the employers, of the unions and of the national governments are 
represented). 
− Suppliers and other contractors, among which could be encountered some 
important implementing NGOs (i.e. Oxfam international, emergency, etc.); an 
important distinction should be made between suppliers of materials and 
contractors for services. Suppliers usually lobby through the respective national 
governments or directly to the UN administrative units; the first case is more 
common in the extra-budgetary projects; it is well known for example that one of the 
conditions applied by the US in their voluntary donations to the WFP is that the food 
supply is bought by the organization among the domestic suppliers accredited to 
the UN. The second case concerns the regular budget resources, where accredited 
suppliers –meeting the minimum standards of quality and delivery capacity required 
by the UN organization- acquire contracts through competitive tendering. Service 
contractors –more in particular organizations to whom project delivery is delegated 
by the IOs- are fundamental stakeholders, since they have direct contact with the 
affected communities and local governments and the quality and transparency of 
their service is directly affecting the image of the delegating IO. Several 
outsourcees can be seen as competitors as well, since in some cases (i.e. 
AgaKhan foundation) they have flexible and significant presence on the field and 
efficient support processes.  
− Competitors and partners, which can be the other UN agencies, other technical 
cooperation agencies, private foundations or NGOs. As a general trend, the 
humanitarian and technical cooperation sectors are experiencing a complexification 
of their “value chain”: more and more often, national states give contribution to IOs 
which allocated resources consistently with political agreement within the 
international community and externalize the project delivery to partner 
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organizations. In the indirect delivery, the IO is responsible to control the quality, 
impartiality, efficiency and effectiveness of the outsourcees. To this extent, 
implementing NGOs are to be considered partners, but more and more often they 
could try to substitute themselves to the IOs towards the donors’ community, relying 
on their supposed greater efficiency as competitive advantage. The counter 
argument of the UN system organizations is that NGOs cannot offer the formal 
endorsement of the international community on the design of the projects and do 
not enjoy the same quality of the political acquaintance on the planned intervention.  
− Media and general public: Media have a double position in relation to IOs: on one 
side they can put some relevant issues on the political agenda; on the other side 
they can comment an d criticize the operate of the IOs. 
 
The above categorization has meant to give an idea of the main kinds of relations and 
interests converging on the IOs, even if overlapping between stakeholder categories are 
inherent in the very nature of the public sector organizations, characterized by a significant 
convergence on IOs of a multitude of potentially conflicting interests on the same subjects 
(Borgonovi, 2000). To this extent, for example, member states could be constituencies, 
beneficiaries and/or donors; NGOs as Oxfam could be contractors, partners and/or 
competitors, big corporations could be suppliers of materials/support services, donors or 
competitors (through their foundations).  
The main relations between IOs and their main stakeholders are usually covered by 
communication tools, which can be specific or more general; in this perspective we would 
like to offer an overview of the main documents issued by the UN organizations. These 
documents can be easily categorized; they do not vary significantly between organizations, 
even if specialised agencies issue a larger number of reports for their stakeholders than 
funds and programmes and observe a strict compliance with the reporting standards of the 
UN system. 
 
− Statistical analyses and reports: this kind of document is one of the output of an 
IO’s technical cooperation activity, several beneficiary countries lack expertise to 
hold public nature registers and statistical data (population, diseases, immigration 
and displacement). These reports are addressed to beneficiary member states and 
to interested public/investors/citizens; 
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− Policy, technical and research papers: this kind of paper is the main input of 
technical cooperation projects and is intended to address public policies; the papers 
explain the reform/macroeconomic model/innovations introduced by a determined 
project. These reports are often used by the IFIs during the lending cycle phases 
(design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Main recipients of these 
reports are the technical bodies of the recipient governments and the community of 
the member states; 
− Project reports: this kind of reports is similar to the previous one, with the difference 
that is used in emergency/healthcare/development implementing projects, where 
the direct intervention of the IOs’ staff (or outsourcee) is required. These reports are 
issued along the project cycle (feasibility, design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation phases); their main recipients are the beneficiary states, the donors (in 
case of extra-budgetary projects) or the community of the member states. For their 
very nature, these reports are the most interesting for the final beneficiaries and for 
the media, since they report in a detailed way the activity of the organization and its 
results. These documents are really important for the partners and the contractors 
too in terms of their accountability face to the IOs (indirect service delivery); 
− Project and programme audit reports: this kind of reports is issued by the audit or 
the monitoring and controlling bodies appointed by the IOs. The monitoring and 
controlling bodies can be sited in two different positions: consulting the 
management (i.e. office of internal evaluation, WB) or independently sited 
supporting the strategic control function of the governing bodies over the 
management (i.e. Office of Internal Oversight, UN). Often, several monitoring 
bodies co-exist in the same organization supervising different control aspects: 
quality at entry (common in the lending organizations and where relevant feasibility 
studies are required), fraud and administrative rules compliance, efficiency and 
effectiveness in resource utilization, ex post effectiveness and evaluation of the 
effects of the implemented public policies. All these organs produce reports; the 
majority of them are for internal use only and are addressed to the community of the 
member states but the real recipients are management or the governing bodies in 
their role of “agents”; 
− Financial statements and reports: UN organizations issue financial reports at the 
and of each administrative period, which for the large majority of the organizations 
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is two years long (all the funds and programmes, some of the specialized agencies) 
and for some of them is one year long (other specialized agencies such as ICAO)23; 
− Performance reports: these reports are often issued together with the financial 
statements and mirror the structure of the programme of work of the organization 
contained in the Programme and Budget documents of the organization, presented 
at the beginning of the administrative period. Usually this kind of documents contain 
financial information about the programme realization (the so-called “budget 
execution” data on financial resources spent for each programme and sub-
programme) and non financial information, constituted by a mix of qualitative 
information about the activity realized and quantitative data on results achieved (i.e. 
number of beneficiaries, amount of service delivered, economic indicators). This is 
the most recent category of documents in chronological order; the majority of the 
organizations began to issue performance reports starting from the second part of 
the 90s’; 
− Official releases, press and conference releases: a residual category of documents 
is represented by the official releases issued by the organizations when taking 
official or significant decisions (i.e. approval of the budget, start-up of a new project) 
and they are often in the form of a declaration of the head of the technical structure 
(Secretary/Director General). 
Considering the scope of this work, the performance reports seem the most suitable 
documents to be analysed. This kind of reporting is, in fact: (i) issued by all the UN 
organizations (Agencies, Programmes and Funds); (ii) focused on data and results at the 
“corporate” level, rather than at the single Region, Programme or project level; (iii) both an 
“internal “and “external” accountability medium. Under the former perspective, the 
document is presented by the technical and executive bodies to the representative ones in 
order to report on the resource allocation and on results achievement. Under the latter 
perspective, it is a document presented to all the “skilled” stakeholders: governments not 
attending the organisation, civil society representatives, third parties. 
The first two points ensure a high level of comparability, while the last one allows us to 
embrace the most comprehensive idea of accountability. 
 
 
                                                 
23The transition to the IPSAS will oblige all the organizations to align their financial and administrative period 
to one year by 2010. 
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4.4. The Accountability Checklist  
4.4.1. Development of the Checklist 
The contents analysis of the UN organisations’ performance reports has been conducted 
using a checklist developed on the basis of the literature on disclosure and accountability 
indices.  
There are several studies measuring the degree of disclosure of financial reporting in the 
private sector (for some examples, Cerf, 1961; Buzby, 1974; Barrett, 1976; Cooke, 1989; 
Meek and others, 1995). Public sector disclosure indices are more recent and less 
numerous. In some cases, they are used to compare the reporting practices of public 
organizations in different countries (Jones and Pendlebury, 1982; Pina and Torres, 1996; 
Coombs and Tayib, 2000), while other studies (Ingram, 1986; Boyne and Law, 1991; 
Taylor and Rosair, 2000) are aimed at measuring the degree of disclosure and 
accountability of reporting, at pointing out weaknesses or strengths in reporting practices, 
at finding correlations with other variables, such as the type and size of government (for 
example, Ingram and others, 1988; Ryan and others, 2002). 
The checklist we applied to UN organisations’ reports on performance has been developed 
with the purpose of analysing the extent and the mix of information disclosed within the 
documents, but not of “rating” them according to the quality of their disclosure (an example 
of study on information reliability is Milne and others, 1999). In other words, we measured 
the kind and the quantity of information provided by the organizations in their documents, 
rather than the “quality” of information in terms of reliability, readability or 
understandability. 
 
4.4.2. Checklist Sections and Items 
The checklist is divided into eight sections: 1) Introductory information, 2) Indicators and 
analysis on cash- and obligation-based data; 3) Financial performance information; 4) 
Indicators and analysis on statistical and empirical data concerning intervention areas; 5) 
Input indicators; 6) Level of disclosure about activities realised; 7) Disclosure about goals 
attainment; 8) Ethical issues and policies.  
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For each section, a list of relevant items likely to be found in the annual report has been 
identified on the basis of previous studies about accountability and transparency in public 
sector organizations (Anthony, 1978; Drebin and others, 1981; Pina and Torres, 1996; 
IFAC-PSC, 2000) and in particular IOs (Ryan and others, 2002; Scott, 2005). The process 
we followed consisted in identifying the main aspects and contents checked by the 
previous literature on performance accountability/reporting and exploding them in relation 
to the UN system environment.  
In the following paragraphs we underline and explain some of the items of the checklist 
and their importance in the context of the UN system, while the complete checklist is 
shown in Table 4.2, Appendix 2. 
As general comment it should be noted that, in order to increase the flexibility of the 
checklist, we included in each section of the checklist a residual item to catch contents 
considered important in terms of accountability level but not contemplated in the regular 
checklist items, because of the peculiarity of the single organizations or the difficulty to 
categorize them (the item is named “others”). 
In the first section we expected to find the basic introductory information regarding the 
environment where the organizaation operates (context and external dynamics) and 
regarding the organization (governing and organizational structure), an executive summary 
of the report (in line with the policy of the UN system to make more readable and 
immediate the documents through an effective sinthesis) and the recall of the strategic 
framework of the organization to be found in the planning and programming documents. 
This must be considered a very important element to link the performance reporting to the 
programming and monitoring cycle.  
The second section –“indicators and analysis on cash and obligation based data”- 
analyzes the presence of information about the kind of financial resources managed by the 
organization (regular resources, extra-budgetary resources, provenience and allocation of 
voluntary resources) and about expenditures: given the nature of performance reporting, 
we expected to find breakdown of expenditure consistently with the programmatic 
structure of the organizations: major programmes -defined as authoritative allocation of 
resources by destination approved by the community of the member states-, programmes, 
subprogrammes and lines of action -defined as allocation of resources by destination 
concerted between management and governing bodies-. We also expected to find other 
breakdowns of the expenditures: by modality of action, by geographical allocation of 
 128
financial resources and expenditures, by percentage of resources spent in the period over 
total available resources. The last mentioned breakdowns could potentially be expected in 
relation to the total resources or to the resources allocated to the programmes/modality of 
action, to form a sort of matrix.  
Section three has been dedicated to Fnancial performance information. As first indicator of 
the financial performance we expected to find information about the amount of standing  
arrears against the ordinary and voluntary contributions of the donors, The level of 
reserves and working capital funds24 is a second expected element, along with the 
analysis of the administrative and support services costs in relation to the core 
programmes. This information, variously presented in the reports (researches used 
flexibility for evaluating the availability of such information from the financial statements or 
qualitative analyes, where available) is intended to evaluate the efficiency of the 
administrative and support structure and the ability of the organziation to allocate the 
maximum amount possible of resources on the field. The last element listed in this section 
is the comparison between current and previous years/biennia data regarding resources 
available and spent.  
The forth section of the checklist presents just one item; it is infact dedicated to the 
presence of statistical data concerning the areas of intervention. We chose to include this 
element to evaluate how carefully the organization presents the general environment it is 
working on, these information should be intentionally given as a context of the 
performance report, rather than result of the organization’s intetvention. 
The fifth section of the checklist –“input indicators”- is dedicated to the personnel, which is 
the single most important input of the international organizations in terms of costs. In this 
section we measured the presence of information related to the number, location, gender 
and position (technical, professional, administrative, managerial) of staff.  
The sixth section is intended to analyze the level of disclosure on the activities performed 
and/or controlled by the organization: a first element into consideration is the kind of 
activity described in the report, which can be classified in two main groups: organization’s 
own activity and interagency activity. In the first group we wanted to analyze if the report 
presents just the activities financed by ordinary resources or includes as well the extra-
budgetary activities, which as mentioned for their nature have dedicated reports to the 
                                                 
24 The working capital fund is a special fund made of anticipation of contribution requested to member states; 
its main function is for the organization to be able to face expenditures while ordinary contributions not yet 
cashed are standing.  
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donors. A second element of analysis has been the depth/analiticity: we identified three 
main level of activity description: “essential”, “analytical” and “very analytical”. The 
judgement was expressed on the two main breakdowns previously identified for the 
expenditures: by element of the programmatic structure (programmes/subprogrammes, 
lines of activity etc.) and by geographical allocation (region/country office). Finally, in this 
section we evaluated the completeness of the field reporting: several reports contained the 
information regarding the number of field offices which participated to the monitoring of the 
activity and performance data; this seemed to be an important element to evaluate the non 
financial accountability25.  
The seventh section -goals indicators- tests the most proper element of the results-based 
type of reports. A first main item identified is the kind of goal indicators presented in the 
reports; we distinguished in the first instance between quantitative and qualitative data and 
again within the first category between financial and non financial indicators. The non 
financial indicators have been further explored with a list of possible performance 
dimensions (projects realised, number of beneficiaries/users, data of impact on the 
intervention areas or outcomes, efficiency level). A second iem which we expected to find 
in the report was the link between the organisational goals and the MDGs, important in the 
system-wide perspective as well. In the same section we also rated the level of detail used 
by the organizations to report by objectives. Higher scores were attributed to the 
organizations which exploded their objectives at programme/subprogramme/linje of activity 
level and at the regional/field level.  
Furthermore, in this section we evaluated the presence of qualitative comments (lesson 
learned, limitations, weakness, impediments) and quantitative analyses (financial or non 
financial; es. link with budgeted performance level/goals). This is an important attribute to 
judge the overall accountability level since it shows the confidence of the organization in 
handling its objectives. Finally, we checked the presence of comparisons between values 
of the goals indicators referred to the current period against the previous periods ones.  
The last section of the checklist is dedicated to ethical issues and policies; we looked for 
information regarding the gender balance (number of male and female by post category 
and by location, with special consideration for the headquarter/field balance), the language 
used in official communications and the accessibility to corporate reporting. 
 
                                                 
25 Reports not contained informaiton about the number of the field office reporting scored a “0”. 
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4.4.3 Approach to rating accountability 
The process we used to attribute the score to each analyzed document is as follows. For 
each item included in the checklist, if the item was absent, a value of “0” was attributed to 
the report, if the item was present, a value of “1” was given. A slightly different process 
was used for the items included in sections 1, 4, 6, 7 and the sub-sections  2.f.2, 2.g.2, 
2.h.2, 3.e.2 of the checklist. These items are by their very nature qualitative and can be 
present with different intensity. Consequently, if the item was rarely present/had a low 
incidence in the analysed document, we attributed a score of “0,33”; if it was often 
present/had a medium incidence we used a “0.67”. Finally, “1” was attributed when the 
given item was very frequent/had a high incidence in the report. This method clearly 
requested a stronger subjective judgement by researchers. The residual item of each 
section of the checklist (“others”) was rated in this way as well. 
The simple average of the scores attributed to the items in each section of the checklist 
constituted the score –or level of accountability-  reached by an organization in each 
section; the score obtained for each checklist section is consequently expressed as a 
percentage, where 100% is the maximum possible level of accountability and 0% the 
minimum one.  
The scores obtained by each organization in each section were used to develop two kinds 
of synthetic indices: i) the “overall accountability” index, the average of the scores obtained 
from the eight sections on the checklist; ii) the “financial accountability” and the “non-
financial accountability” indices. The two last indices were obtained as follows: items within 
the checklist sections were classified as belonging to the financial or non financial kind of 
accountability; Items belonging to sections 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 (excepted 7.a.1) and 8 were 
classified as “non-financial”, items belonging to sections 2, 3 and item 7.a.1. were 
classified as “financial”. The average of the scores obtained by each document for all the 
items classified as financial/non financial gave the financial/non financial accountability 
index. The three indeces have consequently been expressed by percentaces. 
Since the indeces were developed to explore the amount and the mix of information 
provided in the performance reports, no weights were assigned either to the single items to 
determine the score of the section or to the single sections in the checklist to determine 
the value of the index; this approach could have been consistent with the intent to analyze 
the relative importance attributed by the organizations to the items on the checklist. Rating 
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the items would have required a subjective judgement on their importance (however, it 
should be noticed that indices are intrinsically subjective - Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
The rating process we followed presents in any case a significant degree of subjectivity, 
which can be summarized in the following elements: i) the qualitative judgement used for 
some items (rates “0,33”, “0,67”); ii) the number of the items included in each section; 
within more populated sections, the relative weight of the single item on the overall section 
score is infact lower than the one of items in less populated sections; iii) the use of the 
simple average of the items as method to determine the value of the sections and of the 
indices. In all these cases, we already explained the rationale behind the use of such a 
subjectivity.  
Table 4.2 in Appendix 2 summarises the values of the overall, the financial and the non-
financial accountability indices, as well as the synthetic values of the sections on the 
checklist for all organisations.  
 
 
4.5. The Choice and Use of Cluster Analysis 
4.5.1. Definitions and Overview of the Applications 
The term cluster analysis collectively refers to several different algorithms used to group 
similar entities. Each entity is usually described by its position on a set of attributes 
(dimensions) and the boundaries of the groups are not pre-specified (Joyce and Channon, 
1966; Ball and Hall, 1967; Green, Frank and Robinson, 1967). Rather these boundaries 
are derived according to patterns found in the attribute measurements and in the 
distribution of the records along the identified attributes/dimensions. This characteristic 
makes cluster analysis a suitable tool for estimating the heights of mobility barriers which 
segregate groups or clusters formed by the examined records, assuming that researchers 
can isolate dimensions and dimensions which describe the key differences among the 
selected population (Harrigan, 1985).  
In other words, cluster analysis takes a sample of elements (i.e. organizations) 
characterized by some core attributes/dimensions and groups them in such a way that the 
statistical variance among elements grouped together is minimized while variance 
between groups is maximised.  
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Cluster analysis has been extensively used at first in natural sciences; disciplines such as 
biology, anthropology and medicine, to define and classify species and families of the 
studies “entities” such as vegetables/animals/pathology. 
The technique has been extensively used in the social sciences as well; coming to 
managerial sciences, marketing and strategy/organization seem to be the disciplines 
which more recurred to this technique for their research objectives. In particular, this 
technique is interesting because it allows the inclusion of multiple variables as source of 
configuration definition, permitting to group and to classify organizations. For example, 
marketing studies used the technique to group consumer behaviour and preferences 
(Punj, Stewart, 1983). As we explain below, managerial sciences used cluster analysis 
mainly to group, treat and elaborate large dataset where several attributes/variables are 
attributed to examined organizations. 
 
4.5.2. Main Criticisms to Cluster Analysis 
Use of cluster analysis in managerial sciences has been frequently under attack; (i.e. 
Barney Hoskinsson, 1990; Meyer, 1991; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988; Everitt, 1979). 
A first cause of concern is the extensive reliance on researcher judgement inherent in 
cluster analysis. This is an issue throughout the technique but perhaps most troubling is 
the fact that unlike other techniques such as regression and analysis of variance, cluster 
analysis does not offer a statistic test that provides a clear answer regarding the support or 
lack of support of a set of results for a hypothesis of interest. Instead, to a large extent 
researchers are the arbiters of the meaning of results acquired through the analysis in 
terms of selection of most important variables (hierarchical clustering analysis) number of 
groups and their characterisation in relation with the hypotheses of the study (Ketchen, 
Shook, 1996). A second major issue is the perception that most applications of cluster 
analysis in management have lacked an underlying theoretical rationale. Often clustering 
dimensions seem to be selected haphazardly (Reger, Huff, 1993). This is particularly true 
in the inductive approach (as opposed to the deductive or cognitive approach; see more 
extensively below and Ketchen and others, 1993), which focuses on exploratory 
classification of observation; neither the clustering variables nor the number and the nature 
of the resultant groups are tightly linked to a deductive theory. Without a theoretical 
foundation. however, clusters may just reflect statistical artefacts that capitalize random 
numerical variations across organizations (Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988). Thus, cluster 
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analysis has the potential not only to offer inaccurate depictions of groupings in a sample, 
but also to impose groupings where none exists.  
 
4.5.3. Methodological Issues 
As we mentioned before, the concept of cluster analysis is an umbrella covering a series 
of various techniques and methodologies. Without entering in much detail on the 
differences among the various aspects of the mechanism (the interested reader is referred 
to Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984; Everitt, 1980; Hair and others, 1992; Lorr 1983; Punj 
and Stewart, 1983) the most interesting issue regards the selection and treatment of 
variables to cluster and the clustering algorithms.  
The selection of the variables could be deductive or inductive; in the first case there is a 
specific theory offering hypotheses to be tested. In the second case, used often in the 
exploratory studies, the researchers select a series of variables and observe/interpret the 
forming clusters.  
In the treatment of the variables, two main approaches could be followed: consider the 
variables for their absolute values or standardize them. Because cluster analysis groups 
entities (organizations) such that the distance between groups along all clustering 
variables is maximised, variables with large ranges are given more weight in defining a 
cluster solution than those with small ranges. One of the possible remedies is 
standardization, which transforms the distribution of entities (organizations) along variables 
so that each has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This can in turn 
eliminate meaningful differences among elements and for this reason the choice of the 
method is an equivocal issue (Edelbrock, 1979; Hair and others, 1992). Finally, strong 
correlation between variables can be problematic in the clustering process, because it may 
overweight one or more underlying constructs. Thus, researchers may want to correct 
multicollinearity between variables, especially if it is desirable that constructs are equally 
weighted in the clustering process (Hair and others, 1992).  
As far as the clustering algorithms are concerned, there are two basic types of algorithms: 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical. The first type of algorithms progresses through a series 
of steps that build a tree-structure by adding individual variables. The resulting cluster 
have a hierarchy of variables which are classified in relation to their relative importance. 
Usually this approach is used in organizational deductive studies. Non hierarchical 
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algorithms partite a dataset into a pre-specified number of clusters. All the algorithms of 
this kind function in essentially the same way (Hair and others, 1992): after the center 
points of clusters (so called “centroid”) along the determined attributes/variables are 
selected, each observation is assigned to the group with the nearest centroid. Through a 
process of recalculation of centroids and multiple passes through a dataset, to allow 
observations to change cluster membership based on their distance from the recomputed 
centroids - a “stable” and optimal solution is found (Andemberg, 1973). This method is 
more consistent with an exploratory and inductive approach to cluster analysis. The 
number of clusters can be considered a strictly related methodological issue; in 
hierarchical methods, the number is visually determined as resulting from the process of 
aggregation of the variables; researchers look for natural clusters of the data that are 
indicated by relatively dense “branches”; notably, this method heavily relies on 
interpretation (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). 
 
 
4.5.4. The Neglect Use of Cluster Analysis by the Body of Literature Taken into 
Consideration 
As far as the two frameworks taken into consideration by the present study are concerned, 
the contingent approach literature used cluster analysis mainly to group organizations with 
similar characteristics (size, industry, number of employees, etc.), in order then to link 
them with various strategies and levels of financial performance/profit (Hatten and others, 
1978). More in general, contingency studies used cluster analysis to make simpler the 
inherent complexity of panelling organizations, identifying groups of organizations with 
similar characteristics (see for example Harrigan, 1985). These studies then often use 
statistical regression (usually linear regression method) to link the “independent” variables 
commonly found in the identified groups to dependent variables such as performance, 
accountability, etc. Contingency theory has traditionally heavily relied on statistical 
methods even in such cases where the research was based on a relatively limited number 
of observations, sometimes ranging from 40 to 60 (for a review see Ginsberg, 
Venkatraman, 1982). It is rare to find other empirical approaches within the theory, such as 
case study or cluster analysis, because the theory seeks for general relations between 
organizational characteristics and performances. This approach has often been criticised, 
on the base of the fact that, in order to have significant results, a larger panel of 
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organizations should be displayed. On this point, statistical significance is “a constricted, 
technical, narrow term which simply tell us the probability to find in the universe what we 
found in our sample (…) it is a minor quality of statistical certainty directly dependent on 
the size of “n”” (Cohen, Hyman, 1979).  
When it comes to legitimacy theory, the majority of the studies trying to demonstrate the 
link between industry, visibility or environmental performances on one side and social and 
environmental disclosure on the other side, generally uses panels of organizations limited 
by the sector, the size or the appurtenance to a certain country (i.e. Patten, 1992, 1992; 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght 2000). Here quantitative correlation methods are the only 
used. Here the critics to the limited size of the panels compared with the linear and causal 
relations found by the researchers echoes the ones moved to the contingency theory 
(Deegan, 2002). Some legitimacy theory studies used different approaches, based on 
case studies or decision-making simulation exercises; in particular, some studies focused 
on the linkages between media attention and social and environmental disclosure by an 
eminent company (see the well known case of BHP, first analyzed by Guthrie and Parker, 
1989, and then studied by Deegan, Rankin and Tobin, 2002) analysing the response to a 
greater external attention (measured under the Media Agenda Theory) by companies, 
through SER. Other studies examined through interviews the managerial perceptions of 
the social claims/threats and the importance attributed to SER.  
A final body of literature tests through simulation the impacts of disclosure policies on 
decision making (i.e. investment choices). The large majority of these studies adopts a 
strictly quantitative method (linear relations between managerial perceptions, media 
attention, environmental performance and level of disclosure) and a strict minority of 
studies adopt qualitative case studies methodologies (i.e. Chenhall, Morris, 1986). 
Summarizing the review done up to this point, we can state that cluster analysis has been 
used mainly by contingent theorists as a way to group and treat organizations with similar 
organizational characteristics; it has been largely neglected as a tool to interpret dataset 
and more in particular to link independent and dependent variables, almost always 
preferred to quantitative methods –linear regression- even in the case of limited panels of 
observations. Cluster analysis is nonetheless presented in this present study not in 
opposition but in combination with a regression method, as a way to overcome the lack of 
solidity of quantitative measures of statistical significance when reporting to a very limited 
series of observations.  
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4.5.3 Use of Cluster Analysis in the Present Work and Methodological 
Clarifications 
The present research adopt a fairly simple cluster analysis methodology. Our purpose is to 
find some relevant linkages between single independent variables -the factors identified 
both by the contingency and the legitimacy theory as potentially influencing accountability 
patterns of organizations- and the independent variables –the level of financial and non 
financial accountability shown by the UN system organizations in their annual performance 
reports-. 
To this extent, we clusered UN organizations according to their financial and non-financial 
accountability levels (our dependent variables) and the relative value of the selected 
organizational, corporate governance and external influencing factors (our independent 
variables).  
For the present study the cluster analysis is an alternative to the exclusive use of 
regression analysis; we chose the cluster approach because the limited number of 
observations offered by the selected target population, composed by twenty one 
organizations, would have made non reliable any significant statistical relation. 
Nonetheless, in our analysis we chose to display the linear and polynomial correlation as 
quantitative proxy of the trends identified with the cluster analysis. In other terms, we used 
the cluster analysis as qualitative method, heavily based on the researchers’ impression, 
to capture some relevant groups of organizations underlying relevant variables in 
influencing accountability and we used the regression method to complement and validate 
the general trends identified with the cluster analysis, without expecting that this method 
gives back a solid answer to the relation between independent and dependent variables.  
 
Describing the cluster analysis approach in the present work in methodological terms, we 
can first of all state that we used a deductive approach to the identification of the variables, 
given by the hypotheses elaborated drawing from the previous contingency and legitimacy 
literature. The difference between hierarchical and non hierarchical methods does not 
come into consideration in the present study, since we did not construct clusters based on 
an aggregation of multiple independent variables, but we did consider the distribution of 
independent variables one by one in relation to the dependent variables. The number of 
clusters has not been predetermined, but we explicitly looked at the formation of two or 
more clusters underlying some significant trends.  
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We looked first at the linear-monotone relations, for which we also used the graphical 
support of the line of linear regression; in most of the cases where we identified relevant 
clusters we found two-group formations (values of independent/dependent variables – 
“low/low” and “high/high”; “low/high” and “high/low”) or three groups formations. We also 
looked at the non-linear and non-monotone relations which could be found in the 
distributions, for which we used the graphical support of the polynomial regression 
function. In this case, we usually identified three main clusters (U-shapes or inverse U-
shapes) 
In practical terms, for each analyzed relation, the number of clusters and elements 
belonging to them have been determined by the researchers trough a qualitative process 
and with the help of the linear and polynomial regression analysis. The central points have 
been consequently determined as rounded average of the elements belonging to each 
cluster. To make more complete our qualitative analysis, we underlined the number of 
elements falling out the determined clusterization. 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Discussion 
 
In the present chapter we show and discuss the result of our study. We first analyze the 
distribution of the factors potentially affecting IOs accountability as drawn by the existing 
literature (chapter 3) and operationalized in the reality of the IOs (chapter 4) through basic 
descriptive statistic. We then show the existing trends between the different factors at the 
study, noting that even for the UN system organizations’ population, some of them are 
significantly related in line with the previous findings of the international private sector 
literature (i.e. size and complexity). 
We then propose the results of the test of hypotheses identified in chapter 3 through 
qualitative cluster analysis: we will recognize hypotheses which in light of the data turned 
out to be relevant as opposed to hypotheses which seem not relevant and within the first 
category we will underline if a positive or negative impact of the factor on the financial/non 
financial accountability level of the organization exists, in line or contrarily to the relation 
we hypothesized in chapter 3. We will analyse the significant trends emerging from the 
data and we will comment them in light of the alternative or complementary explanations 
given by the legitimacy and contingency theories applied to the reality of the UN system.  
 
 
5.1.  Statistical Analysis of the Factors Affecting UN System organizations’ 
accountability 
Table 5.1 in Appendix 3 shows the complete records of the identified factors potentially 
influencing UN system organizations’ accountability for the entire population taken into 
consideration; Table 5.2 summarizes some descriptive statistics related to the influencing 
factors and the two main accountability dimensions presented in Section 4.  
As the reader can notice, the statistics were produced for the factors with continuum 
values; no statistics were produced for the two variables with discrete and binomial 
distribution (“Presence of warranty mechanisms for members not represented in executive 
organs”, “Type of performed activity” and “Accessibility for members to executive organs”).  
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Table 5.2. Distribution of the Factors Affecting UN System Organizations’ Accountability. Descriptive Atatistics. 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Variance Strd Error
Financial accountability 7% 83% 43% 46% 5,66% 23,78%
Non-financial accountability 34% 77% 57% 56% 1,11% 10,55%
Resource availability (USD/biennium) 48.519.643 5.949.800.000 1.278.318.284 452.183.694 2.833.482.279.280.910.000           1.683.295.066          
Complexity (n.employees) 81 4.426 1.415 857 1.953.258 1.398                        
Decentralisation (% resources spent on the field) 0% 89,50% 46,04% 51,80% 9,43% 30,70%
Financial performance - capacity to attract monetary 
resources (% variation extrabudgetary resources 
current/previous biennium)
-27,14% 96,86% 25,27% 17,52% 9,69% 31,13%
Financial performance - capacity to use monetary 
resources available (% financial resource spent on total 
assessed contributions)
69,79% 100,07% 92,63% 94,83% 0,63% 7,96%
Concentration of ownership (% contributions first ten 
state donors on total available resources) 24,25% 86,77% 65,15% 69,49% 3,07% 17,51%
Presence of warranty mechanism for members not 
represented in executive organs (presence of plenary 
representative organs)
… … … … … …
Accessibility for members to executive organs (n. years 
for executive organs' membership rotation)                    1                             4 … … … …
Organisation's bargaining power (1- % of standing 
arrears on total available financial resources current 
biennium)
55,50% 99,78% 87,93% 90,67% 1,12% 10,58%
Environment uncertainty (weighted percentage of 
decentralized resources) 0% 73,50% 43,09% 54,12% 6,96% 26,37%
Market dependence (% extrabudgetary resources on 
total financial resources available) 3,80% 100,00% 60,01% 69,90% 10,41% 32,26%
Type of performed activity (regulative/financial 
transferring) … … … … … …  
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Table 5.3 shows the correlations between all the considered variables, both “independent” 
(accountability influencing factors) and “dependent” ones (level of financial and non 
financial accountability). Our two dependent variables, in particular, are strongly correlated 
(positive correlation coefficient 0,48), supporting the idea that they represent two 
dimensions of the same overall accountability construct. They have though different 
distributions, where financial accountability varies more widely across organizations and 
has a lower average value than non financial accountability (variance: 5,66% against 
1,11%; standard error: 23,78% and 10,55%; arithmetic mean: 43% and 57%; cfr. Table 
5.2). 
Looking only at Table 5.3, we can notice that financial accountability is on average more 
correlated with the independent variables than non financial accountability, allowing the 
interpretation that this item is more sensitive to the identified influencing factors.  
In terms of correlation between independent and dependent variables, we find a strong 
direct relation between both types of accountability and environmental uncertainty (0,58 
with financial accountability and 0,35 with non-financial accountability). We also find a 
strong positive correlation between financial accountability and both size and complexity 
(respectively 0,39 and 0,40), which in turn are strictly relates, with a coefficient of 0,70. A 
significant relation could be find as well between this kind of accountability and 
decentralization (0,37), which seems to grow in parallel with size and complexity (0,55 and 
0,34). A similar path could be noticed for the environmental uncertainty.  
Another interesting point is that the capacity to attract monetary resources seems to follow 
a trend opposed to the financial accountability, probably because of the tendency of 
organizations heavily relying on voluntary contributions to shift the accountability modules 
to the extra-budgetary donors.  
As far as the relation among the independent variables is concerned, there is undoubtedly 
a strong positive link between size, complexity, decentralization and environmental 
uncertainty. All these variables are negatively related with the capacity to use available 
resources. This trend is explainable in the light of the fact that larger, more complex and 
decentralized organizations experience more severe difficulties in foreseeing their future 
expenditures and realizing all the programmes. Possible reasons behind this could be that: 
i) it is easier to programme for small organizations (and budgets) and ii) costs generated at 
the headquarters have a strong fixed and administrative nature (personnel, materials and 
services, travels, etc.) and their amount is highly foreseeable, while costs generated on the 
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field are linked to the operational activities and hence experience the greatest variations in 
relation to the budgeted resources.  
More in general, it seems that the capacity to use financial resources is negatively linked 
with quite a lot of independent factors: the exposure to the environment and to the market, 
the concentration of ownership and the organization’s bargaining power. Decentralised, 
larger and more complex organizations experience as well a greater exposure to the 
environment uncertainty and market dependence. Decentralization, being strongly 
positively related with market dependence, shows that a larger differentiation in the 
funding sources is associated with higher power delegation. 
As a final interesting trend to notice, the most concentrated organizations in terms of 
ownership are the most exposed to the market, to the environment and are, in turn, the 
biggest, more complex and decentralized. 
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Table 5.3. Correlation Between the Factors Affecting IOs Accountability. The UN System Case. 
Financial 
accountability
Non-financial 
accountability
Resource 
availability Complexity Decentralisation
Financial 
performance - 
capacity to 
attract 
monetary 
resources
Financial 
performance - 
capacity to use 
monetary 
resources 
available
Concentration of 
ownership
Organisation's 
bargaining 
power
Environment 
uncertainty 
Financial accountability 1
Non-financial accountability 0,481681571 1
Resource availability 0,392891985 -0,052662584 1
Complexity
0,402443353 -0,031720036 0,705215695 1
Decentralisation 0,344732462 0,298081103 0,53656037 0,324289356 1
Financial performance - capacity 
to attract monetary resources
-0,281422834 -0,189796417 0,158329023 -0,060814044 0,084712132 1
Financial performance - capacity 
to use monetary resources 
available
-0,135765257 -0,066298627 -0,126788371 0,100112484 -0,681185638 0,099490265 1
Concentration of ownership 0,16771292 0,157131909 0,326869131 0,230767508 0,373931486 -0,227900732 -0,363471907 1
Organisation's bargaining power 0,04712197 0,117607773 0,235065581 0,213626124 0,308188348 0,151890624 -0,308314714 -0,148216235 1
Environment uncertainty 0,584746842 0,349950109 0,386546341 0,415871535 0,602292658 0,010036819 -0,369822208 0,486407708 -0,201817577 1
Market dependence 0,242204045 -0,131497089 0,408087918 0,32707866 0,606346205 0,108397036 -0,362609828 0,365888541 0,081559684 0,562836266
Coeff. Correlation 0,25-0,40
0,401-0,6
0,601-1  
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5.2. Factors affecting International Organizations’ accountability: results of the 
test on the UN population 
As explained in chapter 4 about research methods, given the relatively small number of 
UN system organizations, the main hypotheses have been tested through a qualitative 
cluster analysis, while the regression analysis has been added as useful reference to the 
general trends found. In fact, a pure statistical analysis would not have returned reliable 
and solid results. In the following pages, emergent relationships are discussed and 
possible explanations for evidences are given. Organisational, corporate governance and 
external factor hypotheses are reviewed in order, making explicit the theoretical approach 
they refer to. The relevant graphics and statistical data (covariance, linear or polynomial 
correlation coefficient) recalled in the following paragraphs are reported in Appendix 4. 
The results regarding the relevance and the support/confutation of the envisaged relations 
are summarized and graphically presented in Table 5.4.  
Before proceeding with the analysis of the results, we would like to recall an important 
methodological element from Chapter 4: the number of clusters and of elements belonging 
to them were determined by the researchers trough a qualitative process and with the help 
of the linear and polynomial regression analysis; the central points have been determined 
as rounded average of the elements belonging to each cluster. We underlined the number 
of elements falling out the determined clusterization.  
 
5.2.1 Organizational Factors 
The first hypothesis done regarding organizational factors concerned the positive relation 
between organizations’ dimension and accountability level. Hypothesis 1a stated that 
resource availability encourages a higher financial disclosure. Looking at the results of the 
analysis, reported in Appendix 4, we can notice two main clusters of organizations: the 
first one characterized by a total budget of about 850 million USD/biennium or smaller and 
a level of financial accountability equal or below 45% (small budget/low accountability). 
This is a very concentrated cluster. The second cluster is more spread out and includes 
organizations with budget higher than 850 million USD and financial accountability higher 
than 45% (larger budget/higher accountability). Just two organizations remains out of 
these two clusters. In light of these data, the relation stated in hypothesis 1.a., could be 
considered relevant and verified in the panel of the UN system organizations. 
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Consistently with the contingency approach, a possible explanation for this trend is that a 
lager resource availability is related to larger administrative services and units able to 
better support the organizations in the realization of detailed disclosure.  
 
Hypothesis 1b, linking resource availability to non-financial accountability, turns out to be 
not relevant. This result is confirmed when considering the aspects strictly linked to ethical 
and social responsibility issues. Legitimacy theory predicts that bigger and more visible 
organizations are more exposed to and impacted by societal concerns and media opinion, 
are more sensitive towards SER and consequently adopt more aggressive legitimizing 
strategies. On the contrary, drawing by the results it seems that dimension –and visibility- 
itself is not sufficient to determine reactive legitimizing strategies by the organizations 
concretizing in a higher amount of non financial information.  
 
Hypothesis 1c, linking the level of organizational complexity to non-financial 
accountability seems to be not relevant. On the other side, a different relationship emerged 
from the data: growing levels of complexity seem to be accompanied with greater financial 
accountability.  
This unpredicted result appears to be consistent with the contingency framework: the more 
complex the organisation, in fact, the greater the need for disclosing financial information. 
In particular, looking at the graph we can identify two main cluster of organizations, with 
central points in the following n. employees/financial accountability values: 1000/20% 
(low/low) and 3800/70% (high/high). 
Consistently with the theory, more complex organizations have more articulated 
stakeholder relations (externally) and more complicated financial management issues 
(internally), which lead to a greater financial disclosure in the performance reporting.  
 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b concerns the degree of decentralization.  
Hypothesis 2a states that organizations with a higher degree of decentralisation (i.e. 
which manage a higher amount of resources at their headquarters than they do at their 
field offices) have a greater financial accountability. Results seem consistent with 
hypothesis 2a and contingency theory. Looking at the data, in fact, we could draw two 
clusters with their centroids in the points with the following level of 
decentralisation/financial accountability values: 20%/20% (low/low) and 70%/50% 
(high/high). Just one observation falls out this clusterization.  
 146
This evidence shows that the UN system organizations react and adapt to a greater 
complexity in terms of decentralised operations on the field with a greater amount of 
financial information. This evidence shows also that UN organizations are successful in 
overcoming the inherent difficulty related to the headquarter-field financial information flow, 
determined by the high level of geographical dispersion of the organizations (the most 
decentralised ones, like UNDP, have offices in nearly one hundred countries with a variety 
of different operations).  
Hypothesis 2b seems not to provide relevant relationships: looking at the data there is a 
general trend consistent with the hypothesis –correlation coefficient is 0,30 and high level 
of accountability are shown by organizations with medium or high level of decentralization- 
but we cannot identify any relevant group of clusters which endorses the hypothesis 2b. In 
other words, it seems that the more sensitive accountability dimension to organizational 
decentralization is financial accountability, while no clear trends can be identified for the 
non financial accountability.  
 
Hypothesis three was articulated in four points, since we operationalized the financial 
performance of UN organizations in two different ways: i) as organizational capacity to 
attract financial resources (hypothesis 3a, 3b); ii) as organizational capacity to use the 
available financial resources (hypothesis 3c, 3d). In both cases, contingency theory 
predicts a positive relation between the financial performances and financial/non financial 
disclosure, while legitimacy theory predicts that bad performers minimize financial 
accountability and focus on non financial accountability.  
Hypothesis 3a. Drawing from our data, organizations with higher financial performance -
intended as capacity to attract resources from the donors- generally appear to be less 
financially accountable. Correlation coefficient of -0,28 seems to confirm this relation. On 
the other hand, it is slightly difficult to identify relevant clusters in this case; to the high end 
of the financial performance axis there is a pretty defined group of eight organizations 
which delimitates a first cluster and seems to indicate that good performers actually have a 
lower level of accountability; on the contrary, the group of organizations at the low end of 
the financial performance axis appears to be non homogeneous and highly differentiated 
in terms of accountability. For example, six organizations of this group are characterized 
by medium/high level of accountability. In conclusion, given our research method and the 
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consideration we developed, we do not have enough evidence to declare that hypothesis 
3a is relevant.  
Hypothesis 3b seems to be not relevant in light of the available data; organizations’ level 
of accountability varies widely at different level of capacity to attract monetary resources 
and does not seem possible to identify precise clusters of organizations. Correlation 
coefficient is slightly negative, -0,18.  
Looking at the data, a further significant trend emerged: the bad financial performers have 
a higher level of overall accountability than the good performers. It is possible in fact 
isolate two main clusters of organizations, with central points at the following “% variance 
extra-budgetary resources current-previous biennium” / “overall accountability” values: 
+5%/55% (low/high) and 65%/40% (high/low). This trend, even if not contemplated as 
hypothesis, confutes the contingency framework and is consistent with the evidences we 
found for hypothesis 3a. Correlation coefficient of -0,33 confirms the interpretation of the 
data done through cluster analysis.  
A possible explanation, grounded on legitimacy theory, of the fact that organizations with 
high capacity to attract voluntary resources experience low level of overall accountability is 
that they tend to focus on the accountability towards the member states and the non states 
donors, as opposed to the disclosure addressed to the general public. This phenomenon 
could be partially alleviated for the non financial accountability because organizations may 
try to contrast bad past performance in attracting financial resources by “justifying” the 
organization’s behaviours and results and by explaining in more details how resources 
have been spent. 
Hypotheses 3c and 3d, developed within the contingency framework, seem not to be 
relevant, since it is not possible to identify any significant cluster of organizations 
supporting or confuting them.  
 
5.2.2 Corporate Governance Factors 
Turning to corporate governance factors, there are not clear evidences that a higher 
concentration of ownership is related to a lower level of financial or non-financial 
accountability -hypotheses 4a and 4b-. For both accountability dimensions is not possible 
to identify significant clusters of organizations, since high levels of accountability are 
shown by both organizations with high and low concentration of contributions.  
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Our data suggests that competing forces could be in action determining mixed results. On 
one side, the presence of big donors implies a shift towards a more private-like model of 
performance reporting, in spite of the traditional public sector reporting completeness. This 
could determine a negative tension towards a public type of accountability by the most 
concentrated organizations. On the other side, having already noticed that the 
concentration of contributions goes in parallel with the dimension of the organizations and 
having noted the positive association between size and accountability, dimension could 
represent a positive tension towards accountability.  
 
Hypothesis 4c, drawn by the legitimacy approach, directly relates the bargaining power 
with the level of financial accountability; it seems not to be entirely supported but shows 
nonetheless interesting trends. In particular, looking at the graph it is possible to identify a 
“U shape” in the positioning of the organizations; three main clusters can be identified with 
the central points in the following “1-% consolidated arrears on total available resources” / 
“financial accountability” values: 60%/20% (low/low); 90%/60% (medium/high), 98%/35% 
(high/low). We can notice that the distribution of the variable “bargaining power” is strongly 
screwed towards its high end (in fact we consider 60% as a “low” value for the variable). In 
qualitative terms, we noticed that up to a certain point (bargaining power about 90%) the 
bigger is the organization’s bargaining power, the greater is the financial disclosure. This 
could be consistent with the long term legitimizing view by which more powerful 
organizations try to legitimize their operate and maintain their power through disclosure. 
On the high end though -bargaining power higher than 90%-, the relation is inverted and 
the most powerful organizations tend to disclosure less information than the others. This is 
consistent with a general contingency explanation: the more powerful is the organisation, 
in fact, the less it is obliged to disclose its figures and money allocation to stakeholders. 
 
Finally, hypothesis 4d does not provide relevant results. The distribution of the 
organizations along the identified variables does not allow to determine a clear 
clusterization.  
 
Similarly, data do not highlight significant relations between both the presence of interest 
warranty mechanisms and the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies on one 
side and the financial/non financial accountability on the other (hypothesis 5a, 5b, 5c and 
5d). 
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The fact that the presence of interest warranty mechanism has been operationalized as 
binomial variable (presence/absence of plenary representative organs) could have 
influenced negatively this result, and further research could consider other ways to 
measure this factor. A possible alternative is to identify an index whose value is 
determined by several conditions –presence of plenary representative organs, presence of 
appellate bodies, appointment rules and functioning of auditing and control bodies, etc.-. 
This could allow a more comprehensive measurement of the factor and probably more 
significant results in the relation with the accountability level. 
The same reasoning could be done for the accessibility of stakeholders to executive 
bodies; rotation is just one of the measures of this factor, while a more comprehensive 
index taking into consideration for example the proportion of executive bodies’ (EB) 
members on the totality of member states or the principle of geo-political representation 
applied in the identification of the EB members could be beneficial for the significance of 
the analysis.  
 
 
5.2.3 External Factors 
As far as external factors are concerned, results highlight interesting and relevant trends in 
relation to the identified hypotheses.  
In particular, hypothesis 6a seems to be supported: increasing levels of financial 
accountability are associated to higher environmental uncertainty. Looking at the data 
shown by the relative graph in appendix we can identify two relevant clusters with their 
central points in the following values of the “weighted % of resources spent on the field” / 
“financial accountability”: 2%/20% (low/low) and 60%/50% (high/high). 
This result is consistent with the contingent approach, according to which an unpredictable 
environment is likely to foster organizations’ financial reporting in order to allow external 
stakeholders to better evaluate trends and activities. In particular, this result is consistent 
with the idea that a fair and transparent identification of the resources allocated in the most 
uncertain (and hence in need) areas of the world is considered a powerful communication 
element towards the main donors and publics.  
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Results regarding hypothesis 6b show as a whole a similar trend to hypothesis 6a; 
increasing levels of non financial accountability are associated to higher environmental 
uncertainty, even if values of non-financial accountability are more levelled and close 
values can be found at very different environmental conditions. Looking at the data shown 
by the relative graph in appendix we can identify two relevant clusters with their central 
points in the following values of the “weighted % of resources spent on the field”/non 
financial accountability: 2%/50% (low/low) and 60%/60% (high/high). Five organizations 
fall out the identified clusterization. 
The minor intensity of the relation found for non financial accountability when compared to 
the financial one could be partly due to the fact that in most uncertain areas of operation, 
media and other actors’ attention is also higher. Stakeholders can then gather contextual 
and non- financial information from many other different sources.      
 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b, although not supported, remark a possible inverted U-shaped 
relationship between market dependence and respectively financial and non-financial 
accountability. High levels of market dependency, in fact, are associated with high 
accountability up to a threshold. At about 48% of market dependency, an increase of the 
variable seems to be associated with a decrease in the financial and non-financial 
information disclosed. This might suggest that when organizations become too much 
dependent on the market (about 50%) their accountability starts decreasing in favour of 
alternative forms of reporting and disclosure addressed to single and groups of donors of 
voluntary resources. Specifically, three main clusters emerge: i) organizations mainly 
financed by ordinary sources and thus showing a relatively low level of (financial and non 
financial) accountability; ii) organizations mainly financed by extra-budgetary sources and 
again showing mid or low levels of accountability; and iii) organizations gathering 
resources from different sources and dealing with a more uncertain situation and a higher 
market exposure. The latter condition tends to increase their accountability, consistently 
with a possible legitimating strategy.    
 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b state the relationship between the type of activity performed by 
different UN organizations and their relative degree of accountability. Recalling Chapter 3, 
we made hypotheses regarding organizations characterized by a prevalent regulative and 
informative nature (8a) and by a prevalent financial transferring nature (8b) as opposed to 
organizations with a prevalent implementing and project management activity. In both 
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cases, contingency theory states that the organizations with prevalent regulative/financial 
transferring nature  show higher levels of accountability. Organizations have been rated 
accordingly to a low/medium/high level of regulative and informative activity. 
Specifically, hypothesis 8a seems to be relevant but confuted; organizations sited on the 
low end of this variable show the highest values of financial accountability of the entire 
population, with an average of about 62%, while organizations on the high end show low 
financial accountability values, with an average of 25%. Just two organizations in the high 
end seem to fall out this clusterization. Organizations with a regulative nature of medium 
intensity show average accountability values. 
The negative association between regulative activities and financial accountability could be 
explained by the presence, in the regulative organizations, of a main focus on internal 
procedures and processes and a consequent lower attention to the provision of financial 
data. On the contrary, organizations performing a relatively lower amount of regulative 
activities (and having thus a different focus) could pay less attention to internal procedures 
and compliance and provide more financial information because of their difficulty to 
measure differently their actual results.  
Finally, hypothesis 8b seems to be verified. Organizations with a prevalent financial 
transferring nature show higher levels of financial accountability than organizations rated 
with a low financial transferring nature. Looking at the data, organizations on the low end 
of the independent variable show an average accountability of 16%, while organizations 
sited on the high end score on average an accountability rate of 55%. 
 
The relations resulting from the empirical analysis and discussed above are summarized in 
Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4. Resulting Effect of the Tested Variables on Organizational Performance Reporting: a 
Summary 
Variable Organizational 
factors 
Corporate 
governance factors 
External factors Hypothesis 
resources managed by the 
organization (contingency) 
+ (financial) 
 
  1a - verified 
resources managed by the 
organization (legitimacy) 
not relevant (non 
financial) 
  1b – not relevant 
organizational complexity 
(contingency) 
not relevant (non-
financial) 
+ (financial-emergent 
relation) 
 
  1c – not relevant 
emergent relation 
complexity/financial 
acc. (+) 
organizational decentralization 
(contingency) 
+ (financial) 
not relevant (non 
financial) 
  2a – verified 
2b – not relevant 
organization’s past  
performance in  
attracting financial  
resources  
(contingency) 
not relevant (financial) 
not relevant (non 
financial) 
+ (overall – emergent 
relation) 
 
  3a – not relevant 
3b – not relevant 
emergent relation 
financial 
performance/overall 
acc (+) 
organization’s past performance 
in using available financial 
resources (contingency) 
not relevant (financial) 
not relevant (non 
financial) 
  3c - not relevant 
3d – not relevant 
concentration of  
ownership  
(contingency)  
not relevant 
(financial/non financial) 
  4a – not relevant 
4b – not relevant 
organization’s bargaining power 
(legitimacy) 
 U-shape (financial) 
 
 4c – modified (U-
shape) 
4d – not relevant 
accessibility for stakeholders to 
executive bodies and decision-
making activities (contingency) 
 not relevant 
(financial/non financial) 
 5a - not relevant 
5b - not relevant 
presence of interest warranty 
mechanisms (contingency) 
 not relevant 
(financial/non financial) 
 5c - not relevant 
5d - not relevant 
 environmental uncertainty 
(contingency) 
  + (financial) 
+ (non-financial) 
6a – verified 
6b - verified 
organisation’s market 
dependence (legitimacy) 
  inverted U-shape 
(financial) 
inverted U-shape 
(non financial) 
7a - modified (inverted 
U-shape) 
7b - modified (inverted 
U-shape) 
organization’s prevailing 
regulative activity  
(contingency)   
  - (financial) 8a – confuted 
(opposite) 
organization’s prevailing financial 
transferring activity (contingency) 
  + (financial) 8b – verified 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Further Research 
 
 
The main aim of the present work has been to contribute to the existing literature on the 
factors influencing accountability in public sector organizations, taking into consideration 
the relatively unexplored field of International Intergovernmental Organizations. The 
adopted methodological perspective can be considered original in that we started from the 
assumption that contingency and legitimacy theory can be usefully considered as 
complementary rather than opposite.  
 
6.1. Conclusions: Factors Affecting UN System Organizations’ Accountability 
In the present work, we set the accountability issue within the broader context of 
managerial reforms in IOs; we identified the UN system as the suitable object of analysis; 
we developed hypothesis regarding the factors potentially influencing accountability 
drawing from the existing international literature on contingency and legitimacy 
frameworks; we operationalised these factors identifying suitable measures for the reality 
of the UN system and checked the organizations against these measures; we identified 
the suitable type of reporting for the empirical analysis and we developed a content 
analysis tool which has been used to rate financial and non financial accountability level of 
the UN organizations. 
The results of the analysis show that the features of UN organisations’ reporting are 
influenced both by the contingent nature of the organizations and the search for legitimacy.  
In fact, for each theory, some of the proposed hypotheses are supported. On the 
contingency side, financial accountability seems to be positively influenced by the size of 
the organization (this is also consistent with a legitimacy approach), by its level of 
decentralization, environmental uncertainty and by a prevailing financial transferring 
nature. Moreover, an emergent positive trend between financial disclosure and 
organizational complexity, consistent with the contingency approach but not included in the 
hypotheses, seems to be verified. Hypotheses grounded in contingency theory and 
involving non financial accountability are generally not verified, with the relevant exception 
of the positive relation with the environmental uncertainty. This confirms the overall scarce 
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attitude shown by non financial accountability to be influenced by the identified 
independent factors.  
Test of hypotheses linked to legitimacy theory produced more complicated results: in three 
cases in fact, instead of a linear and monotone relation a significant U-shape/inverted U-
shape relation appears. Legitimacy theory can help explaining at least in part these trends; 
organizations with a low and high bargaining power enjoy higher accountability -under 
legitimacy approach organizations with higher bargaining power experience higher 
accountability as a long-term strategy to maintain their power and justify their actions-, 
organizations with low or high market dependence show lower levels of both financial and 
non financial accountability than the others -under legitimacy approach organizations react 
to the market dependence with more aggressive disclosure policies to defend their 
legitimacy towards the community of voluntary donors-. 
From an overall perspective, then, it is not possible to find an exclusive explanatory 
approach but we can state that contingency factors seems predominant. On the other side, 
is true that a larger number of valid hypotheses were verified for contingency theory, but 
this is partially due to the fact that we developed a larger number of hypotheses grounded 
on this theory rather than on the legitimacy theory.  
In this sense, a first important result of our analysis is that the contingency and the 
legitimacy approaches are indeed complementary approaches rather than opposite.   
Regarding the sensitivity of accountability to the different kind of influencing factors 
identified, our study shows that external factors are the most relevant in influencing 
accountability: financial accountability is positively influenced by environmental uncertainty 
and the regulative or financial transferring nature of the organizations, while market 
dependence has a negative influence on both financial and non-financial disclosure in its 
low end and a positive influence on its high end. In particular, environmental uncertainty is 
the only variable able to influence both financial and non-financial accountability. 
Organizational factors follow: size, level of complexity and decentralization (heavily 
correlated each other) have a positive influence on financial accountability. Finally, 
contrarilty to the significant attention reserved to the corporate governance factors by the 
existing international literature, these factors turned out to be the less significant in 
determining accountability trends: stakeholder’s accessibility to executive organs and 
presence of warranty mechanisms for vested interests do not seem relevant elements, 
while organizations’ bargaining power shows an interesting U-shape trend with financial 
accountability levels. 
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Almost all the identified trends concern financial accountability. This latter seems to be 
positively affected by organization’s size, level of complexity, degree of decentralization, 
level of environmental uncertainty faced by the organization, prevalence of financial 
transferring activities as opposed to regulatory activities. On the contrary, considering the 
number of not significant or verified hypotheses, non-financial accountability seems to be 
less meaningfully affected by the proposed external, corporate governance and 
organizational factors. Nonetheless, growing levels of environmental uncertainty determine 
richer non financial disclosure and market dependence seems to be an interesting variable 
to explain external accountability as well. In fact, organizations relying almost entirely on 
either extra-budgetary or ordinary resources show a lower level of non-financial 
accountability than those relying on a more balanced mix of resources. This could be the 
result of a larger effort to be visible towards both the international community and the 
specific donors at the same time. 
Trying to link our results with the broader context of IOs reforms, we can state that 
managerial reforms and “rational” reactions to contingent internal and external factors 
seem relatively more suitable to explain variations in UN organizations’ accountability than 
factors linked to the search for legitimacy towards the main stakeholders. This evidence 
can be interpreted as a sign of the fact that UN organizations react and adapt to their 
environmental dynamics improving their accountability, rather than putting in action 
cosmetic strategies to respond to social and stakeholders’ claims. Financial accountability 
seems to be the more sensitive dimension to the identified influencing factors, among 
which the external contingencies and the organizational factors seem to play a prevalent 
role. The subsidiary role of performance reporting in terms financial disclosure can be one 
of the explanations of the wide variations among organizations; emergence of more 
homogeneous levels of non financial accountability is a positive sign for the success of the 
managerial reform. 
 
6.2. Theoretical and Managerial Implications of the Study 
Focusing on the implications of the present research, the logical framework and the results 
offered in the present paper aim to contribute to both theory and management practice.  
From a theorical perspective, we adopted both contingency and legitimacy theory and 
challenged them as possible approaches to explain variations in the level of financial and 
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non-financial accountability among UN system organizations. We showed the usefulness 
to consider them as concurrent and complementary approaches to accountability, rather 
than mutually exclusive. In practical terms, the development of hypotheses realized 
through the combination of both contingency and legitimacy approaches permitted to 
enrich the explanatory power of the single theories and test them as alternative 
explanations for the same analyzed dynamics. 
Moreover, the analysis of a context largely under-investigated such as the UN 
organisations’system can represent a firs important contribution to the enlargment of the 
managerial  and organizational studies towards the international organizations and the UN 
system in particular. A large body of political science and macroeconomics literature has 
been developed around this organizations, but the significance of the managerial reforms 
and the peculiarity of the operational nature and the public management issues make this 
context suitable for further managerial studies and researches. 
From a managerial perspective, the checklist developed for the analysis of the reporting 
contents can be a useful tool for the comprehension of the main dimensions of UN 
organisations’ accountability. This tool can be used by managers for positioning their 
organizations in relation to other UN system organizations in terms of financial, non 
financial and overall accountability, for monitoring their capacity to be accountable to their 
stakeholders and for strenghtening, rethinking or redesigning their disclosure. 
Moreover, in a UN system-wide perspective, the analysis of the differences in 
accountability levels and in the contents of organizations’ disclosure may give useful 
directions for homogeneising the disclosure on performance within the system, and 
sharing languages, contents and forms of reporting. This could be a positive contribution to 
strenghten the overall coherence of the UN system as a whole.  
 
6.3. Limitations and Further Research 
The main methodological limitation of the present study concerns the small number of 
observations taken into consideration, which in any case represents the entire target 
population of UN system organizations. The limited number of observations obliged us to 
run a mainly qualitative cluster analysis rather than a complete statistical analysis. This 
kind of analysis was used to complement and confirm the results of the cluster analysis, 
because, in the developed research settings, its exclusive use would have determined not 
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solid statistical evidences. Relying on cluster analysis we were obliged to an extensive use 
of judgment by the researchers. 
Moreover, due to the general lack of literature focused on UN organizations’ accountability, 
we had to adapt and operationalize variables found in the private and public sector 
litarature to suit the specifiities of the analyzed filed. It could be useful to review some of 
the measures we set, with particular reference to the corporate governance variables, 
which seems the most complex and articulated to capture. 
Furter research claims for the review of these measures, the refinement of the checklist 
contents to mirror the prospective evolution of the UN organizations’ performance 
reporting and the enlargment of the historical series of data used to measure the 
influencing factors in UN organizations. 
Other interesting research prospectives involve the extention of the scope of the present 
study to other aspects of organizational accountability, such as the transition to accrual 
accounting and the level of disclosure reached by organizations in their documents to 
voluntary donors, in both the budgeting and reporting phase. A successful transition to 
IPSAS is expected to have significant effects on the communication languages with 
member states and constituencies (externally) and the internal delegation processes and 
managerial approach to financial management issues (internally). The improvement of 
homogeneity and transparency in extra-budgetary activities’ documents currently 
represents the most important aspect to fairly regulate the growing internal competition 
and to strenghten consistency of the UN system. 
Finally, the present study is highly replicable. The general theoretical framework we 
adopted can be usefully extended to other international organizations’ families, such as the 
international financial institutions, the supranational organizations -i.e. EU specialized 
agencies-, the bilateral cooperation agencies. This enlargement would request an 
adaptation of the measures used to operationalize the factors potentially influencing 
accountability and of the content analysis tool.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1.2: United Nations’ Specialized Agencies 
 
FAO 
Food and Agricultural 
Organization
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
ICAO 
International Civil Aviation 
Association
ILO
International Labour 
Organization
IMO 
International Maritime 
Organization
ITU 
International 
Telecommunication Union
WMO
World Meteorological 
Organization
WIPO
World Intellectual Property 
Organization
Agricultural Industry 
Improvement and 
Alimentation
1957 Wien (Austria) Atomic Energy Use 
Regolamentation and 
Control
1945 Rome (Italy)
1947 Montreal 
(Canada)
Avial Transportation 
Development, Regulation 
and Control
1946 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Employees Rights and 
Labour regolations
1948 London (UK) Maritime Transportation 
Regolation
1947 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Communication 
Development
1947 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Climat Change and 
Environmental Research
1974 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Intellectual Propery 
Title Constitution Headquarter Sector
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Table 1.2 United Nations’ Specialized Agencies (continues) 
 
Title Constitution Headquarter Sector
WHO
World Health Organization
UNESCO
UN Education, Science and 
Culture Organization
UNIDO 
UN Industrial Development 
Organization 
UPU 
Universal Postal Union
1946 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Healthcare promotion
1945 Paris (France) Science, Education and 
Culture Promotion
1986 Wien (Austria) Industrial Development in 
Developing Countries
1948 Bern 
(Svitzerland)
Collaboration among 
National Postal Services 
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Table 1.3 United Nations’ Programmes and Funds 
 
Title Constitution Headquarter Sector
IFAD 
International Fund for 
Agricultural Development
UNCTAD
UN Conference on Trade and 
Development
UNDP 
UN Development Programme
UNEP 
UN Environmental 
Programme
UNFPA
UN Population Fund
UNHCR 
UN office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF 
UN Children's Fund
UNITAR 
UN Training and Research 
Institute
WFP 
World Food Programme
1964 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Commerce and 
Development Research
1965 New York 
(U.S.A.)
Technical Cooperation
1950 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Refugees and Displaced 
Protection
1972 Nairobi 
(Kenia)
Environmental Protecion 
and Research
1972 New York 
(U.S.A.)
Technical Cooperation in 
Demographic Policies
1974 Rome (Italy) Agricultural Industry 
Improvement and 
Alimentation
1965 New York 
(U.S.A.)
Education and Technical 
Training for Developing 
Countries
1946 New York 
(U.S.A.)
Childhood Protection
1977 Rome (Italy) Agricultural Industry 
Improvement and 
Alimentation
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Table 1.4 Other International Organizations 
 
ADB
Asian Development Bank
AfDB
African Development Bank
APEC
American-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation
ASEAN
Association of the SouthEast 
Asian Pacific
AU
African Union
CDB
Caribbean Development Bank
EBRD
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development
ICCO
International Cocoa 
Organization
ICO
International Coffee 
Organization
Title Constitution Headquarter Sector
1966 Manila 
(Philippines)
Regional Development
1964 Abidjan (Avory 
Coasr)
Regional Development
1989 Singapore Economic and Social 
Development
1967 Bangkok 
(Thailand)
Economic and Social 
Development
1999 Addis Abeba 
(Etiopia)
Economic and Social 
Development
1970 Barbados Economic and Social 
Development
1991 London (UK) Economic and Social 
Development in East 
Europe Countries
1973 London (UK) Industrial Development
1963 London (UK) Industrial Development
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Table 1.4 Other International Organizations (continues) 
Title Constitution Headquarter Sector 
ICRC 
International Committee 
of Red Cross 
1863 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Industrial 
Development 
IDB 
Interamerican 
Development Bank 
1959 Washington 
(U.S.A.) 
Regional Development 
MENADB 
Middle East and North 
African Development 
Bank 
1995 Cairo (Egypt) Regional Development 
MERCOSUR 1991 Montevideo 
(Uruguay) 
Economic and Social 
Development 
NAFTA Ottawa 
(Canada) 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
1992 
Mexico City 
(Mexico)  
Washington 
(U.S.A.) 
Free Trade Promotion 
NATO 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
1949 Bruxelles 
(Belgium) 
Regional Security and 
Defence 
OECD 
Organization for the 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
1961 Paris 
(France) 
Economic Research 
OSCE 
Organization for  
Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
1975 Wien 
(Austria) 
Regional Security and 
Defence 
IMF 
International Monetary 
Fund 
1947 Washington 
(U.S.A.)  
Regulation of the 
Intetrnational 
Monetary/Financial 
System 
WTO 
Workd Trade 
Organization 
1995 Geneva 
(Switzerland)
Free Trade Promotion 
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Appendix 2 – UN Performance Accountability Checklist – Results 
Table 4.2 – Results of the Test on Performance Accountability of UN system Organizations’ Reports 
UNDP UNEP FAO WHO UNESCO UNICEF ILO UNFPA UNHCR WFP
Introductory information 0,58 0,84 0,58 0,58 0,75 0,58 0,75 0,58 0,75 0,67
a Executive summary 0,67 0,67 1 1 1 0,33 1 0,33 1 0,67        
b Context and external dynamics 0,33 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
c Strategic framework recall 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
d Governing structure and organisational structure 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,33 1 0 0 0 0 1
e Others
Indicators and analysis on cash and obligation based data 0,64 0,09 0,73 0,82 0,82 0,73 0,09 0,58 0,58 0,48
a Resource analysis: percentage of regular, extrabudget and other fund in trust resources 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
b Expenditure by major programmes  (compulsory/authoritative level) 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
c Expenditure by programs/subprogrammes/line of actions (non compulsory/authoritative level) 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
d Expenditure by "goals"/"strategic objects" (output/outcome) 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,33
Level of decentralisation on expenditure
f.1 total resources 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
f.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0,33 0,33 0
Regionalisation of expenditure
g.1 total resurces 0 0 1 1 1 1 0,33 1 1 1
g.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 0 0 0 1 1 1 0,33 1 1 1
Budgeted resources versus expenditure
h.1 total resurces 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
h.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 0 0 1 1 1 0.33 0 0 0 0
i Others
Financial performance information 0,67 0,17 0,78 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,17 0,33 0,33 0,67
a Arrears by country 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
b Level of reserves and other funds 1 0 1 1 1 0 0,33 0 0 0
c Entity/percentage of general and administrative costs on total costs (or on total core programme costs) 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
d Entity/percentage of indirect costs (programme support services) on total costs 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
e Comparisons with previous biennium
e.1 resource amount by source of funding 1 1 1 0 0 0 0,33 0 0 1
e.2 0 0 0,67 0 0 0 0,33 0 0 1
f. Others
4 Indicators and analysis on statistical and emphyrical data concerning intervention areas 0 0,33 0 0,33 0 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,33
Input indicators 0,25 0 0,67 0 1 0,66667 0 0,3333 0 0
a Posts by grade and location 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
b Post decentralisation/by Region 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
c Post by position (technical, professional, administrative, managerial) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
d Others 1
Expenditure for main modality of action/instrument (coordination, advice, studies and analyses, 
training, operational activities, etc.)
resource distribution (by country/region; by programme/subprogramme/line of action;by modality 
Sections/Items
f
g
h
1
2
3
5
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UNDP UNEP FAO WHO UNESCO UNICEF ILO UNFPA UNHCR WFP
Activities: disclosure level 0,72 0,45 0,72 0,50 0,72 0,33 0,61 0,56 0,67 0,78
Kinds of activities
a.1 own activities
a.1.1 financed by ordinary resources 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,67 1 0,66 1 0,67 0,67
a.1.2 0,33 0 0,33 0 0,67 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,67 0,67
a.2 interagency cooperations 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Description level  (essential, analytical, very analytical)
b.1 activity detail by programme/subprogramme/line of action/modality of action 0,67 1 1 0,33 1 0,33 1 1 0,67 0,33
b.2 activity detail by regional/country office 1 0,67 1 0,33 1 0,33 1 0,33 1 1
c Number/percentage of country/regional office reporting under the document (all/majority/minority) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
d Others
Goals indicators (result-oriented report) 0,61 0,47 0,72 0,67 0,61 0,80 0,60 0,40 0,27 0,47
Kinds of indicators
Identification of measurable goals and disclosure about their realisation level
a.1 financial data (level of expenses) 0 0 0,33 0 0 0,33 0 0 0 0
non financial data
a.2.1 activities or projetcs realised 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,67 1
a.2.2 number of beneficiaries/users/partners 0,33 1 0 0,33 0,33 0,33 1 0,67 0,67 1
a.2.3 statistical data concerning intervention areas/phenomena (outcomes) 0,33 0,33 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0,67
a.2.4 efficiency level (expenditure for activity/projects) 0,33 0 1 1 0,67 0,67 0 0 0 0,67
a.2.5 other data 1 1 1 1
a.2 Identification and disclosure about strictly qualitative goals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,67 0
b Link between organisational goals and millennium development goals 1 0,67 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Goals: level of detail/structure
c.1 organisation as a whole 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c.2 main core programmes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c.3 sub-programmes/line of activities 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
c.4 regional/country office 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0,33 0,67 1
c.5 support services 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
c.6 main modality of action 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
c.7 others
Goals/performances reached: comments and analysis
d.1 qualitative analysis (lesson learned, limitations, weakness, impediments) 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
d.2 quantitative analysis (financial or non financial; es. link with budgeted performance level/goals) 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
e comparison with previous biennium indicator 0,67 0 0,67 0 0,67 0 0 0 0 0
Ethical issues and policies 0,75 0,7 1 0,4 0,7 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,3 0,3
a Gender policies (posts male/female; female by grade) 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
b Languages and terminology ( used in publications, meetings, etc.) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
c Information accessibility to stakeholder 1 1 1 0,33 1 0,67 0,33 1 0 0
d Others 1
4,217 3,00024 5,20 3,84 5,07 4,83 3,66 3,78 3,26 3,73
8 53% 38% 65% 48% 63% 60% 46% 47% 41% 47%
average value of issues classified as "financial" or "non financial"
financial accountability 61,1% 11,1% 72,2% 66,7% 66,7% 63,1% 11,0% 46,3% 46,3% 51,8%
non financial accountability 60,9% 44,8% 64,6% 55,5% 69,7% 57,3% 64,6% 53,1% 46,9% 46,9%
average value of chcklist sections
accountability index
b
financed by extra-ordinary resources (extrabudget res., funds in trust, etc.)
a.1
a.2
8
c
a
a 
7
d
Sections/Items
6
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IFAD UNRWA ITC ITU ICAO UN-Habitat WTO UPU
Introductory information 1,00 0,92 1,00 0,50 1,00 0,58 1,00 0,67
a Executive summary 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
b Context and external dynamics 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c Strategic framework recall 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
d Governing structure and organisational structure 1 0,67 1 0 1 0,33 1 0,67
e Others
Indicators and analysis on cash and obligation based data 0,82 0,82 0,11 0,33 0,09 0,18 0,09 0,27
a Resource analysis: percentage of regular, extrabudget and other fund in trust resources 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b Expenditure by major programmes  (compulsory/authoritative level) 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
c Expenditure by programs/subprogrammes/line of actions (non compulsory/authoritative level) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
d Expenditure by "goals"/"strategic objects" (output/outcome) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Level of decentralisation on expenditure
f.1 total resources 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
f.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 1 1 0 0,33 0 0 0 0
Regionalisation of expenditure
g.1 total resurces 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
g.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Budgeted resources versus expenditure
h.1 total resurces 1 1 0 0,33 0 0 0 1
h.2 by programme/line of action/modality of action/goal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
i Others 0,33
Financial performance information 0,83 0,61 0,00 0,33 0,33 0,50 0,50 0,39
a Arrears by country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,33
b Level of reserves and other funds 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
c Entity/percentage of general and administrative costs on total costs (or on total core programme costs) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
d Entity/percentage of indirect costs (programme support services) on total costs 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
e Comparisons with previous biennium
e.1 resource amount by source of funding 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
e.2 1 0,67 0 1 1 0 0 0
f. Others
4 Indicators and analysis on statistical and emphyrical data concerning intervention areas 0 0,33 1 0,67 1 0,33 0,67 0,67
Input indicators 0,33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0,33
a Posts by grade and location 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
b Post decentralisation/by Region 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
c Post by position (technical, professional, administrative, managerial) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
d Others
Expenditure for main modality of action/instrument (coordination, advice, studies and analyses, 
training, operational activities, etc.)
resource distribution (by country/region; by programme/subprogramme/line of action;by modality 
Sections/Items
f
g
h
1
2
3
5
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IFAD UNRWA ITC ITU ICAO UN-Habitat WTO UPU
Activities: disclosure level 0,83 0,83 0,67 0,73 0,67 0,72 1,00 0,73
Kinds of activities
a.1 own activities
a.1.1 financed by ordinary resources 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a.1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a.2 interagency cooperations 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Description level  (essential, analytical, very analytical)
b.1 activity detail by programme/subprogramme/line of action/modality of action 1 1 1 0,33 0,67 0,67 1 0,67
b.2 activity detail by regional/country office 1 1 1 0,33 0,67 0,67 1 0
c Number/percentage of country/regional office reporting under the document (all/majority/minority) 0 0 0 0
d Others
Goals indicators (result-oriented report) 0,73 0,53 0,60 0,53 0,60 0,47 0,80 0,53
Kinds of indicators
Identification of measurable goals and disclosure about their realisation level
a.1 financial data (level of expenses) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
non financial data
a.2.1 activities or projetcs realised 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a.2.2 number of beneficiaries/users/partners 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
a.2.3 statistical data concerning intervention areas/phenomena (outcomes) 0,67 0,67 1 0,67 1 0 1 0,67
a.2.4 efficiency level (expenditure for activity/projects) 0 0 0 0 0 0,33 0 0
a.2.5 other data
a.2 Identification and disclosure about strictly qualitative goals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b Link between organisational goals and millennium development goals 1 1 0,33 0 0 1 0
Goals: level of detail/structure
c.1 organisation as a whole 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c.2 main core programmes 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
c.3 sub-programmes/line of activities 1 1 1 0 0 0,33 1 0,33
c.4 regional/country office 0,33 0,33 0 0 0 0,33 0 0
c.5 support services 0 0,33 1 0 0 0 0 0
c.6 main modality of action 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
c.7 others
Goals/performances reached: comments and analysis
d.1 qualitative analysis (lesson learned, limitations, weakness, impediments) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
d.2 quantitative analysis (financial or non financial; es. link with budgeted performance level/goals) 0,33 0,33 1 0,33 0 0 0 0
e comparison with previous biennium indicator 0 0 0 1 0 0,33 0 0
Ethical issues and policies 0,0 0,7 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,666667 0,3
a Gender policies (posts male/female; female by grade) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
b Languages and terminology ( used in publications, meetings, etc.) 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
c Information accessibility to stakeholder 0 0.33 0 0 1 1 1 1
d Others
4,55 5,718987 3,71 3,102061 4,025576 3,116984848 4,727576 3,93
8 57% 71% 46% 39% 50% 39% 59% 49%
average value of issues classified as "financial" or "non financial"
financial accountability 83,3% 70,4% 7,0% 31,4% 16,7% 27,8% 27,8% 29,6%
non financial accountability 60,4% 77,1% 66,7% 46,2% 46,3% 54,1% 64,4% 48,4%
average value of chcklist sections
accountability index
b
financed by extra-ordinary resources (extrabudget res., funds in trust, etc.)
a.1
a.2
8
c
a
a 
7
d
Sections/Items
6
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Appendix 3 –Factors Potentially Affecting UN Accountabilities - Measurement 
Table 5.1 – Organizational, Corporate Governance and Environmental Factors Influencing Accountability: Measurement for UN Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACTOR MEASURES UNDP UNEP FAO WHO UNESCO UNICEF ILO UNFPA
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
Resource availability total resources available (regular+extrabudgetary resources) 5.949.800.000 424.387.000 1.271.713.000 2.758.452.000 1.073.700.000 3.126.764.000 791.165.000 770.720.000
Complexity total number of employees 4200 860 3450 3686 2145 7 224 1336 972
Decentralisation
percentage of monetary resources spent away 
from the headquarters (in regional and country 
offices)
75,8% 33% 38% 56% 47,6% 83,0% 38,30% 88,32%
Financial performance - capacity to 
attract monetary resources
variation in % extrabudgetary resources 
current/previous biennium 18% 13% 6% 17,7% 31,8% 34,4% 46,9% -5,8%
Financial performance - capacity to use 
monetary resources available
percentage of obligated resources on total 
available resources 90,4% 91,1% 90,5% 97,0% 95,2% 92,5% 99,97% 69,79%
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS
Concentration of contributions percentage of resources offered by the first ten contributors on total ordinary resources 86% 77,8% 78% 68,5% 74,67% 45,91% 74,04% 64,78%
presence of warranty mechanism for 
members not represented in executive 
organs
presence of direct aznd plenary representative 
organs (Assemblies/Conferences) 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Accessibility for members to executive 
organs
n. years taken for membership rotation in 
executive organs 1 2 3 4 3 3 1
Organisation's bargaining power percentage of resources collected on total resources pledged and promised by contributors 99% 99,4% 91,0% 83,4% 83,4% 91,4% 82,4% 99,8%
EXTERNAL FACTORS
Environment uncertainty "weighted" uncertainty of decentralisated resources (domain: 0-100) 69% 3,4% 55% 54% 72% 54% 58,60% 55,25%
Market dependence percentage of extrabudgetary resources on total resources available 76,3% 95,9% 48,7% 69,9% 48,2% 96,2% 31,3% 94,2%
External visibility number of member states attending the organisation 190 58 187 192 190 174 149 171
regulative and informative nature 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 1
financial transferring nature 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 3
Type of performed activity
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FACTOR MEASURES UNHCR WFP UNIDO UNDCP/ UNODC IFAD UNRWA ITC ITU ICAO
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
Resource availability total resources available (regular+extrabudgetary resources) 1.839.490.000 5.654.690.590 383.653.900 152.064.835 410.007.000 848.033.528 88.854.000 207.041.050 411.923.000
Complexity total number of employees 4426 2287 698 500 295 125 208 931 854
Decentralisation
percentage of monetary resources spent away 
from the headquarters (in regional and country 
offices)
58,6% 87,3% 56,4% 59,1% 2,2% 89,50% 48,62% 9,60% 29,51%
Financial performance - capacity to 
attract monetary resources
variation in % extrabudgetary resources 
current/previous biennium 17,52% 82,64% 14,8% 14,3% 3,2% -27,1% 65,8% 38,3% -8,2%
Financial performance - capacity to use 
monetary resources available
percentage of obligated resources on total 
available resources 100% 87% 98,3% 90,7% 100,1% 78,47% 96,60% 94,50% 91.47%
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS
Concentration of contributions percentage of resources offered by the first ten contributors on total ordinary resources 55,39% 83,14% 40,18% 85,94% 77,39% 86,77% 53,81% 24,25% 69,49%
presence of warranty mechanism for 
members not represented in executive 
organs
presence of direct aznd plenary representative 
organs (Assemblies/Conferences) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Accessibility for members to executive 
organs
n. years taken for membership rotation in 
executive organs 1 1 2 4 0 2 4 3
Organisation's bargaining power percentage of resources collected on total resources pledged and promised by contributors 98,5% 91% 90,34% 55,50% 77% 94,1% 98.66% 85,3% 74,7%
EXTERNAL FACTORS
Environment uncertainty "weighted" uncertainty of decentralisated resources (domain: 0-100) 58.07% 59,09% 54,25% 65,76% 63% 50% 0% 24,90% 50,80%
Market dependence percentage of extrabudgetary resources on total resources available 94,8% 100,0% 60,6% 89,0% 82,9% 24,9% 46,6% 14,5% 72,6%
External visibility number of member states attending the organisation 145 36 171 126 163 58 233 191 189
regulative and informative nature 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 3
financial transferring nature 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 1
Type of performed activity
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Appendix 4 - Test of Hypotheses – Graphs and Relevant Statistics  
 
Hp1  a) The higher the resource availability for an organization, the higher the amount of financial information disclosed in the report 
(contingency theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp1  b) The higher the resource availability for an organization, the higher the amount of non financial information disclosed in the 
report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance 157294844 
correlation 0,39 
covariance -4,79 
correlation -0,031 
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Hp1  c) the higher the level of organizational complexity in terms of number of people 
employed by the organization, the higher the amount of non-financial information 
disclosed in the report (contingency theory) 
 
covariance -3,28 
correlation -0,031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relation1.d) the higher the level of organizational complexity in terms of number of people 
employed by the organization, the higher the amount of financial information 
disclosed in the report (emergent from the data but consistent with the 
contingency approach) 
 
 
covariance 183,39 
correlation 0,40 
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Hp2  a) The higher the organizational level of decentralization, the higher the amount of 
financial information disclosed in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp2 b) The higher the organizational level of decentralization, the higher the amount of 
non-financial information disclosed in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
covariance 0,0094 
correlation 0,30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance 0,024 
correlation 0,34 
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Hp3  a) The better the organization’s past performance in attracting financial resources, 
the higher the amount of financial information in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp3 b) The better the organization’s past performance in attracting financial resources, 
the higher the overall accountability level of the report (contingency theory) 
 
covarianza -0,0062 
correlazione -0,19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance -0,021 
correlation -0,28 
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Relation3.bis) The better the organization’s past performance in attracting financial 
resources, the higher the amount of information disclosed in the report (emergent 
from the data but consistent with the contingency approach) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp3 c) The better the organization’s past performance in using financial resources, the 
higher the amount of financial information in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
covariance -0,0022 
correlation -0,13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance -0,012 
correlation -0,33 
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Hp3 d) The better the organization’s past performance in using financial resources, the 
higher the amount of non-financial information in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
covariance -0,00047 
correlation -0,06 
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Hp4 a) The higher the concentration of ownership, the lower the amount of financial 
information disclosed in the report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
covariance 0,006986
correlation 0,16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp4 b) The higher the concentration of ownership, the lower the amount of non-financial 
information disclosed in the report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
covariance 0,002903
correlation 0,15 
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Hp4 c) The higher the organization’s bargaining power towards its stakeholders, the 
higher the amount of financial information disclosed in the report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
covariance 0,001185
lin. correlation 0,047 
pol. correlation 0,05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp4 d) The higher the organization’s bargaining power towards its stakeholders, the 
higher the amount of non-financial information disclosed in the report.  (legitimacy 
theory) 
 
 
covariance 0,001312
correlation 0,11 
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Hp5  a) The higher the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies and decision-
making activities, the higher the amount of financial information disclosed in the 
report. (contingency theory) 
 
covariance -0,036 
correlation -0,11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp5  b) The higher the accessibility for stakeholders to executive bodies and decision-
making activities, the higher the amount of non-financial information disclosed in the 
report. (contingency theory) 
 
covariance 0,032 
correlation 0,22 
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Hp5  c) The presence of interest warranty mechanisms for stakeholder not represented in 
executive organs enhances the amount of financial information disclosed in the 
report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp5  d) The presence of interest warranty mechanisms for stakeholder not represented 
in executive organs enhances the amount of non-financial information disclosed in 
the report. (contingency theory) 
 
covariance 0,00053 
correlation 0,010 
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Hp6  a) The higher the environmental uncertainty, the higher the amount of financial 
information disclosed in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
covariance 0,036 
lin correlation 0,58 
pol. Correlation 0,36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp6  b) The higher the environmental uncertainty, the higher the amount of non-financial 
information disclosed in the report. (contingency theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance 0,0086 
lin. correlation 0,31 
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Hp7  a) The higher the organization’s market dependence, the higher the amount of 
financial information disclosed in the report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
covariance 0,019 
pol. correlation 0,15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp7  b) The higher the organization’s market dependence, the higher the amount of non-
financial information disclosed in the report. (legitimacy theory) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
covariance -0,0044 
pol. correlation 0,44 
R2 = 0,1599
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Hp8 a) When an organization performs a prevailing regulative activity, this is associated 
with a prevailing amount of financial information displayed in the report. 
(contingency theory) 
 
covariance -0,14 
lin correlation -0,64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hp8 b) When an organization performs a prevailing financial transferring activity, this is 
associated with a prevailing amount of financial information displayed in the report. 
(contingency theory) 
 
covariance 0,11 
lin. correlation 0,48 
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